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ABSTRACT 
PRECARIOUS PIPES: GOVERNANCE, INFORMALITY, AND 
THE POLITICS OF ACCESS IN KARACHI 
SEPTEMBER 2020 
USMAAN MASOOD FAROOQUI 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF EDINGURGH 
M.Sc., LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Professor Regine A. Spector 
This dissertation looks beyond narratives of the chaotic urban south to examine the 
politics of city planning and everyday service access in Pakistan. I draw on a case study of 
Karachi, what is perceived to be one of the world’s most unruly cities, to demonstrate 
how planning enables the representation of political order. Drawing on field research in 
the city, I also explore the materialities, subjectivities, and histories of service access that 
remain uncaptured by official discourses in this context. 
I begin by tracing how Karachi’s postcolonial planners have, for decades, described 
the rapidly expanding city as an object of correction. While early master plans sought to 
order and control Karachi’s physical form, planners in the 1980s, in line with a shift in 
global development ideas, sought to normalize already existing urban spaces through 
legalization and bulk service provision. Advocating “slum improvement” policies, 
planners thus presented the so-called informal city as integral to urban renewal, 




formal and informal city and presented this dichotomy as crucial to Karachi’s urban 
order.  
In contemporary Karachi, however, such representations of the city in artifacts such 
as maps and government ordinances, elide and exist alongside ongoing processes of 
urban stasis and transformation. I therefore subsequently turn attention to everyday 
politics in the city by exploring how Karachi’s residents access a service crucial for 
survival: water. Drawing on seven months of field research, I show how the urban poor 
and low-level state officials navigate and reproduce the city’s fickle hydrologies. I also 
focus on how Karachi’s residents utilize the formalized domain of electoral politics as an 
avenue for material claim making in order to counteract their everyday precarity.  
Karachi’s postcolonial past and millennial present shows how political authority 
discursively (re)constitutes itself out of the very materialities that challenge its existence. 
The everyday coping mechanisms and temporally-bound electoral politics of access and 
belonging, in turn, demonstrates how the urban poor manage urban uncertainty while 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLATION 
All interviews and fieldnotes have been translated and transcribed by me. In certain 
cases, I have included both the English translation of a word or phrase as well as the 
Urdu words spelled out in English letters in parenthesis. This is done in instances where 
an English translation cannot convey the full meaning of a phrase without additional 
context and explanation. Certain Urdu words used by state institutions in official 
discourses have been translated once and then italicized and repeated in the text without 








The architecture profession thought not so long ago that it knew how to design 
cities and that its obligation was to design cities and to teach how to design cities. 
At the same time, we are surrounded by cities that you would call unpleasant. 
Nobody can design cities anymore; or rather the cities that people know how to 
design are completely different from the cities that architecture considers 
legitimate and organised. So, whether we want to or not, we are basically 
confronted with a phenomenal amount of evidence of the redundancy and even 
the absurdity of our profession. It's a really deeply tragic situation. 
 
- Rem Koolhaas, 20171 
 
Today, the world is in a state of crisis brought on by urbanization. The United Nations’ 
(2019) World Urbanization Prospectus estimates, for instance, that 55% of the world’s 
population currently lives in cities. This figure is expected to rise to nearly 69% by the 
year 2050 with the Global South bearing the brunt of future urban growth. For notable 
urbanists like the architect Rem Koolhaas, the contemporary moment reveals the hubris 
in any attempt to plan growing cities. Indeed, as urbanization continues at an exponential 
rate, planners, particularly in the so-called developing world, are faced with the seemingly 
impossible task of ordering vast tracks of urban sprawl that have emerged in the space of 
a few short decades. That national, regional, and local governments struggle to provide 
affordable housing, reduce poverty, and develop infrastructures for essential services 
suggests the sheer pace of urban growth has outstripped even the possibility of planning 
in the Global South.  
In contrast to such narratives of the chaotic city, this dissertation draws on a case 
study of Karachi, Pakistan, to explore the rationalities and power-laden effects of urban 
                                                 




planning practices.2 Once described as the “City of Lights” due to its vibrant culture, 
contemporary Karachi is a snarl of congested streets, so-called slum settlements, and 
patchy access to basic urban services. According to The Economist’s 2018 Global Livability 
Index Karachi is one of the world’s ten least livable cities. This, according to the report, 
is due to a lack of formal housing and unreliable access to water, sanitation, and 
transport. For instance, a 2016 United States Institute of Peace report claims that in 
“2012 an estimated 55 percent of [Karachi’s] population were living in unplanned or only 
partially planned areas” (USIPS, 2016: 9). Civil society actors and urban activists, in turn, 
see this as evidence of a politicized and failed planning process (see Hasan, 2000; Hasan 
et al., 2013; Sayeed et al., 2016). 
But technocrats, military dictators, and elected governments have consistently sought 
to plan Karachi as one of the world’s premier metropolitan areas. Since the 
independence of Pakistan in 1947, a variety of detailed master plans have successively 
aimed to “modernize” the city, develop it as an economic powerhouse, or transform it 
into a “world-class” urban area. In this dissertation, I turn attention away from the 
implementation of these urban plans to instead explore the rationalities undergirding 
their conception. I argue that while planning initiatives in Karachi have certainly failed to 
shape the city’s streets, housing societies, business districts, and service infrastructures as 
“legitimate and organized” (in Rem Koolhaas’ words), they have nevertheless enabled a 
novel claim about the existent of order. Indeed, faced with waves of unplanned 
migration, Karachi’s governors have long described the city’s ad-hoc housing settlements 
as disordered and chaotic. But, rather than seeking to eliminate or otherwise overcome 
this perceived disorder, city planners have both reproduced narrative of urban ad-
                                                 
2 I draw here on a long tradition of critical scholarship both within planning theory (Beauregard, 
1986, 2015; Flyvbjerg; 1996; Roy, 2009; Yiftachel, 1998) and the social sciences in general 
(Ferguson, 1994; Foucault, 1991; Scott, 1998) which see “technical” practices – such as 
development, measurement, and standardization – as depoliticized manifestations of power 




hocism, unregulated social and political relationships, and societal illegibility, as well as 
describe these forms of urbanism as integral to the work of everyday governance.  
At the same time, this dissertation also shows how the narratives of planners are 
hopelessly out of step with the lived urban materialities, subjectivities, and histories of 
urban communities. In turning ethnographic attention to everyday water access in 
Karachi, this dissertation thus also explores the disjuncture between representations of 
Pakistan’s largest city and the messiness of everyday life therein.3 It does so not to 
demonstrate that things are always more complicated than official discourses suggest, but 
to shed light on the banal and, indeed, spectacular actions and discourses through which 
Karachi is made, remade, and contested.  
 
The Ideal City: Governmentality, Legibility, and Formalization  
What is the process through which societies, cities, and social groups come to be ruled? 
In his now seminal lectures at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault (1991, 2010) 
described “governmentality” as a technique of governance emerging in 18th century 
France in which rule was rationalized. Central to Foucault’s thesis was a new 
understanding of power whereby, rather than being exercised in direct, often violent 
interventions by a sovereign, power was dispersed throughout society by various 
technologies of control. Foucault argued that this “art of government” was based on an 
increasing reliance on enumerative techniques such as cartography, population censuses, 
statistics, and the creation of social categories as diverse as economic growth and 
madness. Such technologies enabled rule precisely because they became dispersed in the 
everyday operation of society, expanding the traditional sphere of government to include 
people’s subjectivities, habits, and beliefs. As power created subjects who governed 
                                                 
3 For an enlightening, ethnographic overview of how residents living at Karachi’s peripheries 




themselves and were willing to be governed by others, it enabled the work of 
government through indirect, diffuse means. For Foucault, the culmination of this 
process of shaping individual conduct in desirable ways was rule becoming 
“governmentalized… elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under 
the auspices of, state institutions” (Foucault, 1982b: 793, emphasis added).  
Foucault’s unique understanding of power has since been developed and extended to 
describe the relationship between rationality, urban planning, and rule.4 For instance, 
James Scott (1998: 3) has argued that a central problem to solve in matters of governance 
is societal illegibility, and that modern states therefore seek to rule by “standardizing and 
rationalizing… a social hieroglyph.” The legible city, a crucial component of state 
strength, operates at the level of both simplified state-society relations, wherein the state 
views its population through readable technologies such as maps, population registers, 
and standardized units of measurement, as well as simplified physical space (Ibid: 24). 
For the latter, Scott notes how during 19th and 20th urban planning the “straight line, 
the right angle, and the imposition of international building standards were all 
determined steps in the direction of simplification” (Ibid: 109). According to Scott, urban 
planners have long attempted to overcome the spatial unintelligibility of pre-modern 
cities, seeking to transform indecipherable networks of local knowledge, diverse social 
practices, and unsystematic physical space into a “simple, repetitive logic [that] will be 
easiest to administer and police” from the outside (Ibid: 55). Scott describes nineteenth 
                                                 
4 In his influential thesis on the “dark side of planning”, for instance, Bent Flyvbjerg (1996) 
explores the relationship between power, rationality, and spatial control. Though often described 
as a process of development, reform, and improvement (see Hall, 2014; Pearce, 1992), Flyvbjerg 
argues that planning is a power-laden activity which rulers use to govern, direct, and otherwise 
control their populations and territory. Moreover, as much of the scholarly work on the urban 
South shows, planning has long been a form of historical and ongoing social oppression (Sarin, 
2019). Planning might prioritize elite economic interests in land redevelopment over needs like 
housing and equitable service provision (Rajagopal, 2010; Zad, 2013), reproduce class, racial, and 
gender-based hierarchies (Frisch, 2002; Jacobs, 1996; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992; Weisman, 
1994), and in some cases create the conditions for violence and disorder (Davis, 2014).See, also, 
Lewi and Wickham (1996), Scott (1998), Watson, (2009a), and Yiftachel (1998) for critical 




century Chicago as an exemplary case where the “logic of the grid” made rule from 
“above and outside” by a faceless state apparatus possible (Ibid: 43). The grid, for 
instance, secured the state’s monopoly on violence by allowing it to locate and crush 
urban insurgencies while also making administrative tasks such as taxation, 
transportation, and public service provision simpler.5 
Where the spatial organization of cities is concerned, it is thus impossible to overstate 
the material character of urban governmentality. Creating self-governing subjects, as 
Stephen Collier (2011: 7) writes, means that rulers seek to regulate the “biological, social, 
and economic life of their subjects.” 6 Roads, water supply systems, sanitation networks, 
and communication technologies, as well as the more intangible legal, economic, and 
cultural rationalities that regulate their operation are intrinsic to the process through 
which rule becomes dispersed throughout society. Such infrastructures are essential to 
how the state infiltrates and orders society to create self-governing, legible, and 
rationalized subjects.7 A critical aspect of urban governmentality therefore lies in 
establishing what Stephen and Graham (2001) call the “modern infrastructural ideal” – 
centralized, sociomaterial systems for water, sanitation, and other services that make rule 
possible by giving cultural, economic, legal and political logics of rule a consistent 
material form.8 Historical examples regarding the consolidation of liberal rule point to 
                                                 
5 Crucially, Scott is careful to note that attempts to fully rationalize society have failed precisely 
because they ignore the host of “informal practices and improvisations” (Scott, 1998: 6) that 
define any “real, functioning social order.”   
6 Foucault himself (1986b) saw extending infrastructures for water and sanitation as critical to 
urban order in 18th century Europe in as much as this controlled outbreaks of disease and social 
revolts. For studies linking governmentality to the expansion of water and sanitation, see Bakker 
(2013), Boelens et al. (2015), Hellberg (2014), Morales et al. (2014), and Rodgers et al. (2016).  
7 For instance, Michael Mann (1984) argues that state power stems from its unique characteristics 
as a “socio-spatial organization” that is able to know and regulate a territorially defined area. 
What makes state authority unique is the capacity to infiltrate society and enforce policy through 
“infrastructural power”, or various sociomaterial organizational networks developed and 
regulated by the state itself (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008: 222). 
8 An empirically and theoretically rich scholarship demonstrates how various material and 
immaterial infrastructures create the legal, spatial, and ideological basis for state rule (see Larkin, 
2013 for an overview). Through quotidian engagements with pipes, roads, and sewerage systems 




the tacit, yet effective ways in which city planning, in as much as it entailed extending 
water, sanitation, and electricity infrastructures enabled the diffuse work of governance. 
Cities like London, Manchester, and Los Angeles – as well as colonial Calcutta – for 
instance, were made more governable through what Patrick Joyce (2003) calls the “rule 
of freedom.” Here, politicians, planners, and architects idealized the city as a place where 
the free individual, unmoored from the pre-modern trappings of feudalism, would 
engage in the unobstructed circulation of information, goods, and people. Yet, this vision 
of the liberal city is precisely what Joyce argues justified interventions in society as 
sanitation and waterworks projects sought to cultivate and, indeed, control the free urban 
dweller.9  
If modern rule is achieved by rationalizing physical space and social relations, then 
Karachi’s seemingly illegible and disorderly landscape of ad-hoc housing settlements and 
decrepit service infrastructures suggests a lack of systematized governance.10 For civil 
society activists, these areas are a symptom of ineffective planning in the face of rapid 
urbanization (Hasan, 2000; Hasan et al., 2013:19).11 Since Pakistan’s independence in 
1947, the city has faced successive waves of migration including from Muslims refugees 
in the post-partition era, rural families during industrialization policies in the 1970s, 
Afghan refugees during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, and internally displaced 
persons from Northern Pakistan during the post-9/11 War on Terror. With Karachi’s 
growth constantly outstripping plans to accommodate hopeful settlers in well-designed 
housing communities complete with urban services, there has been an exponential rise in 
what state authorities call “katchi abadis”, or areas that state officials describe as having 
                                                                                                                                            
with power and authority, and create larger (if unintended) political effects through daily 
infrastructural practices (Collier, 2011; Nucho, 2017; Von Schnitzler, 2016). 
9 For legibility beyond the context of the urban North, see Lee (2014), Nasritdinov (2016).  
10 For James Scott (1998) illegibility is a source of political autonomy. Here, however, I draw 
attention to Scott’s somewhat implicit claim that the lack of legibility and order points to a failed 
or incomplete project of rule.  
11 Karachi is not along in this regard. Urbanization and globalization has shaped the planning and 




been developed without the support of formal institutions or legally recognized non-state 
actors.12 Officials see these areas as having been developed by migrant communities 
themselves who often bribe state officials to settle on state-owned land (see Gazdar and 
Mallah, 2011 for a critique of such a dichotomy in Karachi’s context). As such, katchi 
abadis are also described as being part of Karachi’s growing “informal sector” – where 
relationships and practices that are not regulated by formal rules, codified institutional 
practices, and legal frameworks are common.13 As such, the persistent lack of 
formalization – or ordered and rationalized sociomaterial space – in Karachi’s katchi 
abadis may be seen as evidence of a lack of order and a failed planning process..14 It is 
here however, that postcolonial perspectives of state power and governance provide an 
alternate way of thinking about Karachi’s so-called informal areas.  
 
Urban Peripheries: Postcolonial Governmentality and State Power 
In her remarkable work City Requiem, Ananya Roy (2003) offers ethnographic insight into 
how rulers actively utilize extralegality to govern. In her research at Calcutta’s ever-
changing eastern fringes, Roy finds that the lack of land records and maps – a common 
occurrence in postcolonial bureaucracies – means that legibility as “a tool by which  
                                                 
12 A rich and growing body of scholarship explores how official descriptions of urban space are 
themselves political (see Ghertner, 2015). Concurrently, I do not seek to describe “katchi abadis” 
as objectively existing spaces in Karachi, but a categorization of urban space used by state 
officials to denote certain assumed characteristics of (usually low-income) housing settlements.   
13 There is a rich tradition of scholarship on informality in the social sciences (see Roy, AlSayyad, 
2004 for an overview). Here, I use this term to highlight the formal/informal dichotomy that 
reflects a preoccupation with legality/illegality amongst urban planners and civil society activists, 
especially in Karachi (see Hasan et al., 2013). For many urban scholars, such a “dichotomization” 
is itself an expression of state power (Boudreau and Davis, 2017). I do not suggest here that 
informality is not an enduring feature of cities in the urban North (see Duneier and Carter, 2001; 
Haid, 2017; Polese et al., 2016; Wacquant, 2006). Moreover, informality as a concept is inherently 
useful in that it permits otherwise difficult comparisons between the urban North and South (see 
Hilbrandt et al., 2017; Ranganthan and Balazs, 2015). Rather, I draw attention to how informality 
has largely emerged as a theoretical concept from an analysis of the urban South itself (see Roy 
and AlSayyad, 2004).    
14 I follow Boudreau and Davis (2017) use of the term “formalization” to move beyond the 




modern states supervise and articulate their territories” – is missing (Ibid: 135). For Roy, 
the absence of such official representations raises questions about how physical space is 
governed amidst competing land claims between state officials, political parties, 
developers, and rural communities (Ibid: 137). Roy finds an answer in the paradoxical 
process of “vesting” where land is controlled through the “convergence of both legality 
and extralegality in the same process” (Ibid: 161). Writes Roy:  
As a tool, vesting allows the legal intervention of the state in land transactions 
and service provision. But as an indeterminate mechanism, vesting makes 
possible the extralegal intervention of the [political] party to negotiate the 
ownership and use of land, shielding the state from public scrutiny. The party 
does what the state cannot do. It encourages land invasions, exacts electoral 
discipline, and maintains political loyalties. The state does what the party cannot 
do. It deploys its legal authority to provide infrastructure, to selectively regularize 
titles, and to evict when necessary. Vesting, then, is not simply a bureaucratic 
tactic but instead a field of constant and ceaseless negotiation of de facto and de 
jure rights, formal and informal claims. (Roy, 2003: 161). 
 
Roy’s focus on vesting inverts the Foucauldian knowledge/power nexus which critical 
studies of urban planning see as facilitating depoliticized forms of social control (see 
Flyvbjerg, 1996; Scott, 1998; Watson, 2009b; and Yiftachel, 1998). Here, the capacity to 
rule does not stem from the state’s ability to render its territory legible and hence 
intervene in its operation, but by its ability to “unmap” physical space in order to use 
legal and administrative ambiguities to its advantage (Ibid: 135). With a paucity of official 
knowledge – maps, urban plans, and legal titles – the state’s official apparatus works with 
non-state actors such as brokers, patrons, and political parties to selectively provide 
urban services, change land use provisions, or evict entire communities for development 
purposes.15  
Roy’s account of Calcutta more generally shows that the state often operates outside 
its own formally and legally circumscribed domain of action. Roy’s description of 
                                                 
15 No doubt, the state already possesses great powers of territorial control. While land fuzziness 
gives it territorial flexibility in controlling the ambiguous urban-rural periphery, in Karachi, like in 
much of the urban South, the threat of evictions exists regardless of a settlement’s planned or 




postcolonial state power thus provides an important counterbalance to Foucauldian-
inspired accounts that highlight the rationalized expansion of everyday rule (see Kalia, 
1988).16 Whereas the latter emphasizes legibility and increased formalization as a crucial 
(and often lacking) component of everyday social and political order in the urban South, 
Roy describes extralegality as a unique form of state power (see Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018: 
2142). Rather than infiltrating society through rationalized, sociomaterial infrastructures 
for water, sanitation, and other services, Roy describes how rule is achieved through 
flexible and contested constellations of the state’s formal apparatus and non-state actors 
such as political parties that together discipline and control urban populations. Indeed, 
writing in the context of India in general, Roy (2009: 81) argues that planning is not 
characterized by “technologies of visibility, counting, mapping, and enumerating”, but by 
the “relationship between the published plan and unmapped territory.” Here, the “state” 
as a continuous regime of various actors seeks to enact whatever it deems as appropriate 
urban policy. Read in this light, Karachi’s katchi abadis can be thought of as “zones of 
exception” (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2008; Ong 2007) where the banal and spectacular work 
of governance is carried out by a diverse set of actors that blur the lines between state 
and society.  
In theorizing the messiness of urban life, Roy’s work demonstrates the theoretically 
and empirically untenable dichotomies of legal/illegal; formal/informal; and 
state/nonstate that planners and a number of scholars use to make sense of postcolonial 
contexts. Nevertheless, while Roy offers an alternative to Eurocentric notions of urban 
governance (or the lack thereof), she says little about whether or how the “technologies 
of visibility, counting, mapping, and enumerating” play a role in the planning of rapidly 
                                                 
16 Studies of governmentality has long been applied to (and complicated by) the colonial context 




expanding cities.17 Yet, the importance of these practices is particularly significant given 
how city space in often described in contemporary Karachi based on a fixed set of 
categories. Looking in from its urban peripheries, the city is demarcated into areas that 
are described as either “planned” or “unplanned” (Ahmed, 2008). The former are areas 
that planners claim have been developed legally by state institutions such as the military 
or non-state actors. These areas, often based on a grid layout, are further assumed to 
exist within and function according to the laws, codified rules, and official procedures of 
the formal city. By contrast, the city’s katchi abadis, which planners see as having been 
developed through ad-hoc and sometimes illegal practices such as bribery are described 
as haphazard and disorganized according to traditional understandings of urban planning 
in which the city’s ordered form is paramount for governance (see Laquain, 2006). As 
described by one commentator, these areas are “developed by ‘land grabbers’ who 
illegally take public land and develop it for residential purposes...[providing] services, 
such as water, through informal means” the consequence of which lies in “public utilities 
[losing] their relevance in the expanding urban landscape of Karachi, with huge loss of 
potential revenues” (Anwar, 2014). And yet, while many such katchi abadis are deemed 
illegal, many others have a distinct legal status. Indeed, since the 1980s, planners have 
pursued development and improvement policies through which katchi abadis may be 
provided legal tenure and access to bulk infrastructures. In Karachi, then, amidst 
“planned”, legal and formal areas, there are also spaces that are partially planned or 
formalized in the eyes of state officials.  
What role, if any, does planning – conceived of as an effort to order and structure 
physical space and social relations – play in such a context? What implications might this 
                                                 
17 Roy’s case study of Calcutta, a city that has had only one master plan throughout its history, is 
telling in this regard. It is important to note that Roy’s later work (2009) addresses planning in the 




have for our understanding of how state power is performed and secured? How, if at all, 
does planning shape the material nature of urban politics?  
 
 
Research Arguments: Techno-Political Discourses 
For experts and technocrats, the work of urban planning is associated with achieving a 
normative good. As Oren Yiftachel (1998: 3) writes, planning “emerged out of the 
unacceptable and inhumane living conditions prevalent in the rapidly expanding 
industrial cities of the 18th and 19th centuries.” As such, planning is always directed 
toward increasing the public good. The work of creating ideal cities, however, first 
involves defining the contours of urban utopia. In the United States and Britain, for 
instance, the public good in the 18th and 19th centuries was defined as improving the 
lives of urban dwellers by creating hygienic, well-serviced cities (Burgess, 1993; Cherry, 
1988). More recently, the public good has been defined in ways such as “environmental 
justice” (Raymond et al., 2016; Wolch et al., 2014), a revitalization of the arts (Chang, 
2000; Vanolo, 2008) and urban “resilience” in the face of climate change (Ahern, 2011, 
2013; Pickett et al., 2004). For critical perspectives, however, the ability to define and 
pursue the public good is itself a political process because it invariably associates progress 
with a privileged set of assumptions, ideas, and concepts. The notable works of Bruce 
Braun (2014), James Ferguson (1994), and James Scott (1998), for instance, demonstrate 
how the seemingly apolitical, technical practices of development and urban planning are 
based on Eurocentric notions of progress that, when understood as signifying objective 
notions of advancement, reproduce power relations between technocrats and everyday 
populations (Ferguson, 1994); rulers and their subjects (Scott, 1998); and, on a broader 




Crucial to these power relations is their ability to function as empowered discourses. 
For instance, in his remarkable work Encountering Development, Arturo Escobar (2012 
[1994]) demonstrates how the technical work of development in the post 
Washingtonconsensus era functions as a discursive field. Examining how the rapidly 
decolonizing Global South was described as a subject of reform by former colonizing 
nations in the 20th century, Escobar argues that the notion of “development” is based 
on a set of assumptions about social progress that are presented as ontological givens by 
practitioners. The “problematization of poverty” (Ibid: 21) and its solution through free 
market liberalism for instance, claims Escobar, are evidence of how the discursive field 
of development both defines the problem of underdevelopment and its prescription in 
terms of a set of economic practices that themselves emerged through the historical 
experiences in the Global North. When interventions invariably fail due to their inability 
to account for the everyday lifeworlds of their development objects the discourse of 
development finds ammunition to justify ever more interventions. Thus, writes Escobar, 
development functions as an empowered discourse through which social groups, cultural 
practices, and entire countries are represented as objects of constant correction. 
Escobar’s work is significant because it shows that “techno-representations” (Ibid: 
213) of progress that are embedded in practices such as development and planning are, 
rather than mirror images of an ontological reality, inherently political discourses. In what 
follows, I therefore move away from viewing planning as a technical practice that is liable 
to fail in weak institutional contexts like Karachi. Instead, I suggest we view planning as 
an empowered discourse of development that is based on a privileged set of assumptions 
and concepts regarding urban revitalization in the Global South more generally. 
Promoted (and funded) by multilateral actors like the World Bank, such an approach to 
planning has emerged as a popular response to urbanization in cities such as Karachi, 




have come to favor post-hoc “formalization policies” that seek to extend legal 
frameworks and rules to preexisting urban spaces that state officials describe as 
unplanned or undeveloped (Durand-Lasserve. 2006; Kamete, 2013; Laquian, 1984; 
Mukhija, 2001; Smart and Smart, 2017; Varley, 2002).18 In recent years, a particularly 
widespread example of such formalization policies has been “slum improvement” 
initiatives, which planners and development practitioners argue are an inclusive and 
proven way to manage unplanned urbanization. Focusing on land titling, this approach 
provides legal and technical support to the urban poor while encouraging them to 
improve their living conditions through grassroots and community-based initiatives such 
as building drainage systems, securing potable water, and fortifying housing structures.  
Examining slum improvement as a discourse of development, I seek to shed light on 
how planners represent a megacity like Karachi through technical narratives of urban 
improvement. In Karachi, I argue that under slum improvement the work of planning 
has shifted from formalizing the city’s built form through material practices like eviction, 
to discursively reproducing and normalizing its perceived disorganization as crucial for 
urban governance. Indeed, the turn toward slum improvement has set up discursive 
bifurcation between the laws, rules, and procedures of the overarching regulatory state 
and the unregulated social structures, relationships, and practices of everyday 
communities that supposedly exist parallel to formal authority. In setting up this 
dichotomy, planners not only reproduce distinctions between what the so-called formal 
and informal city, they also present this dichotomy as a whole as crucial to governance 
tasks like everyday service provision. Focusing on how Karachi’s governors understand 
and represent the city through such dichotomies, I argue that the work of planners, in 
both producing and, indeed, normalizing the city’s “informality”, is imbricated in how 
                                                 
18 Urban and national level efforts such as regulating street hawkers and land titling have become 
a popular way to address unplanned urbanization in the Global South. See Björkman (2014), 




political authority claims its legibility of physical territory and, by extension, discursively 
performs the existent of order.19 
Yet, while representations of the ordered city rely on a neat partition between the 
formal and informal city, such a categorization of Karachi does little to reflect the messy, 
lived realities of Pakistan’s largest urban area. As much of the recent literature in urban 
studies demonstrates, dichotomies between the formal and informal city – or for that 
matter, civil and political society; the static and kinetic city; and the legal and illegal city 
respectively – are theoretically and empirically untenable when it comes to the “fluidity of 
urban life” (Anand, 2017: 68. See also, Boudreau and Davis, 2017; Björkman, 2015; 
Furlong, 2014; Ghertner, 2015; Simone, 2006; Naqvi, 2017). In Karachi, too, life is not 
characterized by a clear distinction between the regulatory state on one hand, whose role 
is limited to providing bulk services and land titles, and everyday grassroots and 
community based organizations that enact everyday development goals such as service 
provision within geographically defined islands of deregulation.20 Instead, it is 
characterized by a variety of sociomaterial practices that transcend a discursive 
dichotomy between the formal and informal city as seen by planners. One need only look 
at how a critical urban resource like water is secured to see the how the laws, official land 
use categories, and codified procedures of the regulator state exist in a symbiotic, 
                                                 
19 In using the term “discursive” here, I do not suggest that representations of rule in Karachi are 
somehow immaterial.  Rather, I refer to the modality through which order is constructed and 
evidenced. Such modalities include artifacts like maps, legal documents, and master plans, all of 
which reproduce the city’s space as an object of legibility. For instance, in her widely influential 
work Karen Barad (2003; 2007) has argued that distinctions between material and discursive 
worlds are products of Newtonian scientific work, and that scholars should turn focus to 
“material-discursive” practices to explore how  matter and meaning intertwine to reproduce the 
world in terms of Cartesian dualities.  Here, appearance is far from immaterial. Producing master 
urban plans, for instance, is an inherently material effort that requires, among other things, 
physical practices of measurement based on pre-given conceptually defined categories such as 
“legal.” These “material-discursive” practices produce artifacts like maps, in turn, represent what 
is considered “real.”   
20 I draw attention here to how order is not only a product of formalized, legalized, and state-
sanctioned conventions, but can spring from everyday practices of social groups as well (Coburn, 




overlapping relationship with the subjectivities, relationships, and material practices of 
everyday urban communities. In Karachi, there exists a disjuncture between 
representations of the bifurcated formal and informal city and the everyday rhythms of 
urban life through which many of Karachi’s residents make the work of everyday 
settlement possible. Exploring this disjuncture, I make three further claims related to 
state-society relations and popular politics as experienced in the postcolony.  
First, I demonstrate that the state as a web of power relations (Mitchell, 1991) 
reproduces itself by creating, out of the very material realities that might challenge its 
claim to order, technical categories that it presents as part of its legal and procedural 
domain. Specifically, by demonstrating how katchi abadis are constructed as a legal social 
category in their own right, I show how planners both reproduce narratives of disorderly 
and disorganized urban spaces and utilize them to present Karachi as a whole an object 
of legibility.  
Second, in contrast to critical and postcolonial scholarship that sees urban 
“informality” as a space of political insurgence and resistance (Chatterjee, 2004; Scott, 
1998), I demonstrate how a focus on the meanings associated with unregulated practices 
like patronage and water vending in Karachi shed light on how the poor understand their 
precarity. In making this argument, I do not suggest that the concept of informality 
ought then to be singularly associated with narratives of marginalization and consent to 
power (see Auyero and Swistun, 2008). Rather, I demonstrate that informality as an 
“experience near” concept (Geertz, 2001; Schaffer, 2016) affords a more holistic and 
conscientious understanding of so-called subaltern lifeworlds.  
Finally, I demonstrate the ways in which urban populations use elections as 
institutionalized – albeit brief – moments of political action. Specifically, I show how the 
ability to appropriate or make one’s own – what Simone (2006) usefully refers to as 




their demand to live as deserving citizens of the city, but put formal institutions to work 
for themselves in ways uncaptured by theories of liberal democratic politics.  
In the pages that follow, I therefore explore both how the work of urban planning 
shapes Karachi’s urban space in discursive terms, and the material realities through which 
the city is made, remade, and actively contested. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
In Ordinary Cities, Jennifer Robinson (2006: 2) makes the case that “we think about a 
world of ordinary cities.” Robinson’s argument is not that cities as diverse as Karachi, 
New York, and São Paulo be considered the same; it is quite the opposite. For Robinson, 
viewing cities as ordinary allows us to recognize and move past the western development 
bias in contemporary urban studies. Cities like Karachi are not abnormal because they do 
not conform to a Eurocentric standard of the urban. Rather, like all cities, they are 
“dynamic and diverse, if conflicted, arenas for social and economic life” (Ibid). 
Robinson’s call to normalize the very different trajectories of development both within 
and across the global north and south is a welcome intervention that requires a matching 
methodological approach.  
Logical positivism, because it treats people and their social practices as objects with 
essential features that can be compared and generalized across space and time (King et 
al., 1994), is ill suited to address the specificities of Karachi’s urbanism. I therefore adopt 
an interpretivist approach that is sensitive to the contextualized meanings individual 
ascribe to everyday social practices. Such a methodology is grounded in the 
presupposition that the world is intersubjectively created, and that knowing it requires 
interpretation; rather than hierarchically ranked study goals, understanding and explaining 




sensibility” (Schatz, 2009) is not limited to a single method or source of data. Instead, it 
extends across the board of methods used by the researcher and applies to data gathered 
from observing social practices, conducting interviews, as well as analyzing official 
documents, government reports, newspaper articles, and fieldnotes.  
My goal is therefore not to make causal claims; rather, I seek to uncover the causes – 
understood as contextual, meaning-laden clues about “why individuals respond to their 
worlds as they do” – of distinct social and political phenomenon (Schwartz-Shea, 2014: 
141, my emphasis). Moreover, while I do not aim to discover generalizable truths, I 
nevertheless see the notion of the general as significant to this research in two ways. 
First, I seek to provide sufficiently detailed descriptions regarding the goals, procedures, 
and insights of this study so that they may be “transferred” where appropriate to other 
studies (Ibid). Second, I see Karachi as a city with a unique history that is nevertheless 
participating in what Bendix and Geertz (1974) call a “general movement in history” 
(cited in Adcock, 2014: 93). As urbanization runs rampant across the world, it comes into 
contact with contextual and historical particularities. Studying such “world-making” 
projects in context thus provides an opportunity to explore how generalized historical 
movements lead to different social and political outcomes (Tsing, 2000).  
This dissertation is based on 3 years of research (2017-2020) of which seven, non-
contiguous months were spent conducting fieldwork in Karachi.21 When I first began 
researching Karachi, I was interested in exploring the relationship between urbanization 
and urban violence.22 Given its history of unplanned urbanization, institutional deadlock, 
and ethnic cleavages, policymakers and popular discourses described Karachi as a future 
site for violence over limited water resources. But Pakistan’s largest city had yet to 
                                                 
21 I visited Karachi a total of four times between this period. 
22 For instance, scholars argue that alongside patchy housing, environmental degradation, and 
unequal public service access, urbanization in the Global South created the threat of “civic” 
conflict (Beal et al., 2013). This is defined as a uniquely urban phenomenon where otherwise 
healthy civic engagement turns violent as increasing demand for limited urban resources, like 




experience notable instances of rioting, protests, and intercommunal violence despite an 
escalating water crisis. As such, I focused on studying Karachi as a “most-likely crucial 
case” for violent conflict over water (Levy, 2008: 232). My very first fieldwork trip in 
early 2017 therefore revolved around selecting a fieldsite that would provide analytical 
leverage in explaining the puzzling lack of civic conflict over water in Pakistan’s largest, 
most notoriously conflict-prone city. As a low-income, unplanned and water-stressed 
housing settlement at the city’s urbanized southwest, the settlement I call “Samandar 
Colony” was an ideal choice; it contained many of the causal drivers, such as persistent 
social cleavages and weak state institutions, that scholars of urban conflict and 
“environmental security” more generally argued led to violence (see Beall et al., 2013; 
Detges, 2017; Gleick, 2014; Homer-Dixon, 2006; Kahl, 2008). Crucially, however, the 
settlement remained free of any observable, violent conflict over water.23   
 But, as I learned about Samandar Colony’s fickle hydrologies and situated them 
within its legal, institutional, and historical context as a legalized (regularized) unplanned 
settlement, my initial puzzle gave way to broader questions about the politics of urban 
planning, rule, and everyday service access in a fragile city.24 Water, a substance that is 
“intensely political in the conventional sense: implicated in contested relationships of 
power and authority” (Bakker, 2012: 616), thus turned out to be a remarkably useful way 
to think about the two overarching questions that began to structure my research; 1) 
                                                 
23 In the following chapters, I shift attention from much of the scholarship on Karachi and 
beyond that focuses on the urban periphery (Ahmed and Sohail, 2003; Hasan, 1995; 2000; 2002; 
Nausheen, 2014; Soliman, 1996; Young and Keil, 2010 Ahmed and Sohail, 2003; Hasan, 1995; 
2000; 2002). Instead, I draw attention to settlements within postcolonial Karachi provide as a 
new empirical context in which to explore how state power is enacted and received. 
24 There is a rich, multidisciplinary scholarship that emphasizes the materiality of water in shaping 
the social world. Studies in political ecology show how water’s distinctive materiality both enable 
and produces tensions within the economic, legal, political and moral structures of societies 
(Gandy, 2004; 2014; Kaika, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; 2015). As an object crucial to everything 
biopolitical, water has for centuries enabled the project of colonial and modern rule itself 
(Gilmartin, 2015; Haines, 2015; Meehan, 2014). At the same time, as a material that leaks, flows, 
and floods, water constantly escapes the control of human designs and thus engenders new 




what, if anything, is the relationship between urban planning and rule in Karachi? And 2) 
how are everyday political economies of access and belonging received and contested by 
urban populations in the city? Initially selected as a most-likely case for a research puzzle 
about the lack of civic conflict, Samandar Colony quickly turned into an abductively 
selected site which provided learning opportunities that could address an evolving set of 
questions.25 My continued engagement with the settlement was thus a research exercise 
characterized by an “iterative-recursive fashion between what is puzzling and possible 
explanations for it” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 27). An abductive logic of 
discovery followed me beyond Karachi as well. While at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, I constructed and analyzed two datasets using Nvivo 11 that would further aide 
in answering the questions I was developing; the first, a “planning archive” consisting of 
20 official documents including city plans as well as Government of Sindh acts, 
regulations, and ordinances covering the period 1952 – 2007(see appendix A); the 
second, a “discourse archive” consisting newspaper articles over the period 2001 – 
present (N>500). Articles were collected from a variety of English language newspapers 
including Dawn, The Express Tribune, The Nation, The News, and The Herald.26  
I employed three study distinct procedures as part of my abductive logic of discovery. 
First, I used textual analysis on my planning archive. Applying an ethnographic sensibility 
to official state documents such as city plans, laws, and public ordinances, my goal was to 
explore the distinctly political work – in terms of how certain concepts and 
understandings were privileged over others in representing the city – done by these 
                                                 
25 Unlike either deduction or induction, abduction signifies a “nonlinear, path-dependent process 
of combining efforts with the ultimate objective of matching theory and reality” (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002: 556). Abduction thus recognizes that the research process is every-changing, messy, 
and subject to changes based on “serendipitous” discoveries made in real time (Rivoal and 
Salazar, 2013). 
26 I did not peruse Urdu language newspapers because my goal was to explore “official 
discourses” about Karachi. Given that English is the language used in courts, laws, and 
planning/policy documents, these newspapers were far more representative of how official 




technical texts (Schatz, 2009). I also used textual analysis on my discourse archives. 
Unlike official documents which I treated as political artifacts, I used newspapers as 
“cultural texts” (Gupta, 1995: 377) that represented how issues like planning, service 
access, and elections were spoken about in Karachi. My goal was to contextualize 
findings from my field research within these public discourses.  
Second, I conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with 75 interlocutors. Interviews 
were conducted at the neighborhood level with families and community leaders in 
Samandar Colony; the institutional level with Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 
workers and management; and finally at a technical level with retired city planners and 
civil society activists (see appendix C). More than just using interviews to gather 
information about issues such as water access, the conversational format of my 
interviews – while guided by a common set of questions (appendix B) – was aimed at 
eliciting the meanings my interlocutors assigned to their lived experiences.27 My goal was 
not to accept and thereby privilege the understandings I encountered. Rather, it was to 
construct a coherent account of how my interlocutors understood their lifeworlds. 
Finally, my interviews were not based on a sampling logic which seeks to secure a small-
n, representative slice of a given population group. Rather, they were based on a case 
study logic in which interviews were conceived of as cases in themselves (Small, 2009). 
Each interview was thus conducted with the goal of more accurately understanding a 
cohesive whole. Different actors thus provided new insights, further extrapolated older 
points of interests, or confirmed my understanding of an ongoing social process.   
Finally, I used participant observation as an overarching tool for immersion. My use 
of this method was not limited to a singular fieldsite; for instance, I did not stop 
observing Karachi when I left Samandar Colony after a day’s work. Though the 
                                                 
27 Conversational interviews, for instance, allow for a “mutually negotiated” style of interrogation 





settlement’s narrow allies and its pumping station was where I recorded the bulk of my 
observations, I continued to observe as I drove around Karachi, conducted phone calls 
with interlocutors, engaged with family members and friends, and travelled between 
Pakistan and the United States. Not all observations were directly related to my research 
questions. Nevertheless, in constantly reorienting my “line of sight” (Pachirat, 2007) 
observations garnered from different viewpoints provided a way to triangulate and 
contextualize data collected from the fieldsite. Interview transcripts and fieldnotes were 
stored in Nvivo 11 where I developed a codebook to systematically code emerging 
concepts (appendix D). 
In addition to these theoretical, ontological, and epistemological considerations, my 
methodology and research design is also a product of my identity as a “semi-indigenous 
researcher” (Shehata 2014: 211) conducting research in my hometown of Karachi. My 
social position as a native of the city both intentionally and subconsciously shaped critical 
aspects of my research such as ontological presuppositions, methods, and choice of 
fieldsite. For instance, as a native Urdu speaker who translated findings to English, I 
naturally gravitated toward an interpretivist ontology that was sensitive of how everyday 
words and phrases were uniquely expressive of cultural meanings (Schaffer, 2012; 2016). 
My position as a Pakistani male from a comfortable socioeconomic background meant 
that I had a preexisting network of contacts to secure access to Karachi’s low-income 
settlements. My choice of Samandar Colony as a fieldsite, while based on the presence of 
theoretical parameters associated with water conflict, stemmed from the fact that my 
family’s maid had lived in the settlement for decades. I deliberatively chose this fieldsite 
because it allowed me to visit people in their homes and talk to women in a socially 
conservative society, tasks that would otherwise require time – regardless of my ability to 




Of course, my identity also posed a significant epistemological challenge; I was at risk 
of considering normal what a non-indigenous researcher might consider surprising (see 
Ward et al., 2016). For instance, it was not odd to me that Karachi received water on a 
staggered supply system rather than a 24/7 one where the city’s pipes were constantly 
pressurized. Had I ignored the immediate surprise of colleagues in the United States who 
learned this information, I would most likely have overlooked a significant insight 
embedded in my fieldnotes; the politics behind changing pumping schedules as well as 
how negotiated schedules shed light on the diverse set of practices through which 
Karachi’s hydrologies were reproduced. My trips back to the United States in the fall and 
spring semesters between the period 2017-2019, during which time I collected archival 
materials, transcribed interviews, and coded fieldnotes, thus became critical to the overall 
epistemological process. These trips allowed me to keep learning about my home of 
Karachi by constantly making the city “strange” (Ybema and Kamsteeg, 2009).   
 
Chapter Overview 
I begin by contextualizing the process and examining the logic under which Karachi has 
come to be represented as ordered, structured, and systematically ruled. Chapter two thus 
explores the work of city planners who tried to curb, control, or otherwise direct the 
city’s growing space during its postcolonial trajectory. While earlier initiatives focused on 
demolishing what planners called “katcha” (impermanent) settlements, the 1970s marked 
an important turning point with planners stressing the need to legalize (with tenure) these 
areas and develop their service infrastructures.28 Karachi’s planners were by no means 
pioneers in this regard. Instead, they were following broader shifts in development 
discourses in the 1970s that emphasized “slum improvement” in an urbanizing world 
                                                 
28 Of course, legal status alone is insufficient in protecting against evictions (Hasan et al., 2013). 
The salient point, however, is that that regularized areas are “mapped” in significant ways 




(see Turner and Fischer, 1972; van Horen, 2000 for an overview). Enacted under the 
1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, the shift to legalization was not just a formalization policy 
that sought to develop rather than destroy “katcha” settlements. It was also a broader 
initiative that produced “regularized katchi abadis” as a unique category of land use where 
legalization and state support would go hand in hand with improvisation, local agency, 
and practical knowledge in the ongoing work of urban development.29 Regularized katchi 
abadis were thus evidence of how planners discursively separated the so-called formal and 
informal city while simultaneously incorporating these distinctions under a singular logic 
of urban growth management. As planners embraced this new approach, legal 
documents, regulations, and cartographic tactics became the discursive tools which 
constructed regularized katchi abadis as unique settlements that were at once legible, legal, 
and rationalized  parts of the formalized city and a space for “informal practices and 
improvisations” (Scott, 1998: 6). As such, the city’s once incoherent landscape, at least 
according to traditional understandings of urban planning, was now incorporated under a 
singular logic of order, and thus produced as legible, knowable, and governed. As chapter 
two further shows, regularization policies have proved resilient by molding to fit ever-
changing global discourses of urban redevelopment. As such, the construction of 
regularized, and indeed “non-regularized” katchi abadis in Karachi not only enables a 
novel rationality of rule in which so-called unplanned space is discursively presented as 
known and governed, it also becomes a way for political authority to construct and 
incorporate within its formal, legal domain new social categories that, at first glance, 
might seem to be at odds with the modern state.  
                                                 
29 A list of katchi abadis and their legal status in Sindh can be found at 
https://sindh.gov.pk/dpt/SKAA/status%20of%20katchi.htm. These figures are considered 
outdated by civil society actors because they do not account for the increase in unplanned 
settlements after 1985. Studies based on field surveys and elite interviews, for instance, place the 
total number of unplanned settlements eligible for “regularization” at 702 with only 376 being 




But while Karachi is certainly represented as ordered, structured, and governed in 
various artifacts, everyday life in the city is far more haphazard, uncertain, and precarious. 
The city’s residents must simultaneously navigate laws, official procedures and state 
bureaucracies on one hand, and cultural relationships like patronage, improvised material 
practices, and unregulated political economies of service access on the other. The three 
subsequent chapters thus turn ethnographic attention to the material-discursive 
exigencies of everyday life in Karachi by focusing on how residents of a settlement I call 
Samandar Colony negotiate daily access to a good essential for survival: water.  
Chapter three begins by revisiting the puzzle that initially framed the fieldwork for 
this dissertation; why is Karachi characterized by a lack of civic conflict over water 
despite the state’s failure to effectively provide this precious resource? Indeed, Samandar 
Colony is a likely-case for such water-related conflict given its regular potable water 
shortages and underlying social tensions. To explain what I call the settlement’s 
continuing “hydraulic order”, this chapter explores the settlement’s development history 
shedding light on the multiple overlaps between the formal regulatory state – its rules, 
laws, and representatives – and the relational forms of access and belonging like 
friendship and kinship that have always been part of Samandar Colony’s social fabric. 
Such overlaps are particularly apparent in the fickle and uncertain relationships, practices, 
and procedures through which water is accessed in Hindu Para – an old part of the 
settlement. In such circumstances, small-scale water vending has emerged as the most 
common and reliable method of access. But, while theories of market-based orders in 
development discourse celebrate small-scale vending practices as necessary, residents of 
Hindu Para bemoan the extreme social and financial burdens of having to purchase 
water daily. How, then, does water vending persist without instances of rioting, protests, 
and intercommunal conflict? The second half of this chapter answers this question by 




and everyday resistance – that Hindu Para’s residents purposively adopt to produce a 
livable environment.  
Chapter four zooms out of Samandar Colony to focus on water access at the level of 
bulk supply. This level of analysis turns attention to the material and social infrastructures 
through which the settlement’s water supplies – thousands of gallons weekly – are 
counted, secured, and distributed to distinct “pumping zones” in a staggered supply 
system. In particular, chapter four focuses on Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 
(KWSB) “machine operators” who work at Samandar Colony’s sole pumping station 
amidst considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty stems from various sources; machine 
operators must not only contend with failed motors, misadjusted valves, and errant 
pumping schedules, they must also navigate the demands of a turn-based (“wāri”) 
distribution system in which local leaders constantly seek to secure water for their 
respective “pumping zones.” This chapter proceeds to describe how everyday knowledge 
about Samandar Colony’s water levels and pumping schedules becomes crucial for access 
in these circumstances. Yet, as machine operators produce and circulate such alternate 
knowledge, they also perform the role of “neutral” state officials. These neutral 
performances play out in how machine operators set up a distinction between their own, 
technical work of dealing with water board schedules, setting valve positions, and 
maintaining pumping motors on one hand, and others’ political (“siyasi”) work of 
allocating bulk water supplies for different parts of the settlement on the other. Chapter 
four shows how, in staying clear of the latter, KWSB machine operators – though 
integral to ensuring the flow of water – are also implicated in reproducing Samandar 
Colony’s wider hydraulic uncertainty. 
Chapters three and four collectively shed light on the daily conventions and meanings 
through which Karachi’s precarious hydrologies are made and remade. These everyday 




and the sociomaterial arrangements through which life in the city is made possible on the 
other. In shedding light on this urban bricolage, chapters three and four demonstrate 
how “informality” – often associated with bottom-up agency and the subversion of 
power relations (Appadurai, 2002; De Soto, 2000; Scott, 1998) – is rather evidence of 
how the urban poor understand and cope with their own precarity without necessarily 
challenging the status quo through their everyday actions.  
The final empirical chapter returns attention to Samandar Colony’s residents amidst 
Pakistan’s 2018 general elections. This chapter is split in two halves; the first explores 
elections as temporal, institutionalized instances of political action where Karachi’s urban 
poor engage in negotiation and contestation – however briefly – to demand better urban 
services, jobs, and security. As I argue, such demands are not evidence of vote buying, 
but of how Samandar Colony’s residents stake their claim to live in the city as decent 
citizens. The second half of this chapter focuses on the fortunes of one political party in 
particular during the 2018 general elections: the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). 
Asking why the TLP carved out a significant electorate even as it campaigned on nothing 
more than a vague notion of religious governance captured in the phrase “Khatm-e-
Nubuwat” or “Finality of the Holy Prophet”, I argue that support for the party is not, as 
popular and scholarly accounts suggest, evidence of a pious urban population voting its 
preferences in Karachi’s fundamentally altered, post-2016 electoral landscape. Instead, it 
is evidence of how Samandar Colony’s residents actively appropriated the TLP’s 
discourses to rearticulate demands for everyday urban services, jobs, and security. In 
demonstrating these arguments, chapter five sheds light on the meaningful ways in which 
Karachi’s urban populations put formal institutions to work for themselves – both by 
directly negotiating exchanges of votes for particularistic benefits and by indirectly 
articulating their demands for these services – in ways that are not captured by liberal 




This dissertation does not take a normative position on planning itself as a technical 
practice. While managing and directing cities certainly has a “dark side” (Flyvbjerg, 1996) 
in that it has the potential to spatialize class, racial, and gendered logics as well as enact 
mass social control, such practices are also capable of creating what my interlocutors 
called “sunwai” – a hearing and accounting of claims and desires. During my time in 
Karachi, residents of Samandar Colony argued that well-organized systems for water 
access, sanitation, housing, and other services, when overseen by responsible state 
officials would make it possible to live less precarious lives – a minimal yet strongly held 
desire that many families expressed. For those who stand to benefit from it, planning is 
thus understood as a powerful force for social and economic justice. In setting out these 
two very different sides of the same coin, Precarious Pipes seeks to show that planning 
should not simply be rejected as a project that, despite its failures, facilitates the 
expansion of hegemonic rule (Scott, 2000). Instead, in a rapidly urbanizing world, 
planning might also serve as an arena for social and political equalization. The potential 
for such equalization, though certainly entailed in social groups actively taking part in 
various development projects ostensibly meant to benefit them, is also apparent in how 
planning provides a common language for such groups to understand and hence grapple 







“FORECOURT OF THE NATION” 
Resettlement, Regularization, and Rule 
I don’t even think people in the local government department of Sindh know 
what is going on [right now]. First, ad-hocism used to be like this: “There is 400 
million gallons of water available. Some sahib [lord/sir] has come to Clifton, so 
send 100 million gallons there to avoid mayhem. It’s hot!” That was ad-hocism. 
Now, ad-hocism is such that the laws, the rules – everything – is amended, 
molded, bent on a daily basis to suit one set of requirements or the other set of 
desires.  
– Former city government official30 
 
For retired state officials, civil society activists, and urban planners, Karachi is the 
prototypical failed city. I wasn’t surprised, then, when a former high-ranking city 
government official I interviewed in 2017 described Karachi as “ungovernable.” This 
assessment was based on comparing present Karachi to an earlier time where urban 
governance was characterized by a reliable system of elitism. As the official implied, 
whereas before the rules of the game were relatively well-known, Pakistan’s largest city 
was now a Gordian knot of competing political and economic interests that had little 
regard for the rule of law. As if to further explain the difference between an acceptable 
past and an unscrupulous present, the official lamented that “before, at least it was 
possible to tell the difference between good and bad.” Yet, it wasn’t the official’s 
description of and distinction between a previous, vestige of colonial governance and a 
current situation of political corruption that intrigued me. Instead, it was his description 
of Karachi as always somehow being governed through improvised or makeshift efforts. 
                                                 




The official’s use of the word “ad-hocism” in this respect was a powerful descriptor of 
Karachi’s postcolonial history as well as its millennial present because it pointed to the 
perpetual failure of top-down city planning. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Karachi land owning agencies (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007). 
 
One needn’t look further than the fragmented nature of land ownership in Karachi to 
grasp the impossibility of planning in Pakistan’s largest city (figure 2.1). As noted by the 
2007 Karachi Strategic Development Plan (KDSP), the sheer number of land owning 
agencies in the city has created, among other problems, a “Lack of holistic and unified 
vision for the city, hampering the formulation and implementation of development 
plans… in [an] integrated manner” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: 2). 
According to civil society reports, the “presence of numerous land-owning agencies with 
no shared plan or coordinating mechanism results in a serious clash of interests, frequent 




vi). Millennial Karachi is therefore often viewed through narratives of fragmented 
political authority, a lack of planning, and failed governance.  
Karachi’s chequered history of urban development points to the consequences of 
failing to plan, rationalize, and govern a growing metropolis. Since 1947, the city has 
accommodated an estimated 20 million urban migrants (Gazdar, 2014). Rising housing 
demands coupled with the absence of a single, consolidated land authority means that 
over 50 percent of the population lives in areas that planners, politicians, and popular 
discourses refer to as “katchi abadis” or “unplanned” settlements that described as having 
been developed without the official support of state institutions (see Ahmed, 2008; 
Davis, 2007).31 A majority of these settlements are situated on public land owned by a 
mélange of federal and provincial institutions, and are characterized by a lack of potable 
water and sanitation (Ahmed, 2008; Hasan, 2000). For instance, according to a 2019 
World Resources Report titled Unaffordable and Undrinkable households in Karachi’s katchi 
abadis receive potable water for an average of two hours – spread over three days – in a 
single week period (see Mitlin et al., 2019). From a planning perspective, such narratives 
suggest that Karachi’s chaotic state can be assessed by looking at the presence (or lack 
thereof) of reliable, formalized (public or private) service delivery.32 Popular discourses, 
in turn, describe how residents of katchi abadis live precarious, invisible lives in the 
assumed absence of state planning.33 Scholars describe these areas as spaces where the 
urban poor use connections lying outside formal associations with state institutions to 
                                                 
31 Here and throughout, I use the term “unplanned” interchangeably with the term katchi abadi to 
denote how planners and state officials describe ad-hoc (usually low-income) settlements in 
Karachi. Far from being neutral, such descriptors come with considerable baggage in that they 
paint these areas as existing outside and parallel to the formal regulatory state. 
32 This is apparent in development scholarship that sees effective service delivery as a signal of 
strong state capacity (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004) as well as critical scholarship, described in 
chapter 1, which sees formalized, centrally controlled infrastructures for water and sanitation as 
evidence of the state’s capacity to  infiltrate society (see Mann, 1986; Stephen and Graham, 2001).  
33 For instance, a report published with the Middle East Institute describes Karachi as a “city 
within a city” where “informal processes and actors seem to have taken control to provide basic 




secure urban resources and services. With municipal institutions falling short, residents 
rely on the work of community organizations, cultural bodies such as jirgas, and even 
gangs to secure housing, access water, and ensure trash collection (see Gayer, 2014; 
Viqar, 2014).  
For the city’s planners, Karachi’s katchi abadis are thus understood as spaces where 
cultural relationships, practices, and social forms exist outside and parallel to the state’s 
formal, regulatory domain. Addressing such presumed “informality”, in turn, has been 
the thread that unites much of Karachi’s discordant planning history.34 Since Pakistan’s 
independence in 1947, postcolonial governments and military dictatorships have 
commissioned planners to reinvent the city as an economic, cultural, and political 
powerhouse by tackling what they saw as a growing number of katchi abadis. For instance, 
in the immediate confusion of post-partition migration, city officials and international 
consultants sought to remake Karachi as the “heart of Pakistan… the forecourt of the 
nation… enclosed by the House of Parliament, the principle Mosque, the Supreme Court 
of Justice and buildings for state authorities and cultural institutions” (MRV, 1967: 2).  
These planning attempts proposed to eradicate Karachi’s burgeoning katchi abadis, and by 
extension, the unregulated political, economic, and social activities that were perceived to 
thrive therein. Earlier plans thus saw katchi abadis as illegal, backward, and undeveloped, 
thus justifying policies which evicted residents from public lands and resettled them at 
Karachi’s vacant peripheries.  
Justified by melding cultural narratives of progress with processes of capital 
reinvestment, housing demolitions, anti-encroachment drives, and wholescale evictions 
                                                 
34 In this chapter, I use the terms “informal” and “informality” to refer to “experience-near” 
concepts (see Schaffer, 2016) utilized by planners. Although recent studies have moved away 
from conceptualizing informality as a static phenomenon running parallel to the nation state to 
instead described it as a process, even a form of urbanization itself (see Boudreau and Davis, 2017; 
McFarlane, 2008; Roy, 2004), here, I highlight how Karachi’s urban planners, but also 
development practitioners and civil society activists’ preoccupation with the so-called informal 




were (and are) a particularly violent response to urbanization in the Global South. 
Indeed, the redevelopment of so-called unplanned settlements is aimed at reasserting the 
writ of the state by rationalizing urban space as legal and formal.35 But, while demolitions 
and eviction remain common in many southern cities (including Karachi), development 
discourses since the 1970s have also espoused the importance of “slum upgrading” (see 
(Laquian 1983, Payne 1984, Skinner et al. 1987). For instance, in his important work 
Freedom to Build, British architect John Turner’s (with Fischer, 1972) argued that the local 
knowledge and situational awareness of so-called squatters should be privileged in 
housing initiatives. Drawing on his work in Peru, Turner claimed the state would be 
better off nurturing the agency of everyday populations living in unplanned settlements 
by providing legal tenure and technical support in terms of service delivery rather than 
implementing centrally planned development schemes that inevitably required a heavy-
handed approach (usually involving eviction). The emerging logic, now common 
amongst development practitioners, is that effective urban development need not require 
expanding the state’s formalized role in housing and service delivery (see UN-Habitat, 
2007). Instead, urban populations should be given legal and institutional support in order 
to improve the living conditions they have themselves secured over several years of 
entrepreneurial, if extralegal activity. 
Given this wider shift in development discourse, planners adopted an alternative 
approach to dealing with Karachi’s so-called unplanned settlements in the late 1970s. 
Working in conjunction with development agencies like the United Nations 
Development Project (UNDP), city planners introduced a comprehensive ideological, 
legal, and institutional framework under which katchi abadis could be legalized and given 
state support in terms of infrastructural development. “Regularization”, as it was called in 
the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, protected katchi abadis from eviction, offered legal 
                                                 




land titles, and afforded access to bulk water and sanitation infrastructures. The act did 
so by declaring eligible settlements (those with 40 or more households constructed 
before a specified cut-off date) as “regularized katchi abadis” [legalized impermanent 
settlements].36 Crucially, in a critical break from the resettlement policies of the past, 
planners also signaled the importance of local, community-based initiatives assumed 
independent of the state in everyday waterworks, sanitation, and housing projects. In 
short, the unregulated material practices and social structures which planners assumed 
thrived in katchi abadis and which they once sought to eliminate through aggressive 
resettlement were now seen as integral to democratizing and expanding access to urban 
services in Karachi.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the shift from resettlement to “regularization” 
allowed planners to discursively produce and rationalize Karachi’s landscape as governed. 
This was accomplished through the active construction of settlements as “regularized” 
and “non-regularized” katchi abadis. In this respect, the 1987 Katchi Abadis Act 
introduced a new category of land use known as “regularized katchi abadis.” Planners 
described this category of land use as a knowable object in terms of physical attributes 
(number of household), a particularly history of development (“unplanned”) and a 
particularly legal status under the 1987 act (“regularized”). Regularized katchi abadis were 
thus discursively produced as specific kind of unplanned, yet legalized urban space in 
Karachi that was distinguishable from other discursive land use categories including both 
“non-regularizable” katchi abadis [illegal unplanned settlements] as designated by the act 
and “planned” areas assumed to have developed under the auspices of state institutions. 
But, as “regularized” areas, planners simultaneously reproduced the perception that katchi 
                                                 
36 The term katchi abadi literally translates to “impermanent settlements.” This term – particularly 
kutcha (impermanent) – has been used by city planners throughout Karachi’s planning history to 
describe urban areas they perceived as unplanned – or existing outside state jurisdiction. While uses 
of this term from independence through to the 1975 Karachi Metropolitan Plan had no legal 
bearing, the term katchi abadi was introduces as a specific category of land use after the 1987 




abadis were unregulated spaces in the city. This played out most visibly in how regularized 
katchi abadis were to be developed once legalized. Specifically, the 1993 Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority (Regularisation, Improvement, and Development) entailed an 
“external/internal” division whereby formal state institutions were responsible for 
providing bulk infrastructure for water and sanitation, while community organization and 
local actors were expected to facilitate service delivery projects within unplanned 
settlements. With this “internal” logic of development ascribed to them, regularized 
katchi abadis were simultaneously framed as unregulated – albeit innovative and 
entrepreneurial – spaces.  
In empirically demonstrating these claims, this chapter shows how recent urban 
development initiatives in Karachi, while having done very little in terms of the state’s 
capacity to infiltrate and control society have nevertheless enabled a discourse of rule in 
which narratives of disorderly and unregulated urban space are reproduced as 
constitutive of a formal system of governance. Karachi’s vast physical territory is thus 
represented in terms of discursively constructed  social categories, thus making an 
otherwise sprawling, dynamic, and politically fractured city legible “from above and 
outside” (Scott, 1998: 43). Such representations, moreover, are deeply implicated in how 
political authority rearticulates itself through artifacts like maps, legal documents, and 
government ordinances.  
This chapter draws on an ethnographic analysis of official state documents, including 
Karachi’s master plans, various legal acts, and urban governance ordinances. I also draw 
intermittently on civil society accounts and elite interviews with retired city planners. I 
focus on the rationality of rulers – and in particular city planners – who have sought to 
develop postcolonial Karachi in different political contexts. I proceed by describing the 
resettlement initiatives that characterized city planning in Karachi’s immediate 




described the need for well-designed housing townships complete with formalized 
service delivery infrastructures, thus seeking to eliminate the “unplanned” spaces that 
planners and rulers saw as wreaking havoc during the early post-partition period. I then 
examine the critical juncture of the 1974 Karachi Development Plan in which planners 
identified “regularization” – or the legalization and improvement of so-called unplanned 
settlements – as a central policy for urban development. Emerging in a context where 
Pakistan’s socialist-leaning civilian government came into contact with global discourses 
of “slum upgrading”, the crux of regularization lay in ideologically separating unregulated 
social and economic practices from narratives of backwardness and presumed illegality. 
Instead, the 1974 plan highlighted how practices and relationships presumed to exist 
beyond the regulatory state were critical to Karachi’s overall development. I subsequently 
turn attention to the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act and the 1993 Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Authority (Regularisation, Improvement, and Development) Regulations, and the 
political work this legal and institutional framework accomplished in terms of creating an 
expanded typology of land use with which to make sense of Karachi. Finally, I explore 
how regularized and non-regularized katchi abadis, as social categories that made physical 
space legible, enabled a novel representation of Karachi as ordered and governed. I 
conclude this chapter by pointing to how this representation of Karachi as governed 
remains at odds with the lived experience of everyday communities, a theme I take up in 
greater detail in the chapters that follow.  
 
Resettlement  
In 1947, the newly created nation of Pakistan was poised as a country ready for 
industrialization and democratization. Karachi, at this time Pakistan’s federal capital, was 




Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin’s civilian government faced a critical challenge in 
accommodating nearly 50% of the 600,000 Urdu-speaking refugees from India who were 
changing Karachi’s demographic, political, and, indeed, physical landscape (Ansari, 
2005).37 The influx of refugees from India had created a number of settlements on public 
lands which, until 1952, had benefited from an official policy of toleration by state 
institutions (Hasan and Mohib, 2003). The first attempt to plan Karachi was thus 
undertaken by the newly formed Karachi Improvement Trust (KIT) with assistance from 
Swedish design and engineering consultants Merz Rendell Vatten (MRV). The result was 
the Greater Karachi Plan of 1952 (GKP), a comprehensive proposal outlining the city’s 
potential development as a major political, economic, and cultural center up to the year 
2000. The GKP’s modernist underpinning were apparent in its comparison of Karachi’s 
anticipated population growth, occupational makeup, and employment levels with the 
experience of western cities like Washington D.C. and Stockholm (MRV, 1967: 27). 
MRV’s planners recognized that Pakistan was expected to catch up to the standard of 
living in Europe in roughly half a century. The GKP thus emphasized a need to control 
and shape the city’s form in order to achieve comparable levels of industrialization, 
economic growth, and employment. According to MRV’s planners, Karachi’s physical 
form was crucial because it would:  
[Express] both the requirements and wishes of the individual and those of the 
social groups… provide for and emphasize the peaceful life in a residential area, 
the productive co-operation in the place of employment, the swarming life in the 
bazaar, the “joie de vivre” in the community center and the ideological tension in 
the large meeting places (MRV, 1967: 15). 
 
To achieve its vision, the plan proposed that Karachi develop its port area for 
dockyard industries; its industrial districts for metal, mechanical, and building industries; 
its residential areas for housing, shops, and services; and its peripheries for a variety of 
                                                 
37 Under the 1948 draft plan which was quickly abandoned, refugees were largely ignored in 




public and private needs (Ibid: 32-33). In addition, the GKP proposed a detached 
administrative center towards the city’s north as well as a university district, both of 
which would have smooth transport links to other parts of the city. As the GKP stated: 
“The new Capital and the existing central business section should be given the possibility 
of growing together into one common core” (MRV, 1967: 2). The GKP had a two 
pronged approach to address the refugee population as part of this overall physical 
development. The first was to develop high-density residential complexes within and 
close to the city center. MRV’s planners noted that Karachi’s already built up central 
district would most likely become a center for employment and, hence, house a 
population of roughly 1.5 million (Ibid: 55). The GKP proposed developing apartment 
complexes within and close to the city’s center to house some of Karachi’s refugee 
population. The second, more long-term plan was to clear what MRV officials described 
as “kutcha” [impermanent/unplanned] housing settlements and resettle communities in 
government-sponsored housing schemes on Karachi’s outskirts. These proposed housing 
schemes, particularly on the Lyari riverbed towards the western periphery, were not only 
to accommodate refugees living within the city, but also serve urban migrants in the 
future:  
In general, clearance can only be brought about by increasing the height of 
buildings and by replacing districts now covered with huts by high blocks of flats. 
The area that comes first to mind in this contest consists of Lyari Quarters and 
adjacent districts, but the same applies, of course, to many other existing areas 
with a “kutcha” settlement of poor buildings… the new districts… The new 
districts should be prepared for the reception of the section of the population 
now living in very bad circumstances in the inner city, as well as for the expected 
increase in the population of Karachi (MRV, 1967: 114). 
 
Up to 60,000 units were proposed as part of this resettlement strategy (Hasan, 2000). 
MRV’s planners argued that the state’s apparatus would have to play a major role in 
resettling populations not only given the costs associated with constructing high-rise 




– which planners saw as natural outcome of urban populations settling if left to their 
own devices – were not permitted in any of the areas earmarked for redevelopment and 
resettlement (MRV, 1967: 114). In a complete reversal of toleration policies, MRV’s 
planners proposed eviction and resettlement as a major step in achieving Karachi’s 
desired long-term physical form. Clearing “katcha” settlements would transform 
Karachi’s scattered periphery, “consisting of tents and huts without sanitary 
conveniences”, into well-planned residential district where “parks, schools, hospitals and 
other public services [would] be introduced” (Ibid: 114).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Population growth in Karachi (Gazdar, 2014) 
 
Despite its meticulous planning, the GKP was not fully implemented. This was for 
two reasons. First, the plan itself was hopelessly outdated in the face of Karachi’s 
burgeoning refugee population. For instance, MRV’s planners assumed that the city’s 
population would reach the 3 million mark by the year 2000, leaving only a number of 




mark sometime in the mid-1960s, well before the anticipated half century timeline! 
Additionally, Pakistan experienced its second stint of military rule under General Ayub 
Khan beginning in 1958. General Ayub was quick to shift the federal capital from 
Karachi to Islamabad in Punjab, thereby rendering the GKP’s main proposal and 
planning hook – an all-important administrative center – moot (Hasan and Sadiq, 2004). 
Nevertheless, while Karachi’s western periphery and inner city remained a home for 
migrant and refugee populations, the GKP had important implications for future 
planning in that it was the blueprint for subsequent physical development. In particular, 
the GKP’s emphasis on eviction and resettlement as a strategy to handle urbanization 
continued to shape Karachi’s peripheries for the better part of the next three decades. 
By 1957, Karachi’s governing structure had undergone a significant change with the 
KIT having been converted into the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). While 
KDA was made responsible for land development, the Karachi Municipal Corporation 
(KMC), a body originally formed in 1934, was made responsible for providing public 
services and otherwise maintaining developed urban land. Armed with this new 
separation of powers, and given Ayub Khan’s reported disapproval of slums, the military 
dictatorship commissioned a new plan to address Karachi’s skyrocketing growth. The 
resulting Greater Karachi Resettlement Housing Programme of 1961 (GKRP) was 
prepared by the famed Doxiadis Associates from Greece, and framed Karachi’s 
problems – including growing inequalities in housing and service access – as a “problem 
of proper planning” (Doxiadis Associates, 1961: 6).  The plan thus focused exclusively 
on resettlement, seeking to accommodate both refugee populations as well as urban 
populations evicted in the course of inner city redevelopment. For instance, Doxiadis 
planners estimated that there were roughly 119,000 inner city residents requiring housing 
and access to public services, and that Karachi would require 500,000 new housing units 




– complete with schools, commercial areas, employment opportunities, and public 
service amenities – on the eastern and northern outskirts of Karachi. Korangi Town to 
the east, for instance, was to house a population of 400,000. These townships, in turn, 
were to be funded by a combination of government subsidies and installments paid by 
residents which would later be used to develop public services. But, with only 10,000 of a 
proposed 45,000 houses constructed, the GKRP, like its predecessor, was not fully 
implemented (Hasan, 2000; Soomro and Soomro, 2018). Moreover, state institutions like 
the KMC were slow to provide supporting infrastructures such as roads, waterworks, and 
sanitation facilities that were essential in making peripheral townships livable, well-
connected areas (Hasan and Sadiq, 2004). Eventually, Doxiadis Associates’ new focus on 
planning Islamabad as the federal capital was the final nail in the GKRP’s coffin. 
The GKP and the GKRP were both emblematic visions of an urban planning 
paradigm in the 20th century which sought to construct the liberal city through top-down 
“master planning” (see Joyce, 2006). As Aprodicio Laquian (2005: 66) writes, this 
planning approach, which was common in most Asian cities in the 20th century, assumed 
that: “[population] growth, people’s movements, their productive behavior, and their 
search for leisure and cultural activities determined the shape and geographic extent of 
the city.” Planners thus focused on shaping the city’s built form by organizing its streets, 
providing potable water and networks of sanitation, separating housing areas from 
industrial and work districts, and creating aesthetically pleasing spaces such as parks 
(Ibid).38  Both the GKP and GKRP thus envisioned a substantial role for the state in 
transferring inner-city populations living in “katcha” settlements to well-planned 
residential areas at the city’s outskirts. These resettlement housing schemes were 
                                                 
38 In general, master planning, common in American and European cities throughout the 20th 
century, was “shaped by a concern with aesthetics (order, harmony, formality and symmetry); 
efficiency (functional specialisation of areas and movement, and the free flow of traffic); and 
modernisation (slum removal, vertical or tower buildings, connectivity, plentiful open green 




described as all-inclusive urban units complete with state-provided infrastructures for 
transport, public services, and housing. For instance, MRV planners emphasized the 
need to develop the “Neighborhood Unit” as “the most important and harmonious unit 
in the body of the city” that would include all the necessities of everyday life including 
public services and civic amenities (MRV, 1967: 54). Such a unit, moreover, was to 
replace what planners saw as “irregularly shaped [parts] of the city with multi-story 
buildings and narrow winding streets with alleys, partly used for bazaars” (Ibid, 17). In 
addition, the GKRP described Korangi as a township where residents “integrated into 
properly organized communities with all necessary schools, mosques, parks, playgrounds, 
markets, health centers and public utilities” (Doxiadis Associates, 1961: 2).  
Both the GKP and GKRP thus envisioned the rationalization and standardization of 
urban space as part of Karachi’s physical development. In seeking to extend 
infrastructures, build public parks, schools, and hospitals, the work of post-partition 
planning in Karachi was a concerted effort to eradicate spaces that – largely because of 
their appearance and low-income inhabitants – were considered unplanned spaces. 
Ultimately, however, while planners were successful in working out the land 
requirements, the inability (or unwillingness) of state institutions to provide formalized 
infrastructures for public utilities meant that resettlement was never realized as 
envisioned.39  
In turn, civil society activists argue that in their efforts to create well-functioning 
townships, resettlement policies had the paradoxical effect of growing the unregulated, 
so-called informal sector. For instance, they claim that because evicted residents were 
removed from their dwellings and left without livable areas to settle in, many families 
                                                 
39 As Daechsel (2011) convincingly argues, the relative early successes of resettling refugee 
populations in Korangi with the equally swift abandonment by the state in developing much 
needed infrastructure did not signify a lack of control. Rather, Ayub’s military regime was more 
concerned with demonstrating its territorial power than solidifying social control in townships 




preferred to relocate themselves to parts of the city where they could access basic 
necessities like water through lakes and rivers, unauthorized boreholes, tankers, or theft 
from municipal sources (Hasan and Sadiq, 2004). As a retired city planner and urban 
activists stated in describing for me the state of Karachi’s early resettlement: “Refugees 
and others were uprooted and sent to large swathes of lands called townships. The KIT 
made one access road in and out.” For many urban activists and state officials, the half-
hearted construction of peripheral townships along with the continuing rise in 
urbanizations rates meant that state policies for resettlement could be linked to an 
increased Karachi’s “katcha” areas (Ibid; see also Hasan and Mohib, 2003).  
In general, the period from the mid-60s to mid-70s is often described by civil society 
accounts as one where planning lapsed (Sayeed et al., 2013). Ayub Khan’s military 
dictatorship continued to demolish what it described as unplanned settlements and 
relocate Karachi’s urban to the city’s western fringes, now sprawling beyond the Lyari 
River, without providing resettled populations with housing units or sufficient access to 
city infrastructure. Moreover, while resettlement continued, the KDA had no 
complementary policy in place to improve living conditions in already existing city 
settlements. According to one civil society account, this period was therefore marked by 
a planning paradigm which “advocated relocating… poor communities to new sites 
instead of upgrading the area where they lived” (Hasan and Sadiq, 2004: 80).  
 
Regularization and the 1974 Plan 
By the time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s socialist Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came into power 
in 1973, Karachi was in desperate need of a new master plan. According to KDA 
estimates, the city’s population was at 4.4 million in 1974 and projected to grow to 14.2 




housing and public service access (Master Planning Group of Offices, 1974: 49). Much 
of this growth was concentrated towards the city’s north and northwest where the 
growing number of unplanned settlements and underserviced housing schemes had the 
dual effect of unbalancing overall urban density and increasing urban sprawl. Moreover, 
Karachi was also facing pressures created from an economic standpoint. First, Pakistan 
had left behind its status as an Asian Tiger by the early 70s and, instead, embraced a far 
reduced rate of economic growth (Talbot, 2012). Second, while there was a decrease in 
refugee arrivals, the changing structure of Pakistan’s economy under General Ayub’s 
Green Revolution policies kept rural-urban migration high. According to KDA statistics, 
for instance, of the 384,000 people that came to Karachi between 1951 and 1958, 
170,000 came from rural parts of Pakistan rather than India (KDA, 1974: 47). But KDA 
planners also accentuated the positives of such continued urban migration, going as far 
to suggest that reduced urban growth would likely “signal overall economic and social 
disaster” (Ibid: 7). As the country’s largest (and fastest growing) city, Karachi thus bore 
the dual burden of accommodating a growing urban population and revitalizing 
Pakistan’s economy.  
KDA thus prepared the Karachi Development Plan 1974-1985 (KDP) with support 
from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The KDP described Karachi 
as being in a state of “crisis caused by the lack of services”, a situation that was made 
worse by an explosive rate of rural-urban migration which posed significant challenges 
for housing and service delivery (Ibid: 3). In response, the KDP proposed an ambitious 
“Metroville Programme” as a way to shape the city’s future form. KDA planners did not 
want to repeat the process of allotting land for resettlement while failing to provide 
supporting of infrastructure, so they prompted a new idea for housing altogether that 
encouraged permanent residence and reduced land speculation. KDA’s planners made 




out incremental building programme” (Ibid: 33). “Metrovilles” were thus envisioned as 
distinct housing modules of more than 50,000 people from a variety of income groups. 
These modules, moreover, were to have on-site administrative systems, employment in 
the form of small industries and “high street” local commerce, as well as reliable accesses 
to water and sanitation services, education, and healthcare (Ibid: 338-339). Finally, while 
the KDP proposed that Metrovilles serve a variety of income groups with 80, 120, 240, 
and 400 square-yard plots of land available for housing units, it explicitly targeted 
communities and families that were “concerned [with] the ownership and building of a 
permanent urban home” (Ibid: 335).  
Despite its attempts to sidestep previous planning mistakes, the KDP shared many 
similarities with earlier resettlement projects. Chiefly, it proposed developing the city’s 
peripheral areas, in particular the northwestern, eastern, and southeastern quarters, as 
self-sufficient and self-governable urban units. But, the KDP also emerged in a national 
political and global developmental context during this period that offered a new 
approach to urban development. First, global development paradigms during the 1970s 
were advocating the need to partner with local communities to engender grassroots, 
participatory development in urban “slums” (see Turner and Fitcher, 1972). Second, 
Bhutto’s socialist platform of “roti, kapra, aur makan” [food, clothing, and shelter] did a 
great deal to legitimate the existence (and hitherto untapped voting power) of residents 
living in what were still described as “katcha” and illegal housing settlements.40 Planners 
capitalized on this ideological shift by advocating the need to develop rather than destroy 
these areas. Thus, in addition to the Metroville Programme, the KDP also proposed an 
“Improvement and Regularization Programme for Unauthorized Areas” – later called 
KAIRP – as one of three major housing programs for low-income communities. In a 
                                                 
40 According to civil society accounts, illegal areas garnered a degree of legitimacy in popular 





noteworthy break from previous policies, KDA planners recognized the limitations of 
resettlement:  
Over 10,000 jhuggi [mud/slum] huts have been removed, but still their number is 
increasing… Given the large population affected and the generally recognized 
failure of the previous resettlement programme to hold the jhuggi dwellers at 
their open plot site… it is apparent that wholesale resettlement is not physically, 
financially or socially possible (Master Planning Group of Offices, 1974: 183 – 
184). 
 
For KDA’s planners, the logic was simple. Resettlement policies of the past had not 
taken into account the needs of low-income communities. As such, the quality of 
housing units was not the problem, but issues like “security of land tenure, water, 
drainage, sanitation, employment and education and health services” (Master Planning 
Group of Offices, 1974; 35). As a “regularization” program, KAIRP sought to address 
precisely these issues by taking the first and crucial step of awarding already existing 
katchi abadis (specifically, those which were not occupying important public land such as 
railways) with legal land tenure. Following this, state organs such as the KMC and 
various provincial departments including education and health would work together with 
communities to upgrade living conditions.  
The 1974 Karachi Development Plan’s legacy remains mixed despite its reputation as 
a pioneering initiative (see Hasan et al., 2013). On the one hand, it failed to account for 
many of Karachi’s political dynamics, despite its astute observation on the historic causes 
and projected futures of unplanned urbanization. For instance, according to a joint 1991 
UNDP and KDA evaluation mission, the KDP failed because of a lack of political will, 
the absence of a powerful central planning authority, and pressure from “powerful 
lobbies of vested interest groups” (UNDP, 1991: 12). In short, the KDP failed to 
eliminate the very sources of land speculation it identified as posing a problem to 
housing, let alone provide an institutionally feasible roadmap to transform the city. 




land developers interested in constructing high-rise apartment buildings for middle-class 
residents. KAIRP, too, was considered a failure as it managed to “regularize” a paltry 
18,000 housing units out of a possible 233,000 (Hasan and Sadiq, 2004: 85). 
Nevertheless, KDA planners displayed in the KDP a new perception in which the so-
called unplanned city was a positive – if unavoidable – aspect of Karachi:  
[Jhuggi] settlements serve a vital and useful purpose. They usually are associated 
with a well-developed social structure which provides security in times of 
uncertainty and individual need. They are frequently located near employment 
places and they frequently are substantial generators of employment. They 
provide a means for the low-income family to survive at prices it can afford 
(Master Planning Group of Offices, 1974: 33).  
 
While the KDP, like earlier plans, continued to describe a domain of social, political, 
and cultural relationships that existed beyond the regulatory domain of the formal state, 
it also presented such a domain as crucial for Karachi’s future development. As such, 
despite KAIRP’s objective failure in terms of bulk titling, the KDP marked an important 
turning point in how planners, politicians, and state institutions understood what they 
perceived to be unplanned parts of the city. It did so by challenging planners’ own, 
previous assumption that such settlements were dirty, backward, and inherently 
problematic areas that needed to be eliminated in the interests of good urban 
governance. In doing so, the KDP paved the way to give regularization policies legal 
cover. In fact, the plan secured an important victory in 1987 when the Government of 
Sindh passed the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, creating the Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Authority (SKAA) as a dedicated institution with considerable financial powers to enact 
regularization. The provincial government subsequently passed the 1993 Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority (Regularisation, Improvement, and Development) Regulations which 
outlines the regularization procedures. In the following sections, I turn attention to how 




dichotomy between the so-called formal and informal city.41 I first examine how the 1987 
act reframed previously considered illegal and illegitimate urban areas as either 
“regularized” (legalized) or “non-regularized” (illegal) katchi abadis. I then address how 
the 1993 regulations, in advocating an “external/internal” division in the work of urban 
redevelopment in regularized katchi abadis, discursively reproduced divisions between so-
called formal and informal actors. In doing so, the regulations, constructed “regularized” 
katchi abadis as unique areas critical to urban development and governance in Karachi. 
 
Katchi Abadis and the 1987 Act 
In 1978, Pakistan entered its longest stint of military rule. Unlike his predecessors who 
were committed to resettlement, however, General Zia-ul Haq did little to alter KDP’s 
approach. In fact, it was precisely because hitherto ignored settlements had become an 
important well of political support under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, that General 
Zia pushed forward a comprehensive legal and administrative framework to encourage 
their legalization and development (Hasan et al., 2013). In March 1987, the Government 
of Sindh passed the Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, establishing the SKAA as a separate 
provincial department whose sole purpose was to provide legal status to all or specific 
parts of an “unplanned” settlement – a process that was known as “regularization.” The 
act was a milestone, not least because it established the SKAA as a body with broad 
financial and procedural powers to “acquire, hold and dispose of property” (Government 
of Sindh, 1987: 18) – a significant breakthrough given the number of land owning 
                                                 
41 I shift attention from the politics of the regularization process in Karachi (see Gazdar and 
Mallah, 2011) to instead examine the political work done by the legal and administrative 
framework of regularization. I draw here on the work of legal scholars who demonstrate the law 
is a political resource that can be drawn upon by a variety of state and non-state actors to achieve 
different ends. For instance, in his important work, Law’s Fragile State, Mark Massoud (2014) 
examines the role of law in weak institutional contexts. Focusing on Sudan, Massoud not only 
describes how colonial and postcolonial rulers have utilized legality to further authoritarian rule, 
but how legal provisions have also opened space for civil society and humanitarian actors to 




agencies in Karachi (figure 2.1) – but also because, unlike KAIRP, it introduced a specific 
criterion to legalize eligible settlements that were without legal tenure. The most 
significant power afforded to the SKAA under the 1987 act, therefore, was the authority 
to determine which settlements could be officially declared “regularized katchi abadis.” 
These powers were laid out in Chapter IV of the act titled “Declaration of Katchi Abadis 
and Acquisition of Land.” Under Chapter IV, an untitled settlement could only be 
“regularized” as a katchi abadi if it contained a minimum of 40 households and was 
established before 23rd March 1985 (later extended to June 30 1997): 
Subject to sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) and directions of Government, if any, the 
Authority may, after such enquiry as deemed fit, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, declare any area or part thereof which is partially or wholly occupied 
unauthorisedly before the 23rd day of March, 1985 and continues to be occupied 
to be a Katchi Abadi (Government of Sindh, 1987: 23, emphasis added). 
 
Of significance here was not only that “unauthorized” settlements could now be 
legalized under a specific criterion. Rather, it was that the act assigned the specific 
nomenclature of “regularization” to areas that were eligible to be titled. Indeed, chapter 
IV went further by describing what could disqualify an untitled settlement from being 
declared a regularized katchi abadi. For instance, while the SKAA had the authority to 
initiate court proceedings if it could not arrange a consensual purchase of state-owned 
land on which an untitled settlement was located, this rule did not apply to land owned 
by the federal government, private individuals, or cooperative societies. In these latter 
cases, SKAA would have to be given express consent by the relevant third party in order 
to declare the untitled settlement a regularized katchi abadi. Chapter IV also disqualified 
untitled settlement if they existed on land earmarked for “the purposes of road, streets, 
water supply arrangements, sewerage or other conservancy arrangements, hospitals, 
schools, colleges, libraries, playgrounds, gardens, mosques, graveyards, railways, high 
tension lines, or such” (Ibid: 24). Finally, chapter IV did the important work of situating 




declared eligible for regularization, chapter III of the act granted the SKAA authority to 
develop bulk infrastructure such as trunk water and sewage mains, evict occupants in 
parts of the settlement deemed ineligible for titling, and grant legal tenure to individual 
households. Regularized katchi abadis were also located within the jurisdiction of specific 
urban administrative units. Depending on their location, regularized katchi abadis would 
continue to “vest in the Council in which such Katchi Abadis are situated for the 
purpose of improvement, development or regularization” according to the act (Ibid). The 
1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act therefore did the important work of creating an extended 
typology of land use that could retroactively distinguish between different kinds of urban 
space in Karachi according to what planners presumed to be the characteristics of 
“planned” and “unplanned” space.  
For instance, under the Sindh Katchi Abadis Act planned areas, which were often 
described in the city’s master plans as areas developed legally and according to a 
predefined blueprint, could be distinguished from much of the unplanned space of 
“katcha” areas that planners saw as extralegally emerging through urban migration. In this 
sense, “katchi abadis” as a whole were distinguished from planned settlements based on a 
perceived history of legal or illegal development.42 Planned settlements in this sense 
included both colonial cantonments and upper-class housing societies that were officially 
developed by the Pakistan Army after 1947, as well as resettlement housing schemes like 
Korangi that were proposed by earlier master plans and developed by the KDA. By 
contrast, katchi abadis were perceived to have been developed entirely outside formal state 
                                                 
42 In his excellent work on the Indian city of New Delhi, Asher Ghertner’s (2015) deconstructs 
the legal/illegal binary as it relates to so-called planned or unplanned urban space. For Ghertner, 
the legal nature of developments in millennial Delhi matters less than their aesthetic qualities of a 
“world-class” city. In turn, it is how closely structures resemble a graspable world-class aesthetic 
that determines whether they are sanctioned by the state and hence whether they have a place in 
the changing city. Ghertner thus shows that state-sanctioned structures may nevertheless remain 




rules and codified procedures.43 For planners, these areas were understood as “squatter” 
settlements and included much of the city’s space that the KDP had previously described 
as “jhuggi [mud/slum] settlements” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 1974: 183).44   
But, the Sindh Katchi Abadis Act also gave rise to a second logic of distinction based 
on whether settlements could currently be described as legal. Here, “regularized” katchi 
abadis and planned areas were perceived to have something in common; while planned 
areas were always considered legally developed under the auspices of state institutions, 
regularized katchi abadis were retroactively legalized under the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Act. A more significant distinction, however, lay between regularized katchi abadis and 
what planners continued to describe as “illegal” unplanned areas. While the former were 
legalized forms of land use under the 1987 act, the latter, because they were “not 
regularizable” under chapter III of the act (Government of Sindh, 1987: 21) remained 
illegal. Despite sharing a presumed extralegal history of development, these latter 
settlements did not meet the eligibility criterion to be legalized and hence could not be 
regularized. For these settlements, the 1987 act gave the SKAA the power to “evict or 
cause to be evicted… any area which is not regularizable as a Katchi Abadi in accordance 
with the law” (Ibid, emphasis added). 
The Sindh Katchi Abadis act thus introduced regularized katchi abadis as a new, official 
category of land use. In addition to distinguishing such areas from other types of 
“planned” and “unplanned” urban space, the 1987 act also made regularized katchi abadis 
knowable objects in terms of specific characteristics. Regularized katchi abadis were 
understood as having a specific history of development (“unplanned”), size (larger than 
                                                 
43 Gazdar and Mallah (2011) provide an excellent account of how Karachi’s katchi abadis were in 
fact developed by middlemen, political patrons, and community based organizations who worked 
with formal institutions and state officials to provide housing, water, sanitation, and other 
services. For accounts of “middlemen” involved in urban development both in Karachi and 
beyond see Anwar (2014), Hasan (1989), Hansen and Verkaaik (2009). 
44 Such settlements were generally described as “kutcha” [impermanent] in other plans such as the 




40 households), age (older than 1985) and legal status under the 1987 act (“regularized”). 
By standardizing them in terms of nomenclature, physical characteristics, and formalized 
jurisdiction, the 1987 act rationalized Karachi’s burgeoning the ethnically, physically, and 
socially diverse housing settlements that were emerging in the wake of rural to urban 
migration.  
But, while the 1987 act took a significant step forward in so rationalizing urban space 
in Karachi, it had remarkably few, if any provisions to increase the role of state 
institutions in service delivery. For instance, aside from making the SKAA responsible 
for arranging “civic amenities and civic services in the Katchi Abadis through the 
Councils or other concerned agencies” (Ibid), the act did not indicate whether these now 
legalized areas would be subject to the everyday jurisdiction of state institutions like the 
KMC and the (now defunct) Karachi Water Board. While it discursively produced 
regularized katchi abadis as formal, legal units of urban space, the 1987 Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Act was considerably less clear about how everyday governance tasks such as 
trash collection, water supply, or sanitation would be carried out.45 As I demonstrate 
below, the absence of these provisions allowed rulers to effectively rationalize regularized 
katchi abadis as simultaneously legal and unregulated, while clearly demarcating the domains 
in which legality and extralegality could exist.  This was most apparent when it came to 
procedures determining the “external/internal” development of a regularized settlement. 
 
“External/Internal” and Formal/Informal 
The SKAA was afforded a broad array of powers to “implement policies formulated by 
Government for the development or improvement of the areas of the Katchi Abadis and 
regularization of such Katchi Abadis” (Government of Sindh, 1987: 21). These included 
                                                 
45 It is important to read this gap in the light of scholarship which sees extending infrastructures 
for water, sanitation, and other services as crucial to the consolidation of formalized rule 




devising and implementing programs to upgrade regularized katchi abadis with better 
housing and infrastructure, initiate proceedings to acquire land, and authorize or carry 
out evictions in settlements that could not be titled because they did not meet the 
eligibility criterion. Steps to title or “regularize” an unplanned settlement were later laid 
out under the 1993 Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority (Regularisation, Improvement, and 
Development) Regulations (Government of Sindh, 1994). Under this process, residents 
of an untitled settlement would first submit documentary proof such as birth certificates, 
national identity cards, utility bills, ration cards or other official paperwork proving 
residence before the cutoff date. Once the SKAA verified this documentation and the 40 
houses requirement, officials would carry out a detailed mapping survey and population 
census, the goal of which was to determine the physical state of housing and 
infrastructure as well as whether all of the settlement or only specific areas may be titled. 
In the latter sense, this meant determining whether any part of the settlement existed on 
land earmarked for other kinds of urban development, obstructed crucial transport links, 
or was built in environmentally hazardous or unsanitary conditions.  
After the SKAA deemed the settlement met this additional criterion, the mapped area 
would be “frozen” so that any future encroachment was excluded from the regularization 
process (Government of Sindh, 1994: 7). The SKAA at this time would also determine 
the government agency that legally owned the land in order to arrange an official 
purchase. With the land transfer complete, the SKAA would “notify” the area, thereby 
granting it status as a katchi abadi that is in the process of being titled – or “regularized.” 
As part of this process, the SKAA, the new legal owner of the land, would make leases 
available to individual households for plots. Essentially, illegally constructed houses 
would be given legal tenure as families paid SKAA yearly lease charges to buy the 
property they occupied. Such individual leasing would not, however, be compulsory, but 




to be declared a regularized katchi abadi and hence safe from eviction, regardless of the 
percentage of individual plot leases issued within the mapped area.  
In addition, the 1993 Sindh Katchi Abadi Regulations also described regularized katchi 
abadis as in need of “development” and “improvement.” With these areas legalized, the 
document described the importance of revamping old or providing new infrastructures, 
paving dirt roads, and providing open spaces such as parks and other recreational areas. 
For instance, once “notified”, katchi abadis would be subjected to a comprehensive 
“amelioration plan” that involved assessing the “existing community facilities available in 
the katchi abadi” in order to determine what kind of tackles developments were required 
(Ibid: 9). Under Chapter IV Section B entitled “Development Scheme”, this could 
include but was not limited to:  
a. Housing, re-housing including low cost housing; 
b. Community facilities including water supply with distribution network, 
underground sewerage including disposal system, treatment plant, electricity 
supply, gas and other public utilities, where required; 
c. Improvements of existing roads & streets and opening of new streets; 
d. The closing, alteration or demolition and improvement of dwelling units or 
portion(s) thereof unfit for human habitation; 
e. Parks, playgrounds or other open spaces; 
f. Reclamation of land for markets and gardens or any other matter related with 
the development scheme (Government of Sindh, 1994: 8).  
 
Like many official documents, ordinances, and plans in Karachi’s past, the 1993 Sindh 
Katchi Abadis Authority Regulations ordinance singled out infrastructural development 
(water, sanitation, roads) and housing as significant areas of improvement in Karachi. 
The regulations even placed an emphasis on “parks, playgrounds or other open spaces” 
(Government of Sindh, 1994: 8), harkening back to the GKP and GKRP’s 
preoccupation with aesthetic form. Yet, an important distinction lay in the framing of how 
and by whom different aspects of urban development should be carried out. For instance, 
while the SKAA was expected to play a considerable role in identifying eligible untitled 




the need for community actors from within a katchi abadi to participate in their 
development and improvement. For instance, under chapter IV of the ordinance, any 
amelioration plan determining the developments needs of a notified settlement would 
require determining the “capacity of… [the] community... of the area [to participate] in 
the development process starting with planning, implementation and maintenance of 
services” (Ibid, 9).  
Indeed, a crucial step of the development process lay in establishing “a committee 
consisting of officers of the Authority, community leaders and representatives of Non-
Government organisations, if any, to assist the Authority in preparation of the 
development scheme” (Ibid). Such provisions carved out a significant space for 
community actors such as collectively appointed representatives, grassroots 
organizations, and local authority holders (such as village chaudhrys “heads”) in the urban 
development process. The 1993 regulations ordinance thus created a clear 
dichotomization between the roles and responsibilities of “formal” actors, such as state 
institutions and NGOs on one hand, and “informal” actors – in the sense of being 
unregulated by codified laws and procedures – from the community on the other. 
Nowhere was this dichotomization more explicit than in the “internal/external” model 
of development described by the ordinance where, to enact the amelioration plan, the 
relevant state institutions would extend bulk infrastructure such as trunk roads and water 
mains to the settlement while communities would pave roads, lay individual pipes, and 
upgrade houses within a “notified” katchi abadi: 
a. The total cost of the scheme including cost of land, cost of development (both 
internal and external) and the cost which shall be recovered from the occupants 
of the katchi abadi in any shape including lease charges; 
b. Wherever necessary the external water supply and sewerage disposal shall be 
financed by the Authority [SKAA]. On receipt of a request from the community, the 
Authority shall assist them in designing and supervising the work of internal development. The 
expenditure for internal development shall be borne by the community 





Though not explicitly laid out in the language of formality and informality, the 
“external/internal” model of development nevertheless mirrored a distinction between 
two distinct processes of urban development; the first reflected the “external”, 
rationalized locus of state institutions providing bulk infrastructures, while the second 
described an unregulated, social and cultural domain through which “internal” 
development could be carried out. Of course, this did not imply that formal, non-state 
actors were not part of the internal development process. For instance, the regulations 
ordinance made a clear place for “NGOs of the area, if any” (Government of Sindh, 
1994: 9) to be included as well. Nevertheless, of critical importance was the community 
participation and concern. Indeed, the idea that “informality” – what might aptly be 
described here as “the vital role played by big men (dadas), friends, families and 
followers” Anand, 2017: 67) – should play a critical role in urban development was 
further reinforced by the SKAA’s own description of the regularization process:  
Since the improvement and development work cannot be successfully carried out 
without the participation of the residents of katchi abadis, the SKAA’s work has 
also included the mobilization of their human and material resources so that the 
development decisions are taken according to the resident’s needs and wishes.46 
 
The 1993 Sindh Katchi Abadi Regulations ordinance embodied the prevailing logic 
emerging amongst development practitioners in the 1970s that effective urban 
development need not require expanding the state’s formalized role in service delivery.47 
Unlike the resettlement policies of the past, the legal and institutional framework of 
regularization did not seek to eradicate the sort of unregulated or “informal” practices 
that planners assumed were characteristic of katchi abadis. Rather, it did the opposite by 
encouraging communities to address their concerns associated with water, sanitation, and 
housing with the everyday social and cultural structures available to them – albeit, with 
the SKAA’s approval and external support. The 1993 regulations ordinance thus adapted 
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the logic already laid out in the 1974 Karachi Development Plan that emphasized the 
need to utilize pre-existing social structures and community relations that planners 
assumed existed in “jhuggi [mud/slum] settlements” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 
1974: 33).  
In addition to producing them as legalized forms of land use, planners thus also 
constructed regularized katchi abadis as areas that simultaneously existed outside everyday 
municipal regulations. This was done by describing a distinct process of urban renewal 
which demarcated the roles and responsibilities of state institutions on the one hand and 
community actors on the other. The latter, which were seen as integral to “internal” 
development, essentially implied a role for community-based social structures and 
relationships. Regularized katchi abadis were thus discursively constructed as legalized 
areas, part of the formal city, that were nevertheless considered spaces of acceptable 
improvisation and grassroots entrepreneurialism – and crucially so when it came to urban 
development – in terms of everyday operation. As a particular kind of land use, then, 
regularized katchi abadis were actively rationalized, based on planners’ own 
understandings of these terms, as simultaneously formal/legal and informal. The 
framework of regularization as embodied in the 1987 Katchi Abadis Act and the 1993 
Katchi Abadis Regulations thus produced urban space as a legible object. Below, I turn 
to how this discursive construction of physical space has enabled representations of 
Karachi in which disorderly and unregulated urban spaces are presented as constitutive 
of an ordered, structured, and governed city.  
 
The Ordered City 
In 2007, the City District Government of Karachi (CDGK) published the Karachi 




for the city until the year 2020 and was unveiled in a moment of political resurgence for 
Karachi. General Pervez Musharraf had dismissed the democratically elected government 
in a 1999 coup d'état, thus plunging Pakistan into military rule once again. Like his 
predecessors, however, General Musharraf saw Karachi as a well of political support and 
was quick to ally with the city’s ruling Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The 
product of this alliance was the 2001 Sindh Local Government Ordinance which granted 
Karachi significant political autonomy. Whereas the city had previously fallen under the 
jurisdiction of the Government of Sindh, with members of the provincial government 
overseeing administrative bodies like the KWSB and KMC, the government of Karachi, 
under the office the mayor, now had considerable regulatory and financial powers. The 
newly-formed CDGK – controlled and managed by the MQM – thus used the KSDP to 
highlight a new vision of Karachi as a “world-class city and attractive economic center 
with a decent life for Karachiites” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: iii). 
Specifically, the newly formed Master Planning Group of Offices asked “leaders, 
institutions and [the] citizens of Karachi to change the way the city works and does 
business” (Ibid, 3). As part of this, planners and the MQM conducted city-wide socio-
economic and land use surveys to better understand the “multifaceted dimension of the 
prevailing urban crisis” (Ibid: 4).  
Yet, despite Karachi’s newfound autonomy, little had changed in terms of how 
physical spaces were to be managed. Other than a somewhat general suggestion that 
world-class cities were “characterized by minimal poverty and slums” (Ibid: 3), the 
KDSP followed the older logic of legalizing eligible untitled settlements. In other words, 
CDGK planners continued to advocate classifying much of Karachi’s physical space as 
either “planned” areas, “regularized” katchi abadis or “non-regularized” and hence illegal 
areas. This hinged on endorsing the “internal/external” model of development under the 




regularization and upgradation of katchi abadis, [the KDSP] favors the Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority (SKAA) model wherein the land title is tied to payment for land and 
development cost” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: 65). In a crucial paragraph, 
the CDGK stated that:  
In addition to provision of new plots to residents of the informal settlements, 
improvement of katchi abadis by way of infrastructure development is an integral 
part of the CDGK’s housing strategy. Ensuring tenure security through 
regularization and grant of land leases to inhabitants of katchi abadis fulfils a basic 
condition for the individuals to invest in their housing and improve living 
conditions (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: 10). 
 
As the KDSP shows, one of the most intriguing aspects of regularization policies in 
Karachi is that they have weathered the incommensurable ideological assumptions held 
by rulers in vastly different national political context. While regularization was first 
introduced under the PPP’s socialist banner in the 1970s, it has since been reinforced by 
a new urban (re)development narrative in the post Washington Consensus era. As Erik 
Swyngedouw (2004: 40) writes, neoliberal discourses that place emphasis on the “global” 
have, since the 1990s, culminated in the “‘hollowing out’ of the nation state”, creating 
“glocal” urban economies where local scales are a manifestation of hegemonic 
international discourses advocating the role of the private sector. But, while this politics 
of scale is apparent in the CDGK’s desire to remake Karachi as an “attractive economic 
center” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: 3) for international investment, 
glocalization has done little to alter the rationality of regularization that first envisioned 
Karachi settlements emerging in the wake of urban migration as deserving of state 
support. Rather, by stating that “[in] the informal sector, the private sector… will be 
crucial to the success of improvement and upgradation programs for katchi abadis” (Ibid: 
66), neoliberal discourses have strengthened the SKAA’s already existing logic for 
regularization by describing informality as a form of bottom-up entrepreneurialism. This 




demonstrates how the city’s ever-increasing physical territory has gradually been rendered 
legible “from above and outside”(Scott, 1998: 43).  
The three sets of maps below illustrate this by charting how Karachi space has 
progressively been represented. The first set of maps, figure 2.3 and 2.4, are derived from 
the 1974 KDP and depict, respectively, Karachi’s land use in the year 1974 and projected 
land use by the year 1987. In the first map, land is demarcated for residential areas, 
agriculture, various industries, and defense purposes. In the second, the map projects a 
significant rise in “unplanned residential” areas both within the city and toward its 
northwestern peripheries in the next decade. Collectively, and in accordance with the 
1974 plan’s predictions regarding Karachi’s future growth, the KDP maps paint the 
picture of an anticipated rise in “unplanned” urban space. The second set of maps, figure 
2.5 and 2.6 are taken from a January 1987 “SPOT” (Satellite for observation of Earth) 
image of Karachi carried out as part of a World Bank study (Bertaud, 1989). Collectively, 
the maps pinpoint the location of “katchi abadis” – defined as “Squatter settlements, along 
waterways, adjacent to railways and other hazardous areas” (Ibid: 57) – in 1987 and 
project their future expansion by the year 2000. Like the KDP set, these maps do the 
important work of conceptually separating planned space from unplanned space – now 
called katchi abadis – as well as charting the current and anticipated locations of the latter 
in Karachi by the year 2000. The final map (figure 2.7), which was produced as part of 
the KDSP, goes a step further in that it makes a further distinction between different 
kinds of unplanned space; specifically, it separates “regularized katchi abadis” as a legal 
category of land use under the 1987 act, from “non-regularized katchi abadis” as 
unplanned, and (as yet) illegal swathes of land. Figure 2.8 thus charts the geographic 




























Figure 2. 1: “Regularized katchi abadis” and “non-regularized katchi abadis” (Master 




These maps show how urban space has progressively been represented in Karachi; 
from being described as simply “planned” and “unplanned”, these spaces are represented 
through the use of an extended typology of land use that not only distinguishes between 
these spaces but also between titled and untitled spaces in the latter. This city-wide 
standardization of physical space does not by itself indicate any additional state capacity 
to enact the urban redevelopment policies called for by the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis 
Act. Nevertheless, what is significant is how the discursive construction of “regularized” 
and “non-regularized” areas as unique forms of land use make it possible to represent 
Karachi as ordered and structured. In a historical context where planners have 
continuously concerned themselves with addressing the prevalence of “slums”, “katcha” 
areas, and “jhuggi [mud] settlements, the ability to rationalize, differentiate, count, and 
represent growing swathes of urban space according to a readily available set of 
categorizations produces Karachi itself as a legible object.48 
Social science scholarship has long sought to identify the foundation of state power 
and, by extension, the capacity to enact political rule. Building on Max Weber’s work, 
Michael Mann (1986) understanding of the modern state as a “socio-spatial” entity which 
operates within a physically demarcated domain has been highly influential in this regard. 
For Mann, the modern state’s capacity to rule stems from its “infrastructural power” – 
understood as the ability to infiltrate, order, and control this physical domain and the 
social relations therein. In particular, as states deliver services and meet the sociomaterial 
needs of their citizens their infrastructural power and unique capacity to rule without the 
explicit use of violence or force increases. For Mann, infrastructural power is a form of 
authority unique to the modern industrial state. But, even a cursory glance at the decrepit 
infrastructures, erratically applied laws, and improvised material practices through which 
                                                 
48 Scholars of colonial order have shown how representations, and in particular maps, are visual 




a service like water is accessed shows that the sort of rule enabled through the state’s 
presence in everyday society is absent in Karachi – regardless of how planners define and 
distinguish planned/unplanned or legal/illegal areas. Yet, while Karachi may be an 
exemplary case of an ungoverned city when seen through the somewhat traditional lens 
of state capacity, here I draw attention to how political authority articulates and 
represents its territory as ordered.49  
In his fantastic work, Colonizing Egypt, Mitchell (1988: 44) describes “enframing” as a 
technique of “dividing up and containing… a neutral surface or volume called ‘space.’” 
Mitchell charts how this technique developed in 19th century Egypt as colonial powers 
experimented with various sources of order; from constructing a modern military, to 
engineering model villages under readily available hierarchies of class and status, and, 
finally, to planning the “Middle-Eastern” city. As Mitchell argues, what was unique about 
this technique was not that “material” realities were forced – often violently – to 
conform to idealized representation of the real. For instance, order (or disorder) was not 
a function of the gap between a plan for a city and its “real” built urban form. Rather, it 
was that the representation of reality – in such artifacts as plans and models – itself 
became the basis for order; “an appearance of order, an order that works by appearance” 
(Ibid: 60). If order and disorder were both social constructs of power, than 
representations of the former became the way in which a presumed, objectively existent 
reality could be grasped. 
These maps, as well as legal documents like the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act, and 
1993 Sindh Katchi Abadis Regulations – by articulating and reinforcing a systematized 
logic of land use – present the existence of a socially constructed order that planners 
assume exists as an objective reality in Karachi. Yet what is novel in Karachi is how the 
                                                 
49 Mann’s influential reading on state capacity has since been operationalized to measure state 
strength (Sofier, 2008; Sofier and Hau, 2008) as well as the capacity for democratization in the 




social construct of “disorder” – here signified by what planners understand as spaces, 
practices, and relationships outside and parallel to the regulatory state – is discursively 
reproduced as part and parcel of social order. Artifacts such as urban plans, land use 
maps, and legal categorizations are the tools through which this discourse represents 
physical space as governed. But representation of the city as rationalized and legible do not 
automatically result in interventions such as “slum” demolitions, infrastructure projects, 
or other kinds of state-sponsored projects that aim to make built urban space physically 
conform to notions of planned social order. Instead, as artifacts, they create what 
Timothy Mitchell (1988: 60) calls “an order that works by appearance.”  
 
Conclusion: Disjuncture  
Early planning approaches in the postcolonial period that focused on shaping Karachi’s 
spatial form saw much of the city’s physical space as antithetical to an ordered, well-
governed, and modernizing metropolis. By the early 1970s, however, global development 
discourses had encouraged Karachi’s planners to entertain a shift in thinking; following 
slum improvement policies gaining ground in development circles, planners began to 
describe katchi abadis and “unplanned” settlements as characteristic of Karachi’s urban 
fabric, and thus argued that they were critical to the current and future form and function 
of the city itself. In turn, the “regularized katchi abadi” was constructed as a unique kind 
of land use that was simultaneously formal and informal; legal yet unplanned; rationalized 
but inherently (and acceptably) disorderly from the perspective of the regulatory state; 
and, moreover, significant for future urban development. As I have argued in this 
chapter, this discursive construction of regularized katchi abadis enables a novel 
rationality of rule in Karachi. Specifically, I have shown how “regularization” initiatives 
from the 1970s onwards, which sought to legalize untitled urban land, allowed planners 




that planners continue to think of as disorderly – as crucial to good governance. Indeed, 
as regularization received legal and institutional cover under the 1987 Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Act, illegible populations and territories were made knowable according to an 
extended typology of land use which distinguished “regularized” and “non-regularized” 
katchi abadis based on their legal status. While the city government official quoted at the 
start of this chapter described how Karachi’s institutionally and politically fractured 
environment makes top-down planning impossible, this chapter has shown how political 
authority discursively claims the existence of order, not just despite an objective failure 
by rulers to consolidate spatial control over the city, but through it.  
In doing so, this chapter has demonstrated that the state is capable of discursively 
reproducing itself in ways that challenge a teleological story of modernization. Here, state 
authority stems from rules, laws, and procedures which allow rulers to shape physical 
territory and social conduct. Crucially, the power to distinguish the formal from the 
“informal”, the “modern” from the backward, and the legal from the “illegal” in this 
sense is the power to declare what exists outside such authority – and by extension the 
modernization process.50 In Karachi, however, the state has taken a shape that exists 
between coterminous dichotomizations of formal/informal, legal/illegal, and 
developed/undeveloped. As planners have constructed the regularized katchi abadi as a 
standalone category of land use with its own, unique set of features, they have de-
dichotomized these distinctions and combined concepts like “informal” and “legal” to 
create new categories that are part of the legible and rationalized domain of political 
authority.  
 
                                                 
50 This has long been understood as the increasingly planned and formalized nature of society; 
what Michel Foucault (1991) and Max Weber (2013) respectively call “governmentality” and the 




But the retroactive classification of urban space according to these new categories of 
legibility has not resulted in dispersing, through formalized service delivery, everyday 
technologies of governance in physical space – or what Michel Foucault (1991) 
considered a crucial aspect of power being “governmentalized.”51 As planners represent 
the city in terms of a reified distinction between the formal and informal city, the 
everyday lived experiences of Karachi’s urban poor continuously transcend such 
fabricated characterizations. Indeed, as I demonstrate in the following chapter, there is 
significant overlap between aspects of what planners in artifacts like the 1987 Sindh 
Katchi Abadis Act describe as the formal and informal city. These overlaps lay bare the 
experience of Karachi’s residents who simultaneously live between and with what 
planners describe as the formal provisions of laws and regulations – of having to pay 
bills, curate official documents, and deal with faceless bureaucracies – and what they 
continue to perceive as an unregulated terrain of extralegal relationships with everyday 
service entrepreneurs, authority figures, and political patrons. To highlight this, the 
following three chapters turn ethnographic attention to how Karachi’s urban poor secure 
a good that is crucial for survival: water. Focusing on the range of actors, practices, and 
subjectivities through which this precious resource is accessed, these chapters display the 
disjuncture between the representation of Karachi as governed, and the realities through 
which everyday life is actually regulated. 
                                                 
51 In general, Foucault’s (1991) use of this term describes how sociomaterial technologies of 
governance are dispersed throughout society to indirectly shape individual conduct. For Foucault, 
the everyday control of individual actions, habits, and subjectivities not only requires power to 
disperse coercive measures (such as the police, societal norms, and prisons) throughout society, 
but also what Certomà (2015: 29) calls “consensual forms of government.” Formalized service 
delivery may be grouped into the latter category as a technology of governance that controls the 
minutest details of everyday life (such as how to dispose of human waste).  For further 







“A COMMUNITY FORSAKEN BY GOD” 
Access and Order in a Karachi Settlement 
 
In early June 2017, a Karachi settlement faced a potable water shortage. Samandar 
Colony’s water supply had often been interrupted by breakdowns upstream. On this 
occasion, however, the shortage was caused by an alleged water theft. Someone, it 
seemed, had tampered with the valves at Samandar Colony’s only pumping station. The 
valves worked by using sealing plates which were manipulated daily to pressurize pipes in 
specific parts of the settlement at distinct days and times. But the thief had transfigured 
this delicate system by removing a sealing plate from one of the valves, leaving the 
corresponding pipe unobstructed regardless of the position of the other two valves. In 
effect, the thief had tried to ensure that a certain segment of Samandar Colony secretly 
received more water by stealing from the water “time” given to other parts of the 
settlement. Residents already aggravated by the scorching heat and lack of electricity were 
apoplectic when they discovered the sabotage. That this occurred in the holy month of 
Ramadan when Muslims were expected to be considerate towards others made the 
trickery unforgivable. With temperatures reaching 100 degrees Fahrenheit, brawls soon 
began to break out at the pumping station, signaling the possibility of widespread rioting 
over the lack of water. In the days following the theft, councilors, local Karachi Water 
and Sewerage Board (KWSB) officials, political party workers and ordinary residents 




the Jirga decided to institute a system of community-enforced watching at the pumping 
station. Under this system, an ordinary resident of Samandar Colony would work with 
KWSB officials posted at the station to make sure water was supplied equally to all parts 
of the settlement. Tensions gradually subsided as residents were assured what little bulk 
water the settlement did receive would be distributed fairly.  
But, while the Jirga’s timely intervention had averted violence, the newly instituted 
watching system did little to address Samandar Colony’s bulk water shortages. The 
settlement’s pipes remained intermittently pressurized, with many households continuing 
to secure water through local vendors, tankers, and political parties, just as they had done 
for years before the pumping station dispute. Despite the threatening flare of water riots 
and water-related violence, little, if anything, had changed in terms of how Samandar 
Colony’s residents accessed this precious resource.  
In June 2017, there was uncertainty and apprehension over Karachi’s escalating 
“water crisis.” While Pakistan’s largest and most diverse city had often suffered from 
periodic bouts of ethnic and sectarian violence, a reported city-wide water shortfall of 
650 million gallon/day was fueling fears of widespread future civil unrest. Members of 
the Sindh Provincial Assembly, climate activists, and international and national media 
outlets were warning of “water riots” in the wake of a study published by the Pakistan 
Council of Research in Water Resources that claimed the country would run out water by 
2025.52 Indeed, as Karachi Mayor Wasim Akhter stated in 2017, the water crisis was likely 
to lead to “civil war-like conditions” (Mansoor, 2017).  
                                                 
52 For instance, edie, an organization focusing on sustainability, claimed in August 2017 that 
“Karachi is bracing for what it calls ‘water riots’, as the 20 million people living in the city grow 
restless over the limited water supply” (edie newsroom, 2017). Such narratives are often 
accompanied by scholarly studies that point to a link between resource scarcity and violent 
conflict in contexts that are characterized by social cleavages and weak state institutions. In 
Karachi, however, it is not only the reported limited supply of water that creates anxiety over 
future violence it is also inefficiency and uncertainty when it comes to equally distributing what 




Such water-related violence appeared likely in the settlement I call Samandar Colony, 
where I began exploratory fieldwork in June 2017.53 Located at Karachi’s southwestern 
edge, this diverse area, which had been developed by a number of actors through a 
variety of ways over the past forty years, was characterized by highly uncertain access to 
clean potable water. While the settlement received a small weekly quota of bulk water 
supplied by the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), individual households 
suffered from intermittently pressurized pipes, shifting pumping schedules, as well as 
regular infrastructural breakdowns. Meanwhile, in the wake of the June 2017 theft, 
families and local councilors in Samandar Colony spoke of the possibility of 
disputes/fights (jhagrey) and altercations (mun mari) between different ethnic groups. 
These conversations often pitted the settlement’s Hindu and ethnic Kutchi residents 
against migrant Pashtun families as the former two accused the latter of stealing their 
water. At first glance, then, Samandar Colony exhibited many of the characteristics – 
social cleavages, weak state institutions, and resource scarcity – that Beall et al. (2013: 
3096) have identified as sources of “civic conflict” – a distinctly urban phenomenon 
defined by the “violent expression of grievances” due to state neglect in providing basic 
services. But, aside from the brief flare up at the pumping station in June 2017, Samandar 
Colony was yet to experience notable instances of overt, violent conflict over access to 
water.54 Indeed, the settlement remained relatively placid between 2016 and 2018, the 
period during which I conducted my fieldwork in Karachi. 
As the excitement from the June 2017 theft died down, I found that the dispute at the 
pumping station had done little to worsen the persistent uncertainty of potable water 
                                                 
53 I follow Levy (2008: 232) here to describe Samandar Colony as a “most-likely case” where “all 
dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted to reach a certain outcome 
and yet does not.” 
54 The lack of such civic conflict over water in Samandar Colony is puzzling given urban 
scholarship that points to a link between poor formal service provision and urban conflict 
(Barraqué, 2012; Beall et al., 2013; von Schnitzler, 2008) and the vast literature on 
“environmental conflict” that links resource scarcity to political destabilization in weak 




supplies; municipal connections remained, at best, intermittently pressurized just as they 
had before the alleged theft. Indeed, rather than relying on municipal supplies, Samandar 
Colony’s residents, like those in many of Karachi’s settlements, met their water needs 
through a system of privately sourced tankers and small-scale vendors.55 For example, 
households in a part of the settlement known as Hindu Para purchased water daily from 
donkey carts carrying distinctively blue jerry cans of water, or “gallons” as residents 
called them, even though many had municipal water connections. The prevalence of 
these small-scale vendors implied that the lack of water-related violence could be 
explained by alternative forms of access emerging to plug gaps in the city’s municipal 
supply system. But closer attention to the discourses surrounding Samandar Colony’s 
water vendors complicated this assumption. Residents routinely described vendor water 
as expensive, contaminated with fecal matter, and unfit for human consumption. Yet, 
they also continued purchasing vendor water, claiming it was a necessity in the face of 
uncertain everyday access. These discourses highlighted an altogether different puzzle; 
why did residents continue purchasing dirty and expensive vendor water as a necessity 
rather than mobilize, protest, or riot in response to the absence of municipal supplies?  
In this chapter, I shed light on Samandar Colony’s puzzling “hydraulic order” by 
exploring the meaning-laden, lived experience of everyday water access in the 
settlement.56 Drawing on seven months of field research in Hindu Para, a community 
                                                 
55 According to a 2019 World Resources Institute Report, 60% of Karachi’s residents rely on 
purchasing water despite a large portion of the city having access to pipe connections (see Mitlin 
et al., 2019). 
56 I define hydraulic order along two dimensions. First, I follow a long tradition in political 
science which equates social “order” and “disorder” with the respective absence and presence of 
civil strife in the form of riots, protests, beatings, the destruction of property, and other overt 
forms of violent conflict (see, for example, North et al., 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006).56 
Second, I address order (or disorder) particularly as it relates to the relationship between water 
access and social stability. Scholars argue that there is a potential link between water scarcity on 
one hand, and violent conflict, political disorder, or social instability on the other (Gleick, 2014; 
Wolf, 2002). I therefore use the term hydraulic order in this chapter to describe a lack of disorder – 
violence, rioting, protest, or what Zerah et al. (2012: 223) call the “flaring-up of localized 




within Samandar Colony, I show that rather than protesting, rioting, or mobilizing for 
better municipal services, residents purchasing vendor water as the only response to a 
situation where both formal forms of access – such as government-sponsored water 
tankers and municipal potable water – and un-institutionalized, more relational means of 
procurement – such as relying on the patronage of a well-connected political fixer or 
elected representative – fail to eliminate the daily uncertainty in securing this precious 
resource. As one resident explained when I asked about the state of water access in the 
settlement: “Nobody helps us here, this is a community forsaken by god.” 
Such descriptions of abjection suggest a familiar understanding of marginalized 
populations as politically paralyzed. For instance, in his seminal work Power and 
Powerlessness, John Gaventa (1980) argues that quiescence to authority is created, not by 
the “fear of power”, but a “sense of powerless [that] may manifest itself as extensive 
fatalism, self-deprecation, or undue apathy about one’s situation” (Gaventa, 1980: 16-17). 
For Gaventa, the lack of collective action in response to structural inequality spells the 
end of politics. Indeed, the absence of such resistance is understood as evidence of the 
hopeless wretchedness of the urban poor as well.57  
But, as studies of resistance show, collective action is rare and episodic. Politics, in 
turn, is often found not in the organized efforts of social groups but in banal, everyday 
social interactions. In Weapons of the Weak, for instance, James Scott (2000 [1985]: 137) 
demonstrates that “rumour, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, 
folktales, ritual gestures, anonymity” in daily language and practice amount to everyday 
forms of resistance. Such resistance stems from an ideological politics that continues to 
criticize and rebuke power relations particularly in contexts where collective action is 
unlikely or impossible. The residents I spoke to chastised and caricatured their leaders for 
                                                 
57 See, for instance, Auyero and Swistun’s (2009) account of “environmental suffering” in 




a lack of potable water in Hindu Para. Not only did they vilify an absent and apathetic 
state (“hakumat”), they often related (unverified) stories of water theft carried out by 
unprincipled neighbors; spread rumors about “illegal connections” made to surrounding 
areas under the protection of powerful councilors; gossiped about households who had 
large water tanks built in their homes; and used unflattering stereotypes to describe rival 
ethnic groups.58 But, while such narratives possibly amounted to a kind of ideological 
resistance to the poor state of water access in the settlement, they tended to exist 
alongside narratives of necessity; of “making do” and “helping oneself” when it came to 
describing the lived experience of purchasing vendor water daily.   
This chapter moves beyond accounts that describe the lives of the urban poor as 
either lacking politics on one hand or replete with instances of everyday resistance on the 
other. Faced with persistent uncertainty in accessing water through both institutionalized 
and relational networks, I show that Hindu Para’s residents respond to their situation 
with neither quiescence nor everyday resistance. Instead, they actively seek to manage the 
generalized precarity of their daily lives. In demonstrating this claim I offer a reading of 
urbanism that is not characterized by dystopia and helplessness. In addition, I seek to 
separate what may be instances of everyday resistance in Karachi from a significant 
coping mechanism – a conscious act of survival – adopted by the residents of Hindu 
Para.59 Rather than passive recipients overcome by a sense of fatalism or plucky political 
                                                 
58 Karachi has long been a home for the Pasthun diaspora. With their population in the city 
growing, Karachi’s Pashtun population has become a target for xenophobic narratives extoling 
the dangers of unplanned urbanization. Indeed, Pashtuns have not only been scapegoated for 
Karachi’s history of ethnic tension, they are also described as a powerful political force involved 
with various illegal activities like water theft and land encroachment (see Gayer 2007, 2014). With 
Samandar Colony becoming a home for ethnic Pasthuns displaced by wars in Afghanistan and 
Northern Pakistan since the mid-1990s, such narratives have emerged in Hindu Para as well with 
residents suggesting Pashtuns in the area are part of a “mafia” involved in selling water. 
59 In his important work on the politics of the urban poor, Asef Bayat (1997: 54) describes how 
people migrating to cities in Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution resorted to various kinds of 
“subsistence activities” such as hawking and silent land-construction to make space for 
themselves in the city. For Bayat, these everyday survival strategies are common in most 




actors engaged in daily subversion, I thus show how Karachi’s urban poor recognize and 
work through their precarity.  
This chapter begins by situating water vending as a practice within the literature on 
market orders. While political economy perspectives emphasize the value of water 
vending in weak institutional contexts, they do little to address how such practices are 
perceived by urban populations. They shed little light on the nature of the “market 
order” (see Hayek et al., 2014) that is observed in circumstances where vending practices 
compliment centralized water supply systems. I then contextualize Samandar Colony’s 
history of development, describing how everyday life in the settlement is characterized by 
multiple overlaps between the formal regulatory state – its rules, laws, and representatives 
– and various relational networks of political support, friendship, and kinship that often 
connect residents to the state bureaucracies and resources. Focusing on an old part of the 
settlement known as Hindu Para, I then show how this complexity increases uncertainty 
in terms of daily water access as residents must simultaneously negotiate a variety of legal 
frameworks and political relationships to secure this precious resource. As small-scale 
vendors become the only reliable method of access in these circumstances, the remainder 
of this chapter shows that purchasing vendor water is neither an instance of everyday 
resistance nor quiescence, but purposively coping with precarity.  
 
Market Orders 
In The Fatal Conceit (2012 [1988]), Austrian-born economist Friedrich von Hayek argued 
that markets, free of cumbersome regulations, were a natural and highly effective source 
of political order. Railing against the evils of socialism, Hayek argued that price signals 
for goods and services in a capitalist system were capable of conveying information in a 
                                                                                                                                            
the coping mechanisms people adopt in such situations. While the former amount to defensive 
acts – through everyday language and practice – that criticize the abuse of power, the latter are 




way that no central planning agency or individual ever could. As such, free markets, and 
the moral, legal, and political structures that upheld them were the life blood of 
“extended order of human cooperation” (Ibid: 6). Over a decade later, Hernando De 
Soto (2002, 2003) built on Hayek’s ideas to argue that markets were a source of subaltern 
agency and ingenuity. In contexts rife with cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, 
exclusionary laws, and weak state institutions, De Soto claimed market logics allowed the 
urban poor to efficiently secure opportunities for trade as well as resources like housing 
and water (see Portes and Schuffler, 1993). Hayek and De Soto’s ideas have considerable 
currency when it comes to explaining how water – a resource associated with the 
possibility of violent conflict – is allocated in the contemporary urban south. With 
centralized urban water supply systems “splintering” and failing under the weight of 
urbanization (see Graham and Marvin, 2001) the urban poor have resorted to various 
kinds of water vending practices (see Kjellén et al., 2009).60 Here, private actors operate 
on a small scale by securing water through a combination of sources such as wells, 
boreholes, and city pipes before delivering it through artisanal means like push carts and 
tankers in low-income settlements. Once considered a temporary solution to urban water 
provision, such vending practices are now seen as an important source of access for 
urban populations in the developing world (see Ayalew et al., 2014; Casey et al., 2006; 
Ishaku et al., 2010; Onyenechere et al., 2012; Vasquez at al., 2009; Whittington et al., 
1991). Indeed, development practitioners see small scale vending as an “acceptable path 
to achieving the [Millennium Development Goals] target” in rapidly urbanizing contexts 
(Ahmad, 2017: 1192; see also McGranahan, 2006; Wutich et al., 2016). Read in the light 
of Hayek and De Soto’s veneration of the market, water vending can be seen as an 
                                                 
60 There are regulated practices as well in which governments and municipal departments 
contract water utility management out to the private sector (Marin, 2008). Though these “public-
private partnerships” remain a subject of controversy – not least because of the political 
dimensions and skewed incentives undergirding them (see Adams and Zulu, 2015; Bakker, 2010; 
Castro, 2008) – the private sector’s role in urban water provision is nevertheless recognized as 




agentic response that fills gaps in inefficient water supply systems and also establishes 
political order by effectively allocating a scarce resource. In Samandar Colony, too, 
smallscale water vending is ubiquitous. One can often see pushcarts operating in the wee 
hours of the morning or in the late evening, moving from one narrow street to the other 
as households purchase individual jerry cans to fulfill their daily needs. The likes of De 
Soto and Hayek would therefore not be surprised when confronted with the lack of 
overt water conflict in Samandar Colony. For them, Samandar Colony’s hydraulic order 
can succinctly be explained by the entrepreneurial vending practices of the urban poor 
that supplant inefficient municipal services.  
But an opposing view holds that unregulated water vending has a deeply marginalizing 
impact on the urban poor (Altenburg and Drachenfels, 2006). Water vending is 
associated with a “poverty premium” where the poor pay more for water supplied by 
vendors than they would for either municipal public or privatized supplies (Braimah et 
al., 2018; Mitlin et al., 2019). Moreover, water from small-scale vendors poses significant 
health risks as it is often not purified and collected through hygienic sources 
(Constantine et al., 2017). As such, the received knowledge of water vendors filling gaps 
in a centralized supply system does not account for how urban populations view their 
need to purchase water amidst these challenges.  
Moreover, as Bolivia’s infamous water wars, “service delivery protests” in 
Johannesburg, and contentious responses to privatization efforts in cities like Manila and 
Jakarta show, the commodification of water – either through the official route of 
privatization or other means like “corporatization” – is its own source of violence.61 In 
Samandar Colony, when the ubiquitous presence of small-scale vendors commodifies 
this precious resource beyond the ability to pay while also adding non-financial costs 
                                                 
61 In fact, a growing body of scholarship has either directly or indirectly associated water 
commodification with rioting, protests, and civil unrest in South Africa (Bond and Dugard, 2007; 




related to health risks and perceived political marginalization, the prospect of violence 
over uncertain water services becomes far more likely. Certainly, negative assessments of 
water vending are evidence of a distinct source of grievance for the settlement’s 
residents; one that crystalizes a view of state institutions as neglectful and corrupt. In 
doing so, water vending as a practice may actively facilitate, rather than impede, the link 
between uncertain access to water on one hand, and conflict in the form of protests and 
riots on the other (see Conca, 2012; Gizelis and Wooden, 2010).  
In the sections that follow, I therefore address the puzzle of hydraulic order in 
Samandar Colony by adopting a mode of inquiry that emphasizes the importance of 
meaning-making processes to causal explanations of social and political phenomenon.62 
This approach moves beyond the objectively observable forms of access that are 
assumed to prevent overt water conflict simply because they allocate a precious resource, 
to the everyday meanings and experiences of the settlement’s residents. In short, I turn 
attention to the lived experience of everyday water access in Samandar Colony.  
 
Everyday Uncertainty 
With the Arabian Sea to its south, a natural deep water port to the west, and Karachi’s 
endless urban sprawl towards the north and east, the settlement I refer to as Samandar 
Colony was initially part of collection of mud flats at the city’s southwestern edge. Like 
much of Karachi, however, the port and its surrounding areas grew exponentially after 
Pakistan’s independence in 1947. Samandar Colony itself began as a small community of 
Hindu, Muslim and Christian families resettled in 1980. Throughout the 1990s, Samandar 
                                                 
62 I draw here on methodological approaches which emphasize the importance of meaning-
making in causal explanations (Norman, 2015; Spector, 2017). Here, causality is not understood 
as a generalizable relationship between two variables, but as contextualized causes which are based 
in how actors make sense of their worlds (Schwartz-Shea, 2012). As Edward Schatz (2015) 
further suggests, “causality-oriented work in the social sciences simply must attend to meaning 




Colony quickly became a highly densified area that various religious and ethnic groups 
called home. These demographic developments were facilitated by ad-hoc changes in the 
settlement’s built form (figure 3.2 below). While some older residents began to convert 
their mud huts into concrete structures with additional floors to accommodate growing 
families, others decided to rent newly-constructed rooms or homes to rural migrants 
arriving from Sindh and Pakistan’s northern areas. Meanwhile, the Soviet – Afghan War 
brought an influx of refugees to Karachi, some of whom settled in Samandar Colony or 
on its periphery by reclaiming land around the marshes that still existed toward the 
settlement’s north. With a growing population, the settlement also became home to 
schools, shops, roadside restaurants, a large contingent of oil tanker mechanics (due in 
part to the settlement’s proximity to the port’s oil terminal), and, more recently, a 
number of high-rise apartment buildings in an ongoing effort to “densify” Karachi. Once 
a landscape of mud huts in the middle of thick vegetation, Samandar Colony turned into 
a densely-populated urban environment with concrete structures in the space of thirty-
five years. 
As such, Samandar Colony is illegible according to many basic benchmarks such as 
population registers, household sizes, and ethnic composition. For instance, 
demographic data for the settlement is either outdated or non-existent.63 Journalistic 
accounts and popular discourses for their part describe settlement like Samandar Colony 
                                                 
63 Controversy continues to surround the results of the 2017 Pakistan census, particularly in 
Karachi (Ghori, 2017). There is also a dearth of demographic data by ethnicity from government 
sources like the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Board of Revenue, and Election Commission of 
Pakistan. Official datasets offer ethnic breakdowns by “mother tongue” at the provincial level, 
thus excluding non-provincialized languages – like Gujari and Kutchi as spoken in Samandar 
Colony. Scholarly datasets, meanwhile, organize ethnic makeup by large administrative units, like 
city districts, rather than smaller, town or union council levels (Gayer, 2014; Gazdar, 2014). 
Nevertheless, district-level data suggests that Karachi South, where Samandar Colony is located, 
has experienced considerable demographic change since 1980. For instance, based on language as 
a measure of diversity, Niazi and Azad (2018) find that, in addition to increases in Punjabi, 
Sindhi, Pashto Balochi and Bhravi speakers, the population speaking “other” languages has 




as a home to poor populations who lack legal tenure in the city and engage in extralegal 
and sometimes illegal activities.64 
But descriptions of Samandar Colony as juxtaposed against legal and “planned” parts 
of Karachi make little sense given the settlement’s complex history of development. 
Despite its growth coming from successive periods of migration, the settlement has 
emerged as a product of both formal planning initiatives and extralegal, indeed 
sometimes illegal practices. For instance, Samandar Colony was initially part of a housing 
initiative from 1972-1985, enacted by the newly formed Master Planning Department 
(MPD), to manage Karachi’s “squatter” population (Hasan, 2000). Samandar Colony’s 
residents were moved from an area called Ismail Goth, where residents had been living 
since before the 1947 Partition of India, to 60-square yard plots at the city’s (then) 
southwestern periphery. But, while Samandar Colony began life as an officially 
sanctioned resettlement project carried out by the MPD, not all of it is classified as a 
“planned” area in the sense of being built-up, provided infrastructure, and generally 
developed directly by state institutions (see Ahmed, 2008). Instead, to solve Karachi’s 
escalating housing problem, the MPD simply shifted working-class and poor populations 
to new tracks of land at the city’s then periphery, with Hindu Para emerging as one of the 
communities in this initial resettlement in 1980. Much of Samandar Colony, in turn, was 
developed by state officials working with middlemen, political patrons, and residents 
themselves; water and sanitation infrastructures were laid under the patronage of political 
parties hoping to expand their voting base; concrete houses were constructed by bribing 
state building control officials; roads were built as families threw dirt on marshy 
                                                 
64 These narratives are supported by scholarly accounts of marginalized settlements in cities 




reclaimed lands. Much of this ad-hoc development was carried out with residents 
themselves bearing the costs of labor and materials.65 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Ad-hoc construction in Hindu Para (photo by author) 
 
Despite its appearance as an unplanned settlement, however, Samandar Colony is not 
illegal in the eyes of the state. While it is true that the original community of families 
resettled by the planning department later expanded through encroachments and illegal 
sub-divisions of state land, these areas are “regularized” according to the 1987 Sindh 
                                                 
65 Scholarly and journalistic accounts describe in great detail how such extralegal development 
works in Karachi (Anwar, 2014; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011; Hasan, 1989). Acting as brokers, 
fixers, and patrons, middlemen provide populations with access to housing and public services by 
working closely with low-level state officials. In the process, they become powerful political 




Katchi Abadis Act. In other words, they are legalized urban areas that are protected from 
eviction under the land use category of regularized katchi abadi. This means that residents 
who have been living in communities like Hindu Para since March 1985 or earlier are 
eligible for 99-year land leases and that the settlement as a whole benefits from KWSB 
provided water as well as trunk sanitation mains.66 Many residents of Hindu Para secured 
their legal tenure and service access as part of the initial resettlement, but subsequent, 
“unofficial” migrants to Samandar Colony have taken advantage of the regularization 
process. 
It was only after I met Yawar Bhai in 2018 after a couple of fieldwork trips to Karachi 
that I realized Samandar Colony was impossible to dichotomize as either a planned/legal 
or unplanned/illegal settlement. Sitting on the smooth, concrete floor of the two-story 
home he had built, Yawar Bhai began like many others interviewees when I asked them 
to describe their earliest memories of Samandar Colony. He explained, for example, how 
“Hindu Para”, a collection of fourteen lanes at the very edge of Samandar Colony where 
resettled families were given 60- square yard plots in 1980, was initially surrounded by 
thick vegetation but soon became overcome by concrete structures. Continuing, to 
describe the area’s history, Yawar Bhai angrily explained how “Hindu Para” had received 
its name: 
The Pathans [Pashtuns] all call if Hindu Para, they don’t even ask what area this 
is, what block it is, although it is called [official name with address]! From here 
ahead the KPT [Karachi Port Trust] land starts. Many people living here are 
Muslim, but they call it Hindu Para. Why? Because they thought because a few 
people are Hindu here everyone else must be Hindu as well. At the time we 
moved here they [the government] gave us plots for Rs1,200. Now these plots 
are worth Rs25 lakhs.  
 
Yawar Bhai’s comments reveal the sort of ethnic diversity and tensions that have 
characterized unplanned urbanization in Samandar Colony. But, more significantly, in 
pointing to how a certain part of the settlement has been mischaracterized based on an 
                                                 




opinion of who lives there (poor Hindus without legal tenure), Yawar Bhai also contested 
the notion that Hindu Para as a whole was an illegal area. Indeed, Yawar Bhai was quick 
to describe the settlement’s official name in response to a segment of the population 
calling it Hindu Para. Such comments resonate with many residents of Hindu Para who 
claimed to be legal residents of the city. At the same time, however, my continuing 
conversation with Yawar Bhai revealed that residents therein often faced difficulty in 
accessing the benefits of urban citizenship. For instance, in his continuing tirade about 
the history of Hindu Para, Yawar Bhai explained how difficult it was for his son to get a 
national identity (shanakhti) card, a document issued to all citizens of Pakistan:  
We don’t even see the faces of our councilors anymore. They [the government] 
give us such difficulty even to make ID cards… They tell us to bring our father’s 
ID card, then our grandfathers’ ID card. But if we’ve never even seen their breed, 
how we will get their ID cards? I went to NADRA [National Database & 
Registration Authority] to get my son’s ID card made with my own card, my 
wife’s card, and my parents’ cards. Our cards say [settlement name] on them. 
They told me to bring ID cards for my parents’ grandparents as well! I said that 
was at the time of the British, I don’t even know what they looked like! They told 
me the ID wouldn’t be issued without them. So, I didn’t submit my son’s form. 
Then, our councilors brought a NADRA truck [to Samandar Colony]. We 
submitted the paperwork to them but who knows, it’s been two years and we still 
don’t have an ID card. We don’t even know where to get the card, who to ask, or 
what to do. I had to do a lot of hard work and pay [councilors] Rs3,600 of my 
own money for that ID card.67 
 
As Yawar Bhai’s account shows, the barriers he faced to secure an official document 
for his son did not only emanate from state bureaucracies that expected him to produce 
excessive documentation to prove his identity, but from other sources as well. Yawar 
Bhai was also forced to navigate extralegal economies of exchange with state officials like 
councilors by paying large sums of money or relying on their patronage to try and secure 
his son’s national identity card. Indeed, Hindu Para’s residents are embedded in multiple 
overlaps between the state’s rules, laws, and bureaucracies, and the relationships of 
                                                 
67 National Identity Cards are crucial in obtaining other documents like passports. In addition, 
they are also required to open bank accounts, purchase property, and secure access to public 
services. Citizens of Pakistan can prove their status by having their application attested by an 




political support, friendship, and kinship that remain part of the settlement’s everyday 
fabric. What Yawar Bhai’s account sheds light on in this respect is the unique set of 
challenges such an overlap poses when one seeks to lay claim to state services or resources. 
Existing between the dichotomies of planned/legal and unplanned/extralegal, Samandar 
Colony’s residents are vulnerable to both the discipline of state institutions and the 
whims of “brokers” and political patrons who remain crucial in helping urban 
populations make claims to state resources.68 But this position is often missed by 
scholarly accounts that frame claim-making in terms of the language of, for example, 
“civil” and “political” society which reflects a dichotomous existence of regulated and 
unregulated spaces, relationships and practices.69 Such descriptions elide the 
kaleidoscopic and deeply uncertain lived experiences of access and belonging in Karachi’s 
katchi abadis. The following sections elaborate this by turning attention to the material 
realities of everyday water access in Hindu Para.  
 
Everyday Hydrology 
For the families that were part of the initial resettlement, Hindu Para was a dream come 
true. With open spaces, friendly neighbors, and easy access to work, older residents 
nostalgically describe life in the 1980s as full of prosperity. Such prosperity was no doubt 
bolstered by the overabundance of water in the area. Samandar Colony was initially 
spared the challenges faced by Karachi’s various satellite towns in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Like the satellite towns, Hindu Para first experience piped water through communal taps  
                                                 
68 As Marilyn Strathern (1991: 584) writes, western perceptions of personhood which inevitable 
rely on some notion of citizenship fail to capture the experience of “dividuals” or “fractal 
persons”; a state of being in which persons and social groups may simultaneously occupy 
multiple, often contradictory social, legal, and political positions. 
69 The implication that legal status determines how resources are accessed is an implication of 
both postcolonial (Chatterjee, 2006) and Marxists (Harvey 2001; 2013) perspectives on the city. 
But, as Lisa Björkman (2015) demonstrates in her ethnography of Mumbai’s water, a structure’s 




in each lane. Unlike the satellite towns, however, it was easy to manage and distribute the 
supply of water via communal taps in Hindu Para given the comparatively small size of 
the community. Describing what life was like in those early, pioneering years, older 
residents spoke of a sense of community and friendship as families gathered around the 
taps twice a day (once in the morning and once in the evening) to fill their water 
containers. The water itself was described as sweet, instantly able to quench one’s thirst, 
and abundant in supply. Over time, however, the lines dried up. One of the first to settle 
the marshes and jungles of Samandar Colony, Kalan Sahib, now an old man who used a 
walker to move around his home, described how the water, once free and abundant in 
communal taps, was now nothing more than a distant memory. “We had so much water 
[before]” he would exclaim in our conversations about Hindu Para’s early days. “The 
uneducated had never seen water like this!” When I inquired whether he received potable 
water, Kalan Sahib lamented that the water lines laid in the 90s to replace the system of 
communal taps had long been dry.  
Things began to change in the 1990s as community leaders and political cadres, with 
development funds from political parties like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), sought 
to, as some cynical interlocutors explained “build their vote banks.” Hindu Para’s water 
infrastructure correspondingly received an overhaul. The old pipes carrying water to the 
hand pumps were not replaced, but simply forgotten as community leaders, local 
patrons, and political parties worked together to lay new pipes over them. Unlike the 
hand pumps for which residents had to line up to receive water, the new pipes were to 
deliver water directly into people’s homes. Local leaders and PPP workers urged 
residents to take advantage of the ongoing development work by making an investment 
in individual household connections. As party workers laid secondary lines roughly 6 
inches in diameter in the settlement’s streets and lanes, Hindu Para’s residents had the 




4 inches. I got a sense of the excitement surrounding individualized access to piped water 
when I spoke to Ishaq Bhai, a former PPP worker who had helped several Hindu Para 
residents establish home connections at the time. As Ishaq Bhai explained, residents were 
advised to take advantage of the modernizing infrastructure in Hindu Para: 
Before, there used to be plenty of water. Around 20 years ago I connected many 
people to the water line, and they used those lines. On Eid, our [home] tanks 
used to overflow with water and I used to tell people to get their connections 
because there was plenty of water to be had!’ 
 
Caught up in the excitement of the moment, Hindu Para’s residents were, however, 
soon let down as their individual pipes slowly dried up over the next decade. Residents 
described, for instance, how after a few years of receiving piped water, their home 
connections barely remained pressurized for five minutes at pumping times compared to 
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2) Securing government issued 
“relief tankers” by filing out an 
application 
 
Deregulated70  3) Unbilled, “illegal” 
connections to 
mainlines where 
there the water 
pressure is high   
4) Free water from community 
tanks built and filled by 
political parties  
5) Purchasing water from small-
scale water vendors operating 
donkey carts 
6) Undocumented bore-well 
connections shared between 
neighbors 
Figure 3.2: Possible methods of water access in Samandar Colony 
 
                                                 
70 Deregulated methods include both legal and illegal access. For instance, while water provided 
by political parties is not illegal, it is not overseen by the city or provincial governments. Hence, it 




This is not to say that Hindu Para’s pipes have remained perpetually dry. There have 
been periods of resurgence where home connections produced water regularly for a few 
months here and there. In general, however, Hindu Para’s residents have resorted to a 
variety of methods of access in the last twenty-five years. Indeed, outside the seemingly 
obvious route of accessing water through official, functioning connections to municipal 
infrastructure, there are several other regulated – in the sense of being overseen by state 
institutions and controlled through procedures like billing and petitioning – and 




Figure 3.3: Methods of water access for 37 households in Samandar Colony 
 
It is important to note that not all methods of access produce the same quality and 
quantity of water. Based on a survey of 37 households in the settlement, for instance, I 
found that a large proportion of Hindu Para’s residents relied on small-scale vendors, 
and, to a lesser extent, on methods like bore-well connections and relief tankers (figure 
















households in Hindu Para. In describing the relative effectiveness of these different 
methods, residents’ lived experiences more generally demonstrate overlaps in the laws, 
official procedures, bureaucracies on one hand, and the relationships of friendship and 
political patronage on the other that characterize the material realties of water access. 
Indeed, even methods of access that can seemingly be classified as either regulated or 
deregulated, often paradoxically rely on a variety of procedures, actors, and practices to 
work. 
Methods 2: Beginning with regulated alternatives to piped water, “relief tankers” – a 
city-wide initiative by the Karachi Municipal Corporation to address the lack of piped 
water by supplying settlements and individual homes with water through officially 
sanctioned water tankers, have disappeared entirely from Hindu Para. For instance, as 
described by Sumit, a young father of two who previously used this method to access 
water, tankers from the government never arrive after applications are made:  
Sumit: First the government used to give it [water]. We used our ID card copies 
and they used to bring water [in tankers] and give it [to us]. But that has stopped 
as well.  
Me: Could you say a little more about that? 
Sumit: What we used to do is take our paid bill with us, with the house number, 
and a copy of a national identity card [to the district deputy commissioner’s 
office]. Then, after one or two or three days, whenever they had time, they 
brought us water. Now, that has stopped as well. Now when we go and wait in 
line and ask for water we don’t get anything. Even now we go [with all the 
documents] and make the application. They tell us the water will come after one 
or two weeks, but it doesn’t come. So, I say what is the point in going now? 
Dragging my father who is old in the heat to go and wait in lines… 
 
As Sumit claims, despite filling out all the legal requirements to secure a relief tanker 
(legal tenure with proof of address and a paid water bill from the KWSB), there is no 
guarantee water can be reliably accessed in this way. Certainly, many residents, including 
a water board official in the area, described how relief tankers once issued in their names 
had stopped in 2015. A local councilor claimed the tankers had purposefully been 




chairman could profit from his private tanker businesses. When a group of residents 
visited the Karachi’s District South office to inquire about the tankers, they were told in 
no uncertain terms by the deputy commissioner’s office that applications from Hindu 
Para would not be processes without approval from the party. “They told us to bring as 
many people as we wanted [to protest],” the councilor said. “But nothing could be done 
without approval from Bilawal House [referring to PPP leadership].” I was unable to 
verify the councilor’s story. But what mattered was that securing relief tankers, an 
otherwise “regulated” mode of access, required more than just filing formal paperwork. 
In addition, securing a relief tanker also required marshalling the influence of a powerful 
political patron who could force the bureaucracy into action.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: An undocumented connection in Samandar Colony (photo by author) 
 
Method 3: Despite widespread accusations of water theft, I saw little first-hand 
evidence that unbilled or “illegal” connections were widespread in Hindu Para. This is 
not to say that undocumented connections weren’t in operation throughout Samandar 




in places where there were known trunk mains (see figure 3.3 below). But, despite my 
friendliness with residents and local leaders, I did not gain the sort of internal observer 
perspective that would have granted me access to witness an illegal connection being 
made in person. Even so, this method of access, though by no means a figment of 
collective imagination, was clearly not open to all of Samandar Colony’s residents, least 
of all residents of Hindu Para. This is because securing an undocumented connection 
required the patronage of a local councilor or elected representative that could prevent 
the police from destroying the illegitimate connection.  
Many of Hindu Para’s residents simply did not possess this sort of political capital. As 
one older resident explained, “We don’t have an illegal connection because we’re scared 
we might get caught by the police.” Even if residents did have the required political 
capital, given Hindu Para’s location at the very edge of Samandar Colony, securing a 
connection to a pressurized segment of the mainline far upstream would require 
significant financial resources to hire the labor and procure the necessary materials. Of 
significance here, however, is that otherwise illegal and deregulated connections still 
depended on aspects of the formal state; not only did securing such a connection require 
the protection of a local councilor, it also relied on the city’s infrastructure.  
Method 4: An overwhelming majority of households claimed they received water 
from political party-run tanks only “sometimes.” When I returned to Karachi for 
fieldwork in 2018, just a few months shy of the general elections I found that while 
household connections still ran dry, many residents were getting water through tanks 
filled by various political parties. In addition to the two tanks already in operation under 
the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI) patronage, the PPP had constructed a brand new 
tank from which to disburse water secured from government-sponsored or private 
tankers. But this method was, at best, a temporary measure that did little to resolve 




jerry cans per households were barely enough for the toilet needs of a family of five, let 
alone cooking and cleaning. Many households thus had to combine this method of 
access with another. Moreover, though it seemed like these tanks were meant to supply 
water indiscriminately, in actuality, each tank supplied water to a select parts of Hindu 
Para. For instance, the PPP tank provided water to houses in the southeastern portion of 
Hindu Para, turning all others away. The PTI tanks, meanwhile, covered up to three lanes 
on Hindu Para’s northern and southern sides respectively. As such, this method left 
many households to fend for their own water needs. Again, however, it was apparent 
that a deregulated (though not illegal) method relied on a regulated sources – such as 
tankers from the government or the private sector – to produce water.71  
Methods 5-6: Of the remaining methods for accessing water, residents are left with 
the option of either purchasing water from small-scale vendors, or using bore-well 
connections. Though the latter produces water reliably, it comes with its own set of 
constraints. First, not all households have borehole connections. Establishing these 
connections requires time, money, and personal effort. Moreover, for those households 
that have made the investment, borehole connections are not a suitable substitute for 
piped water. First, these connections produce salty water that is unsuitable for cooking 
due Samandar Colony’s Para’s proximity to the sea. Second, the silt in the water table 
often jams hand pumps, forcing residents to pool their financial resources to hire a 
plumber for repair work.  
In Hindu Para, the regulated or deregulated nature of a particular method of access 
does not determine the quality and quantity of water it produces. Rather, access for 
residents depends on a variety of factors including the performance of city infrastructure, 
a requirement for particular kinds of paperwork or documentation, and the presence (or 
                                                 
71 I explore the perceptions of these tanks in chapter five where I address the 2018 general 




lack thereof) of patronized relationships. In Hindu Para, for instance, the patronage of 
political party leadership is critical in securing relief tankers which residents should 
otherwise be able to secure simply by producing a paid water bill and ID card (method 
2). By contrast, though anyone can surreptitiously secure an unauthorized connection to 
a bulk main, such an action is risky and unlikely to succeed without the tacit approval of 
state officials like councilors or members of parliament (method 3). Finally, while local 
tanks filled by the patronage of political party workers can prove to be a useful source of 
water, they rely on state sanctioned infrastructures to first secure this precious resource 
(method 4).  
Attention to the material realities of water access in Hindu Para thus reveals a 
symbiotic relationship between the so-called “formal” and “informal” city. What is clear 
in Hindu Para, however, is that this overlap places unique constraints on how water is 
accessed daily.72 Indeed, water access in Hindu Para is characterized by a situation where 
the urban poor must constantly negotiate multiple sources of uncertainty including 
unreliable city infrastructures, fickle bureaucracies, the whims of political patrons, the 
power of the police, and the dubious support of local state officials. Figure 3.4 above 
displays the constrictive consequences of this uncertainty as Hindu Para’s residents are 
forced to rely on the only method of access that works consistently: purchasing water 
from vendors. The following section highlights how purchasing vendor water, while 
perceived as a source of grievance, is simultaneously a way for residents to manage their 
hydraulic uncertainty.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Recent scholarship in urban studies demonstrates how populations caught between various 
dichotomies of legality and extralegality draw on both institutionalized and non-institutionalized 
forms of claim making (see Anand, 2017; Naqvi, 2017). Here I draw attention to how such a 
liminal position might also result in significant barriers that need to be negotiated in accessing 




Interlude: Water Vendors 
The informal sector is almost completely comprised of tankers. These tankers 
supply water legally or illegally, but they do so in collusion with the KWSB 
[Karachi water and Sewerage Board]. They must pay the state money to operate 
their business. They can’t operate without patronage. Rangers [paramilitary 
force], police, KWSB, MNAs, MPAs, everyone is involved in tankers. Then you 
have other aspects. For example, official water stand-posts have long lines which 
are managed by entrepreneurs that charge a premium on supposedly free water.73 
 
Small-scale vendors are ubiquitous in Karachi. Though described as unregulated actors 
operating outside the legal domain of the state, these entrepreneurs depend on both city 
infrastructure and actors such as legislators, police officers, and water board officials. 
Investigative journalism as well as research conducted by urban activists, such as Parveen 
Rahman, has made considerable headway in fleshing out the supply chain for water 
vending practices in Karachi.74 It all begins with private actors securing water from 
various bulk sources such as reservoirs, city pipes, official hydrants, or illegal hydrants. 
This water is then transported across the city through water tankers that range in size 
from 1,000 gallons to 12,000 gallons. Households in the city’s upscale areas or apartment 
complexes purchase the entire content of a single tanker to fill large underground or 
over-ground tanks. In settlements like Samandar Colony, where such tanks are few and 
far between, tanker operators sell their supply to small-scale vendors operating within 
specific communities – often in a small range of streets or houses. These small vendors 
then sell the water from push carts (figure 3.6). According to journalistic accounts, this 
supply chain involves both private actors like water “barons”, tanker drivers, and small-
scale vendors, and state officials like police officers and water board workers who engage 
in bribery or protection payments (see Ahmed, 2003; Ahmed, 2017; Rahman, 2008).   
                                                 
73 Interview with urban activist Arif Hasan, June 2017 
74 Indeed, there is a working theory that Rahman’s work on Karachi’s water tankers – including 





Though small-scale vendors have always been present in Hindu Para, it is only in the 
last 15 years that they have become the major providers of water in the settlement. Now, 
these vendors can be seen all over Samandar Colony (and, indeed, other areas of 
Karachi), pushing carts carrying distinctive blue jerry that sell for between Rs25 – Rs50 
depending on the labor involved to carry the water to people’s homes. In 2018, I spoke 
to Govinda, a small-scale vendor operating in Hindu Para. Govinda described himself as 
a local leader who had started a small water vending business to supply households in his 
vicinity. Relaxing on his charpai in the open air, Govinda explained why he started his 
vending business: 
There is no other water here. There hasn’t been line water in this area for close to 
thirty years. Even when the water does come, it comes for about 10 minutes 
through a tiny pipe and smells of sewage…This is the tail end. Even when there 
is water, it just doesn’t reach us here. As you can see, I started this business out 
of desperation. Before [this business], people would wake up for work and run 
around trying to find water for the day. Now, they know there is water here. 
They can come back from a long day at work and the water will be readily 
available to buy.   
 
Like the other small-scale water suppliers I spoke to, Govinda described the 
temporary, even humanitarian nature of his business. As he explained, his goal was not 
profit (because he had not expanded his business), but to fulfill his responsibilities as a 
local leader. That didn’t mean, however, that people from adjacent streets couldn’t come 
to him and buy water. Nor did Govinda shy away from claiming that he was running a 
business in a market where customers were desperate for his services, and where profits 
were not only used to cover his expenditures (paying for tankers, labor and transport 
materials like carts, cans and pipes) but also supplement his household income. 
Nevertheless, Govinda threatened to use his influence to withhold votes in the future if 
state officials did not fix the piped water situation.  
While Govinda described his water business as a necessary alternative to the 




described the product he was selling as perhaps the worst substitute for potable water. 
Ordinary residents, regardless of their ethnic or religious membership, often claimed 
vendor water was dirty, expensive and unusable for everyday household needs. In direct 
contradiction to Govinda’s humanitarian claims, some residents further pointed out that 
some vendors hiked up the price of a single drum by as much as 50% in times of 
shortage. Alia Aunty, an old widow who took care of her three grandchildren, described 
how the inconvenience with vendor water did not stop at short-term financial 
constraints. Instead, purchasing vendor water created significant long-term burdens for 
many residents:  
All our money is spent on water. Now, when we earn, should we pay for 
education, food, rent, or water? If we take care of our children, we cannot pay 
their school fees. If we cannot pay their school fees, they cannot go to school. If 
we get sick and don’t go to work ourselves, the bangle wala [rich people] tell us to 
stay home and not come anymore. So, what should poor people do? What can 
we do? It’s water. Even if it was Rs100 for a gallon we’d still pay. 
 
For Hindu Para’s residents, there are multiple problems associated with vendor water. 
Not only do families have to put up with dirty water, they must also find the time, labor 
and, most importantly, money to purchase this water on a daily basis. These problems are 
made worse by the deregulated nature of vending in the settlement where market forces, 
contra much of the received wisdom in development circles (see Kjellén et al., 2009 for 
an overview), fail to produce affordable access to clean water. With no official price 
controls in operation, a single jerry can is known to sell for up to Rs50 in summer 
months when demand for water is high across the city. But more than the financial 
burdens it creates, Alia Aunty also describes how continuing to purchase vendor water 
has disastrous consequences for households by straddling them with short-term and 
long-term burdens. From immediate concerns like being able to pay for food and rent, to 




the ability to live a decent life. As such, having to purchase vendor water is a unique 
source of grievance for many of Hindu Para’s residents. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: A vendor distributes water in Hindu Para (photo by author) 
 
And yet, vendors continue to roam the streets of Hindu Para. Despite recognizing the 
burdens of purchasing expensive and sometimes extremely dirty water daily, residents 
continue to justify their actions as a necessity in order to survive. The remainder of this 
chapter shows that rather than an instance of quiescence or subversion, purchasing water 
is a way for Hindu Para’s residents to actionably manage the wider uncertainty of daily 





Helping Oneself [“Apni Madat Āap”]  
Long before Samandar Colony received a dedicated pumping station for its water needs, 
residents of Hindu Para had relied on the influence of community leaders to secure state 
resources. Though these individuals often did not always hold positions as state officials, 
they wielded considerable authority over residents. In our conversations about the 
settlement’s early history, Babu Najib, a frail old man who was bedridden due to a stroke 
in his sixties, spoke of how these “barāy” lobbied on the community’s behalf for things 
like water and sanitation. He recalled, for instance, how the village head, a man named 
Saleh Mohammad, had convinced several families to move from Ismail Goth to the 60-
square yard settlement that would later be called Hindu Para. After the resettlement, 
Saleh Mohammad became the de-facto community representative, often advising families 
who to vote for to secure things like infrastructural improvements and jobs in their new 
living conditions. On a few occasions, Saleh Mohammad even campaigned for his own 
candidacy as an elected official. Though Babu Najib was, at times, critical of Saleh 
Mohammad’s record (“would we be buying water if he had done something for us?”), he 
described Hindu Para’s early years as filled with prosperity (using the Urdu word barkat): 
In those times Rs100 could help your run a house and you could still save money. 
Today, Rs500 will get barely get you enough households supplies to fill one hand. 
Before, it used to be that there was one earner who could feed ten people in the 
household. I used to be the only earner. And now, three or four of my children 
are working too. What I did to work and get my children on their feet, you can 
tell there is a huge difference between now and then. The thing is there was 
barkat [prosperity] then. Even though we didn’t have enough money, whatever 
money we had there was barkat in it. Now, even if you have a salary of Rs20, 000 
you will be crying. Now things are different. The thing is that there is no one to 
support us now either. They have all passed on. These new people, they do 
nothing. The people that we have now – look in our own community – the do 
nothing for us… This is why we miss the days that have passed. We miss those 
people who told us a time like this would come.  
 
In retelling these rosy first-hand accounts of Hindu Para’s history here, I do not claim 




access housing and public services. Instead, I highlight how a collective memory 
regarding Hindu Para’s prosperous early years compares to more recent narratives 
emphasizing an individualized sense of self-help, particularly when it came to everyday 
water access.75 For instance, when I spoke to Bano and Hashim, a young couple with two 
children who worked as domestic help in Karachi’s upscale housing settlements, they 
explained how purchasing vendor water was the only way of ensuring they met their 
household’s needs:  
Me: How is the water situation here?  
Bano: In my opinion it is bad.  
Hashim: It is very bad. There is no water. We have to buy. The water that we 
should easily get we are not getting. If we got water a lot of our problems would 
be solved. The main thing we are worried about is water. Because if we don’t get 
water everything else becomes a problem, cooking, cleaning, everything… 
Bano: And if we can’t buy water then things are really bad. In the summer, if the 
sellers don’t have tankers then we have to go very far and get water. Then after a 
few days they’ll come to us and say: “this is how much a gallon costs (Rs50) if 
you want it buy it, if you don’t want it, don’t buy it.” 
Hashim: Then we have to buy it out of desperation [majboori]. 
 
The couple went on to describe how the need to “help themselves” by purchasing 
vendor water emerged in the perceived lack of community organizing initiatives of the 
past:  
Hashim: Our barāy don’t do anything for water. Even if they say [they will do 
something], nothing happens. They keep quiet. They say, what’s the point? They 
say, let things be because nothing’s going to happen. We’re not going to get 
water. Let things run the way they are running.   
Me: Let things be?  
Bano: Yes, like if there is no water, people are buying water, then who has the 
time to run here and there and get pushed around. Let things run the way they 
are running. Let people keep buying water. Nobody is going to do anything for 
us anyway. 
Me: So, people don’t protest?  
Hashim: Who has the time? Nobody protests. 
Bano: You’ll never even hear that there was a protest in Hindu Para [laughs]… 
We do our work and stay in our homes. Whatever problems we have we solve 
ourselves [apni madat āap]. Like water, everyone knows we don’t have water but 
we keep buying it.  
                                                 
75 Susan Stewart (1993: 23) reminds us of the power of nostalgia as “ideological reality” that 
denies historical lived experiences in favor of utopian narratives of the past. As such, the power 
of nostalgia not only reframes the past, but also shapes how the present is perceived in relation 





Like many other residents, Bano and Hashim described their situation as one of futility in 
terms of political actions like mobilization or lobbying. The lack of potable water 
continued, they explained, because nobody explored these avenues to try and solve the 
problem. In doing so, the couple presented an understanding of their precarity as 
emanating from abjection and collective political paralysis. But, as the conversation 
continued, often veering into criticisms of local leaders, Bano and Hashim also 
emphasized how they continued to “help themselves” in such a situation:  
Bano: Now look, the elections are about to happen so the PPP people came and 
made all these holes [in the roads]. You might have seen all these holes and pipes. 
In the last election the PTI people were the ones that made these roads! 
Me: So, you’re saying they built this road and then broke it again?  
Hashim: Yes.  
Bano: Yes, they just broke it.  
Hashim: All these roads were already built before they broke them. 
Me: But, why break a broken road?  
Bano: To put in new [water] lines. Each party is saying they will do the work. 
This is what happens in poor people’s areas, because we can’t tell them to stop. 
We stick to our work and stay in our homes. Even our barāy do the same. 
Whoever wants they come and break something or build it.  
Hashim: They’re looking after themselves, not the poor.  
Bano: They must be getting money from ahead (the party) 
Hashim: But when you ask them [to finish the work], they say they don’t have the 
budget. 
Bano: So, the people have to solve their own problems. Apni madat āap [helping 
themselves]  
Me: Could you say more about apni madat āap?  
Bano: Like if someone has a problem, they solve it themselves. They do their 
own work.  
Me: Do you think this is a good thing? 
Bano: No. Because look at these holes, god forbid a child were to fall in them. 
We have to close it all ourselves. People from everyone’s houses work and plug 
the holes in their respective areas. They [elected officials, party cadres] don’t do 
the whole work. They break everything and leave. This is what people do here. 
They help themselves. 
Me: Like you help yourself by fixing these roads, do you also help yourselves in 
other circumstances as well? 
Bano: Yes, like how we get water. Look, no one is giving us any water, so we are 
helping ourselves. We are buying water. This is an expenditure as well, isn’t it? It 
ends up being about Rs5,000 a month. Now, the person who has a small salary, 
what is he expected to do? Should he do a job or feed his kids or buy water? If 






As Bano and Hashim noted, Hindu Para’s residents often resorted to solving their 
own problems. Indeed, as I leant through conversations with other families, residents 
saw helping themselves [“apni madat āap”] as more than just a way to address their water 
woes by purchasing vendor water, but as perhaps the only way to deal with a variety of 
everyday problems that were otherwise the responsibility of state officials or local leaders 
to resolve. For instance, Pooja, a woman living with her husband and two young children 
at Hindu Para’s southern edge related a particularly noteworthy example of how she and 
her neighbors were forced to fix broken sewage connections when elected officials 
allegedly shrugged of their responsibility.   
Even now, they have ruined our gulley by digging it up. They broke everyone’s 
gutter lines that were working properly. Then the sewage started going 
everywhere, collecting outside our houses. When the men spoke to them, they 
didn’t listen. Then all the women got together and went to the PPP [Pakistan 
People’s Party] office to tell them about the sewerage problem. But no one came. 
After they broke the street, everyone fixed their own [sewage] connections by 
helping themselves [apni madat āap]. Even now, they are asking for votes, but they 
won’t fix anything. For instance, we were about to have a family wedding, so we 
fixed our own gulley. Other people also fixed the gulley for their own needs. 
Otherwise it would have stayed like this. There was a hole in the middle and 
mounds of sand on each side. We had to fill it ourselves. 
Like Bano and Hashim, Pooja described self-help [“apni madat āap”] as a way for residents 
to solve various kinds of problems pertaining to everyday life including, but not limited 
to, service delivery As Pooja explained, this approach was not based on collective 
mobilization. Though residents often spoke to their representatives as a single group 
with a common concern, when these efforts (often) failed, families solved a problem 
through individualistic efforts aimed at addressing their own household’s needs (such as 
clearing sewage in front of one’s home in advance of a family wedding).  
Though the corresponding effort to help themselves certainly comes from a lack of 
options to solve problems through a combination of institutional and relational forms of 
claim making, the conversations presented here show that helping oneself [“apni madat 




the generalized, albeit individualistic approach to dealing with everyday problems by 
helping oneself shows that residents who purchase vendor water to meet their daily 
needs are not engaging in everyday acts of resistance against authority figures. Instead, 
they are purposively managing and coping with conditions beyond their control. 
Certainly, the conversations presented here show that Hindu Para’s residents do perhaps 
engage in subtle acts of resistance, at least in the realm of everyday speech, when they 
caricature their local leaders. By describing the incompetence of building a road while 
bungling dozens of water and sewage connections in the process, for example, families 
can be seen as rebuking authority figures who have the power to enact development 
plans. Yet, purchasing vendor water in response to dry pipes (or mending sewerage 
connections based on individual need for that matter) does not amount to an act of 
subversion in such circumstances. Rather, it is an act of individualistic problem-solving. 
Framed in the language of helping oneself purchasing vendor water in conditions of 
uncertainty is a conscious effort by Hindu Para’s residents to manage their precarity.  
 
Making Do [“Guzāra”] 
A sense of helping oneself when purchasing vendor water often went hand in hand with 
the need to “make do.” I first met Kavitha Aunty in June 2017 while conducting 
interviews with Hindu Para residents. A young woman at the time of the 1980 
resettlement, Kavitha Aunty moved to Hindu Para with her family and eventually 
married a man from a neighboring Hindu family. Life took an unfortunate turn for 
Kavitha Aunty when her husband passed away, forcing her to clean people’s homes to 
support her six children. Now an old woman, Kavitha Aunty explained she no longer 
worked, but was supported by her younger son who earned about Rs10,000 a month. 




Aunty relied on the kindness of her landlord to make late payments or the indulgence of 
her neighbors to borrow money when the need arose. Where water was concerned, 
Kavitha Aunty relied on bore-well connections or, if political parties were distributing 
water, awami tanks. Mostly, however, Kavitha Aunty purchased water from a vendor in 
her lane. With her monthly water expenditure amounting to roughly Rs4,500 a month – 
nearly half of her son’s income – purchasing water put an inexorable strain on her living 
conditions. When I met Kavitha Aunty again in 2018, she described how she met such 
difficult circumstances:  
We buy gallons for Rs30. We are just making do [guzāra hai]. We’re getting water 
from here and there to meet our needs. What else can we do [laughs]? The poor 
have lots of things to worry about [paraishani]. We have to worry about things like 
electricity, things like the rent, whether children have jobs or not… I don’t like 
buying water. But I do it out of necessity [majboori]. 
 
At first, I found Kavitha Aunty’s account to be an example of inaction and dormancy. 
Given that her precarious financial situation was relatively worse than her neighbors’, I 
had expected to hear far more criticism from her regarding the failings of community 
leaders and elected officials to provide potable water. Instead, what I heard was akin to a 
quiet acceptance of her misfortunes – including those stemming from spending nearly 
half her monthly income on vendor water. 
At the same time, however, the language of “making do” Kavitha Aunty deployed 
also suggested that she was engaged in daily efforts to manage the wider hydraulic 
uncertainty in Hindu Para. Certainly, purchasing vendor water meant that she had one 
less concern when she was constantly worrying about paying rent, electricity bills, and 
whether her son would remain employed. Kavitha Aunty was not alone in this regard. 
Residents in her gulley as well as throughout Hindu Para routinely described purchasing 
vendor water in terms of making do [“guzāra”] or necessity [“majboori”]; a way to tackle 
the particular problem of daily water access amidst a sea of other concerns. Such 




manage a household’s water supplies efficiently on one hand, but who, in a conservative 
society, were also unable to freely venture out to purchase more vendor water if the need 
arose. For instance, Saima, a young single mother who purchased water daily from 
Govinda described how the difficulties of securing vendor water were reproduced along 
gendered lines: 
The problem is that ladies can’t buy [vendor water]… and the pipe [the vendor] 
uses is not long enough to reach the higher floors. So, [the vendor] sells water to 
people on the ground floor for Rs30, but when he has to carry the water up to 
the second floor he charges Rs35 for his labor. Because of this the problems 
become bigger. Sometimes, we tell our neighbors to bring the water for us, but 
then we have to wait for them. The ladies that stay at home, they manage to get 
water from the donkey cart. But for that they have to stay home. But when we 
have to get it from outside – for instance, when [the water vendor] doesn’t have 
any water – then we have to get it from elsewhere in the community or further 
out. Ladies don’t go to get that water. Only if there are men can they go and get 
the water. Either we have to wait for the man or the donkey cart. And after about 
6pm, you can’t get any water.  
 
Saima faced many challenges in securing water that other households with higher 
incomes and male family members did not. Like Kavitha Aunty, Saima’s account also 
suggests a resignation to the difficulties stemming from the lack of potable water and the 
gendered burdens she was forced to navigate. But, much like Kavitha Aunty, Saima went 
on to describe how she focused on managing these difficulties. For instance, Saima 
explained that she purchased vendor water despite knowing full well the money she 
owed the water board was slowly climbing to an insurmountable sum. She made clear 
how she preferred to use what little money she had to continue purchasing vendor water 
– regardless of the gendered problems this reliance created for her – rather than paying 
her water bills:     
I tear them [water bills] and throw them away. There has been no water for four 
years. If there is no water, why should we pay Rs500 for water? Shouldn’t we just 
use that Rs500 to buy water instead? The water has not been coming properly for 
four years. Someone can pay one month without getting water, two months, 
maybe even 6 months. But they’re not going to pay for years without getting 
water, are they? Now people think, the water is not coming, so we have no 






At first glance, it is possible to interpret these responses as quiescence. Like many Hindu 
Para residents, Kavitha Aunty and Saima can be seen as giving in paying exorbitant sums 
for water that is dirty – often to the point of being undrinkable – simply because there is 
no other way to secure this precious resource. But while the language of “making do” 
suggests a lack of choice, it does not imply what Gaventa (1980: 16-17) describes as 
“undue apathy about one’s situation.” In fact, it is quite the opposite; as residents engage 
in unregulated exchanges of time and money with vendors, they reveal an awareness of 
their precarity as well as an understanding of how to move through it. This is borne out 
most clearly in discussions about how paying for water relieves the uncertainty stemming 
not only from a lack of potable water, but also from the general anxieties that many 
residents face on a daily basis.  
In much of the development literature, scholars argue that underserviced populations 
have an innate “willingness to pay” for services like water (Casey et al., 2006; Vásquez et 
al., 2009; Whittington et al., 1991).76 Relying on the rational actor model, a willingness to 
pay is used by development scholars to justify policies like installing water meters. The 
narratives of Hindu Para residents certainly do not negate the idea that people are willing 
to pay for water (even if, they would prefer paying for municipal services rather than 
vending ones simply because the former end up being cheaper). However, closer 
attention to the accounts of Kavitha Aunty and Saima – who are among the worst 
affected by the state of water access in Hindu Para due to their financial and gendered 
positions within the community – suggests that purchasing this precious resource is more 
than just an economic transaction. Indeed, residents like Saima and Kavitha Aunty pay 
for water not only because they are willing to purchase this precious resource, but also 
because paying for vendor water in particular is the only way to lessen the uncertainty 
                                                 




they face in various other facets of their lives. Paying for vendor water ensures, for 
instance, that Saima can come home from work without having to worry about whether 
the municipal connection she is charged for monthly will produce water. For Kavitha 
Aunty, as for many others, paying for water means there is one less things to worry about 
amidst the scramble to pay rent on time, pay bills, and retain employment. Simply put, 
payment while not a choice made by rational actors (in the sense that there is no other 




There is no doubt that small-scale water vending is an exceedingly sub-par solution 
(temporary or otherwise) to Hindu Para’s potable water shortages. Like in other 
developing contexts around the world, such vendors plug the gaps in Karachi’s decrepit 
municipal water network, often working with formal institutions and state officials to do 
so. But small-scale vendors do not always benefit the poor as development practitioners 
often claim (see Ayalew et al., 2014; Casey et al., 2006; Ishaku et al., 2010; Onyenechere 
et al., 2012; Vasquez at al., 2009; Whittington et al., 1991). Instead, in communities where 
vending has largely replaced potable water supplies, such unregulated practices give rise 
to a host of poverty-inducing and health concerns (Altenburg and Drachenfels, 2006; 
Braimah et al., 2018; Constantine et al., 2017; Mitlin et al., 2019). Between these two 
developmental perspectives lie the lived experiences of Hindu Para’s residents who 
venture out daily to meet their water needs. In the preceding sections, I have shed light 
on how purchasing vendor water – despite the financial and social burdens it entails – 
offers as a way to cope with precarity. As such, families’ efforts to secure water reliably 




to uncertain living conditions on the other. Of course, in criticizing state officials, 
different ethnic groups, and even their neighbors, residents show a disinclination to 
accept the status quo – even if they don’t actively mobilize to challenge it. But it is 
important not to overstate purchasing water – as a logical and purposeful response to 
“helping oneself” in such uncertainty – with a form of resistance. At the same time, while 
purchasing water certainly comes out of a lack of choice for many residents, it does not 
evidence indolence, apathy, or quiescence on the part of residents. Indeed, like Saima and 
Kavitha Aunty, many families in Hindu Para work hard to “make do” in a context replete 
with privation. In purchasing vendor water – often at considerable financial and social 
costs – residents neither act as subversive political actors nor dominated and powerless 
individuals. Instead, they are normal everyday residents engaged in efforts to produce 
livable spaces out of hardships beyond their control.  
 
Conclusion 
In Karachi’s Samandar Colony, access to water has been rendered increasingly precarious 
over the space of three decades. With access through a patchwork of municipal pipes, 
government programs, and relational networks rendered, at best, uncertain, small-scale 
vendors have emerged as the only reliable way to procure water. As the experiences of 
everyday residents in an old part of the settlement known as Hindu Para show, these 
vending practices create extreme marginalization with households subjected to debt, 
disease and, ironically, a thirst for usable water. But, even though vendor water is dirty 
and expensive, residents continue purchasing it without instances of civil unrest. Indeed, 
families in Hindu Para have responded to the de-facto privatization of water in the 
settlement by treating vendors as a necessity. Their desire to help themselves [“apni 
madat āap”] and make do [“guzāra”] by purchasing vendor water sheds light on why 




hand, or more violent expressions of their grievances such as rioting and intercommunal 
violence on the other. But as this chapter has argued, the explicit lack of protests, rioting, 
and general unrest in Samandar Colony signals neither everyday resistance nor 
quiescence. Instead, as residents in Hindu Para turn to purchasing vendor water, they 
actively seek to manage and cope with their onerous living conditions. Between the 
extremes of daily subversion or resignation, Hindu para’s families find ways to occupy 
and, indeed, reproduce the city.  
And yet, in their efforts to cope, Samandar Colony’s residents do not relegate 
themselves to Karachi’s social and political margins. In as much as purchasing vendor 
water entails a broader recognition of their everyday precarity, coping strategies signal 
how residents put formalized institutions to work for them when the time is right. In the 
fitful domain of Karachi’s electoral politics when state officials, party workers, and 
middlemen cater to potential voters by promising improved municipal services – 
however briefly – residents’ recognition of their constant deprivation becomes a way to 
frame claims for resources like water. Before, doing so, however, I first examine another 
key site of material practices which reproduce the city; it is to how officials of the 
Karachi Water and Sewerage Board navigate the uncertain social, legal, and material 







“OUR JOB IS TO INFORM” 
Knowledge, Checking and the Politics of Engineering Neutrality 
 
It was a sizzling day in June 2018 when I visited the field offices of Karachi’s Defense 
Housing Authority (DHA) to inquire why my residence was not receiving piped water.77 I 
was met with a deserted courtyard as I walked past the small, wrought iron gate into the 
walled compound of the field office. A tiny room crammed with desks, shelves and steel 
chairs in one corner of the courtyard was unoccupied, save for a rather tired-looking 
person who identified himself as a DHA official. The official responded to my inquiry 
about the lack of line water by gesturing absent-mindedly to a large white board labelled 
“WATER SUPPLY SCHEDULE – SUB-DIVISION II.” He pointed to my street name 
and a date written in magic marker and told me I had received water earlier this week 
according to the schedule. “You will have to wait for next week now,” he said, returning 
to his newspaper. When I explained that I had not received line water for weeks, despite 
what the schedule indicated, he responded: “The office is closed. You’ll have to come 
back another time.”  
Over the next few days, I continued calling the DHA field office to request a house 
call from a maintenance official. Eventually, a DHA official named Rana showed up to 
                                                 
77 The Defense Housing Authority (DHA) is a collection of housing settlements in Karachi 
developed and managed by the Pakistan military. Originally meant as housing for military 
officers, DHA has since become home to many of Karachi’s upper-middle class citizens. As a 
“planned area” (see chapter 2), DHA’s housing settlements are laid out in neat grids with an 
underground network of water pipes to match. As a public body, the DHA is responsible for 
buying water in bulk from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) and pumping it to 




check my piped connection. I watched from the shade as one of the laborers Rana had 
brought with him hacked away at the street in the hot sun. In what seemed like no time 
at all, the laborer used a pickaxe to dig a hole around three feet deep. He then proceeded 
to shovel loose sand out of the hole before finally using a hammer and chisel to clear 
debris around a black pipe no more than 8 inches in diameter. The pipe, which ran 
subterraneously parallel to the street, was connected perpendicularly to a much thinner 
white pipe via an “elbow” joint that curved up and towards the side so that the thinner 
pipe, in turn, ran across the street underground and into the subterranean tank in my 
home (figure 4.1). After unscrewing the elbow joint and checking both pipes, the laborer 
told me there was no obstruction. Frustrated, I asked Rana what would happen now. 
“Look,” he replied, as the laborer shoveled sand back into the hole, “this is all 
underground, so we can’t know for sure. If the problem isn’t here it must be elsewhere. 
So, we’ll have to make more holes to check.” A few weeks later, Rana and his laborers 
found the obstruction. A tree root had grown through the point of contact between the 
secondary black pipe and a “T” joint further up the street. It took Rana and his laborers 
an additional two visits, during which time they made several more “checking holes” in 
different parts of the street, to identify the problem. 
In Karachi, pumping schedules and supply quotas seek to render the city’s water 
network calculable. These formalized technologies represent, in exceedingly precise 
terms, the temporal and spatial logic according to which water is pumped throughout a 
city of 20 million people. Yet, as my own experience trying to secure potable water 
demonstrates, schedules such as the one outside the DHA field office I visited in June 
2018 operate in an idealized, even abstracted domain. They assume that Karachi’s vast 
network of pipes can be easily pressurized by the turn of a valve or the switch of a 
pumping motor. In so doing, such formalized technologies elide the constant, material 




network thus entails a dichotomy in which precise quotas and pumping times exist 
alongside the everyday, often imprecise work of low-level officials like Rana. (After all, it 
took digging up several parts of the street for Rana and his laborer to identify and 
address my dry pipes). Yet, while such work is, by nature, imprecise in that it revolves 
around addressing vague, indistinct problems that afflict the city’s infrastructure, it is 
equally important in rendering Karachi’s opaque, underground water flows knowable. As 
officials like Rana travel the city to “check” pipes, valves, and elbow joints, they produce 
real-time, reliable information about Karachi’s fickle waterscape in a way that remains 
uncaptured by pumping schedules and supply quotas hanging in government offices.78 
In this chapter, I explore how Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) “machine 
operators” make the city’s hydrologies more knowable.79 Specifically, I focus on the work 
of machine operators at a pumping station outside Samandar Colony, a Karachi 
settlement at the very edge of the city’s water network. Drawing on three months of 
participant observation, I document how these low-level state officials constantly 
produce and circulate information about such things as supply levels, shifting pumping 
schedules, and valve position in dealing with the settlement’s water infrastructure.  
I argue that the efforts of machine operators have political effects that far exceed the 
relative availability of water. As they carry out the banal tasks of maintenance and 
“checking”, machine operators insulate themselves from the contentious, everyday 
politics of water access in Samandar Colony by performing the role of “neutral” state 
                                                 
78 Recent urban scholarship argues that city engineers are not vassals of state practice that 
reproduce the technical and privileged domains of official knowledge/power (Björkman and 
Harris, 2018). Instead, working in highly diverse and often intractable local environments, such 
figures mediate the contradictions that emerge between discourses of development on one hand, 
and the everyday complexities of navigating urban life on the other (Björkman, 2018; Hansen and 
Verkaaik, 2009). 
79 Machine operators are civil servants employed to the KWSB through the Government of 
Sindh. With an official rank of BS-06 (a low-level government pay grade), machine operators are 
posted across the city and work in shifts to manually switch pumping motors on and off, set 
valves, and monitor the water infrastructure. The goal of machine operators is to ensure different 




officials. By engaging in this politics of neutrality, Samandar Colony’s machine operators 
enact a discursive and material distinction between the technical work of supplying water 
– of dealing with valve positions and motor pressures – and the constantly negotiated 
process through which the settlement’s residents divvy up bulk water supplies amongst 
themselves. As described by a machine operator I spoke to in June 2018, “Our job is to 
inform; the politics is up to them.” In so doing, machine operators reproduce the 
materialities and subjectivities of a bulk supply system where maintenance goes hand in 
hand with hydraulic uncertainty.   
 
 





This chapter begins with an overview of Samandar Colony’s bulk water supply 
system. Charting how the settlement’s single pumping station receives water and sends it 
onward, I document the material and social uncertainty which structure Samandar 
Colony’s extended hydrology. In such circumstances, information about things such as 
pumping times and locations, supply levels, pressures and valve positions integral to 
facilitating water access in material terms. The subsequent section therefore turns 
ethnographic attention to the practices of Samandar Colony’s machine operators. 
Specifically, I describe the “checking” practices through which machine operators 
produce and circulate information about the settlement’s water flows. In the concluding 
sections of this chapter, I demonstrate both how machine operators use specific 
discourses and practices around this information to perform the role of “neutral” public 
officials, and how such a politics of neutrality reproduces the hydraulic status quo in 
Samandar Colony.  
 
Shifting Schedules  
Karachi does not run on a 24/7 supply network where the city’s pipes are constantly 
pressurized. Instead, water is pumped on a staggered schedule to different parts of the 
city at distinct days and times. This turn-based system is facilitated by an infrastructure 
that includes miles of water pipes, hundreds of inconspicuous valves that are manually 
operated to direct the flow of water, and over 150 pumping stations at various points in 
the city. “Samandar Station” is one such station which supplies Samandar Colony with 
water. Operationalized in 2013 under the auspices of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP), Samandar Station was built with an 80,000-gallon underground tank and two 




easily number in the hundreds of thousands.80 Samandar Station is supplied water by 
“Basin Station”, another pumping node located about a mile and a half from Samandar 
Colony, via a 24-inch mainline (figure 4.2). But Basin Station is not Samandar Colony’s 
only source of water. Samandar Station is also attached to a reverse osmosis (RO) plant 
operated by Pak Oasis, a privately-owned company. The plant, which collects and 
desalinates underground water before depositing it in Samandar Station’s tank, is one of 
many across the city.81 Samandar Station thus serves as a pumping node where water can 
be collected from two distinct sources before being pumped to households in the 
settlement via 12-inch water pipes (see figure 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Samandar Colony bulk water supply system (diagram by author) 
 
                                                 
80 As I discuss in chapter 3, Samandar Colony’s water infrastructure is intertwined with electoral 
politics in the settlement. Lines have largely been laid by political parties looking for vote banks. 
The construction of Samandar Station is another example of how the desire to secure votes has 
shaped the settlement’s water infrastructure.   
81 Reverse osmosis plants are part of an initiative started by the PPP-led Government of Sindh in 
2013. This initiative, which is carried out by the private sector through companies like Pak Oasis, 




I saw how this infrastructure functioned up-close when Rahul, a KWSB machine 
operator posted to Samandar Station, invited me to visit. One of my goals during my first 
few weeks of fieldwork in June 2018 was to learn how much water Samandar Station 
received and pumped onward given reports of city-wide shortages. I therefore focused 
on mapping out the days and times when water from Basin Station was due to be 
pumped to Samandar Station according to a supply schedule mandated by the KWSB. 
After studying station log books and extensive conversations with water operators at 
Basin and Samandar stations, I slowly began to grasp the fortnightly schedule. As table 
4.1 shows, water is due to be pumped from Basin Station at distinct times every day over 
a schedule that runs the course of thirteen days. There is no water on day 14 (Monday), 
and the schedule is then reset to day 1 (Tuesday). Water is due to be pumped from Basin 
Station to Samandar Station five times at 1pm, 3pm, 9pm, 12am, and 3am over each 24-
hour period for the two-week cycle. This creates a biweekly schedule where Tuesdays, 
Thursdays, and Saturdays are due to receive water at 1pm, 3pm, and 9pm and 
Wednesdays, Fridays, and Sundays are due to receive water at 12 am and 3am the first 
week, and vice versa the following week. There is one important caveat in this schedule. 
Because Karachi’s water network is turned off for 24 hours between 6pm on Sunday and 
6pm on Monday, water is not due to be pumped to Samandar Station from Basin Station 
after 3pm on Sunday until 9pm the following Monday at the end of the first week.  
But, after carefully mapping this hard-won information, I found that the official 
schedule simply served as a rough framework for pumping times. For instance, table 4.2 
below depicts a two-week, representative sample of a three month period during which I 
recorded the times at which Samandar Station received water from Basin Station (black 
cells indicate days and times water is meant to be pumped but isn’t). As the figure shows, 




than the five times expected by the schedule; once between 4pm and 6pm, once again at 
8:45pm, and then at 2:45am the same night.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Samandar Station layout (diagram by author) 
 
In addition to charting the days and times water was scheduled to arrive, I also 
focused on measuring the amount of water pumped into Samandar Station’s tank every 
day. But, in the absence of water meters, I had to familiarize myself with a practice that is 
best described as “counting stairs.” This involved physically checking Samandar Station’s 
tank to observe how many “stairs” – a series of metal poles forming a sort of right-angle 
triangle shape at one of the tank’s corners – were visible. With the tank’s capacity at 
80,000 gallons and a total of nine stairs, each stair accounts for roughly 9,000 gallons of 
water. Each pumping time raised the water level by roughly 2.5 stairs (22,500 gallons).82 
                                                 
82 Though it may seem meager given Samandar Station’s 80,000-gallon capacity, water operators 
considered 2.5 stairs “good water” in the sense that it was enough to supply a majority of homes 





Given that water was pumped three times on average from Basin Station over 24 hours, 
Samandar Station received a daily supply of roughly 63,000 gallons. This made the RO 
plant, which deposited roughly 15,000 gallons of desalinated water in Samandar Station’s 
tank daily, an important supplementary supply source. With these sources combines, 
Samandar Station thus received about 82,500 gallons over a representative 24-hour 
period. This was far less than the 127,500 gallons (including RO water) expected if water 
was pumped five times a day as per the official schedule (table 4.2). 
 
Days/Hours 12am 3am 1pm 3pm 9pm 
Tuesday      
Wednesday      
Thursday      
Friday      
Saturday      
Sunday      
Monday City-wide shutdown  
Tuesday       
Wednesday      
Thursday       
Friday       
Saturday       
Sunday      
Monday  City-wide shutdown  
Table 4.1: Scheduled pumping times from Basin Station to Samandar Station 
 
Machine operators working at Samandar Station and Basin Station explained this lack 
of water in terms of city-wide shortages. For instance, when I asked Hunr, an operator 
posted to Basin Station, why water was not pumped to Samandar Station at 1pm and 




shortages. “All we can do is send whatever water we get on (to Samandar Station)” he 
said. Yet, Hunr’s claim that Samandar Colony, like the rest of Karachi, was in the throes 
of a city-wide shortage, failed to explain instances where Samandar Station received 
spectacularly large amounts of water. Indeed, there were a few occasions during my three 
months at Samandar Station where water pumped from Basin Station caused the 
Samandar tank to overflow its 80,000 gallon capacity. On one occasion, Rahul and I were 
enjoying the cool evening while waiting for the scheduled 8:45pm supply from Basin 
Station when a sudden, gurgling sound was followed by water bubbling up through the 
tank cover and quickly sweeping the concrete floor. Quick as a flash, Rahul ran to the 
pump’s control room to switch on the dual motors and pump the water onward so that 
the supply arriving in the tank did not continue to overflow. When I asked Rahul why 
the water had overflowed, he simply shrugged: “Must be a mistake,” he said.  
 
Days/Hours 12am 2:45am 1pm 4pm – 6pm 8:45pm 
Tuesday      
Wednesday      
Thursday      
Friday      
Saturday      
Sunday      
Monday   
Tuesday       
Wednesday      
Thursday       
Friday       
Saturday       
Sunday      
Monday       




This “mistake” was repeated on other instances as well. On another occasion, the 
absence of a machine operator at Samandar Station meant the overflow could not be 
stopped. The incident occurred when the water was pumped from Basin Station at 
4:30pm. Khan, the water operator who worked afternoons at Samandar Station had a 
habit of leaving before his shift was over. It just so happened that Khan was nowhere to 
be found when thousands of gallons of water unexpectedly arrived at Samandar Station 
in the middle of the afternoon. The tank would overflow and inundate the entire 
surrounding compound in 6 inches of water before city officials and residents realized 
what was going on.  
In short, while machine operators often spoke of shortages, it was clear from 
instances such as these that Samandar Colony’s bulk water supply could vary 
dramatically. But not all machine operators pointed to shortages to explain Samandar 
Colony’s (usual) lack of bulk water. On a visit to Basin Station, for instance, I met a 
machine operator named Jamshed who claimed that party workers from the Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM) would routinely seek to hide the amount of water available 
for Samandar Colony. Jamshed explained that water to Basin Station was controlled via a 
small valve further up the road that had to be set manually to direct the flow of water 
(figure 4.2). “The entire problem starts there,” Jamshed said nervously, referring to the 
water supplied to Samandar Station. The water operator then showed me two small pipes 
connected to Basin Station’s pumping motors. One of the pipes carried water to 
Samandar Colony and the other to a neighboring “planned district” also served by Basin 
Station. Jamshed explained that a person affiliated with the MQM named Zulfi, who was 
also in charge of the planned area’s pumping station, often told him to tell Samandar 
Colony residents that the valve controlling water to Basin Station was open when it was, 
in fact, closed. In this way, water meant for Samandar Colony could be secretly collected 




claim the valve was open but there was no water at Basin station; thereby explaining the 
lack of water in terms of a “shortage” beyond his control.  
As these fieldwork experiences show, the flow of water between Basin Station and 
Samandar Station is marked by both material and social uncertainty. Indeed, even the 
common trope of shortages cannot explain the unpredictability through which Samandar 
Station receives water. Neither official schedules, nor carefully calculated, real-time 
schemas (such as the one I created) thus fully account for the excesses and shortages in 
bulk supply experienced at Samandar Station. Whether because of city-wide water 
shortages, the trickery of a few machine operators, “mistakes” in pumping practices, or a 
combination of these factors, the supply from Basin Station, though not unpredictable, 
remains largely incalculable. Below, I describe how this uncertainty is further 
compounded by the actions of local leaders and representatives as Samandar Station’s 
bulk water supplies are pumped onwards to different parts of the settlement.  
 
Negotiated Schedules  
Like the rest of the city, Samandar Colony too is supplied water through a staggered 
system. In terms of physical water infrastructure, this means Samandar Colony is split 
into three pumping zones (figure 4.4 below). Each zone has its own 12-inch piped 
connection to Samandar Station which is pressurized by exit valves controlling the flow 
of water. Every other day, water is first collected at Samandar Station throughout the day 
(from both Basin Station and the RO plant) before being pumped to a single pumping 
zone at 9pm. Between 9am and 3am, water operators wait for the 2:45am supply before 
changing the valves and pumping the water to a different pumping zone at 3am. Water is 
therefore pumped to two of the three pumping zones at 9pm and 3am respectively, every 




only two of the three pumping zones receive water on any given pumping day. Precisely 
which two of the three pumping zones receive water on a given day is subject to constant 
negotiations between Samandar Colony’s residents themselves.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Layout of bulk water supply Samandar Colony (diagram by author) 
 
Specifically, water is divvied up between the three pumping zones according to what 
residents of Samandar Colony call a “wari” [turn] based system. Under the wari system, 
community leaders – and in particular the settlement’s councilors and local elders – 
representing each of the three zones negotiate pumping turns amongst themselves.83 It is 
these negotiations, rather than a fixed pumping schedule, that determine the geographic 
dimension according to which Samandar Colony’s households receive water. Table 4.3 
below, based on a sample of fieldwork recordings over a three-month period, documents 
                                                 
83 Hansen and Stepputat (2006: 297) usefully describe such actors as “informal sovereignties” that 
do not derive their authority from legal provisions or ideas about legitimate rule, but through 




changes in this geographic dimension by charting the distribution of water between 







Tuesday 9pm 1 
Wednesday 3am 2 
Thursday 9pm 2 
Friday 3am 1 
Saturday 9pm 1 
Sunday 3am 2 
Monday 9pm 2 
Tuesday 3am 1 
Wednesday 9pm 1 
Thursday 3am 2 
Friday 9pm 3 
Saturday 3am 1 
Sunday 9pm 2 
Table 4.3: Distribution of water to specific pumping zones in Samandar Colony 
 
At first glance the wari system seems like an example of community-based 
organizing and problem solving in a context where reliable access to water is a city-wide 
problem. Certainly, the daily operation of Karachi’s water network is dogged by multiple 
problems. For instance, an assessment carried out by independent consultants Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA and KWSB, 2008: S1-1) found that “over the 
last three decades, the augmentation of the water supply system including water source, 
bulk conveyance system and distribution network has consistently lagged behind the fast 
growing water demand of the city.” In a 700-page report, JICA and the KWSB found 




water board was a financially unsustainable institution. Additionally, a 2017 study on 
water quality commissioned by the Pakistani Supreme Court found that up to 90% of 
Karachi’s water was unfit for human consumption due to fecal contamination (Justice 
Kalhoro, 2017). Two widely cited investigative media reports, meanwhile, allege that a 
shadowy “tanker mafia” does a roaring business as municipal pipes deliver air instead of 
water (Ahmed and Kaleem, 2014; Maher and Ilyas, 2016). Karachi’s demand of 1,1000 
million gallons/day (MGD) is thus allegedly watered by a meagre 550MGD. In such 
circumstance, the wari system can be seen as a bulwark against city-wide hydraulic 
uncertainty. Its localized turn-based supply logic marshals both community relationships 
and a creative material setup (figure 4.5) to distribute water equally in Samandar Colony. 
During my time at Samandar Station, however, I found that the wari system, while 
certainly a useful way to water the settlement, often created its own irregularities in 
supply. Indeed, because it was open to constant negotiation and contestation between 
community leaders and residents, the wari system rendered Samandar Colony’s turn-
based supply system at best fluid and at worst deeply unreliable. This can be seen in how 
Samandar Colony’s present hydraulic landscape came to be.  
Prior to 2017, Samandar Colony was split into two pumping zones, each on either 
side of the dual carriageway that runs the length of the settlement (figure 4.6). Each side 
of the road was served by its own 12-inch line which was pressurized on alternate days 
by manipulating Samandar Station’s exit valves. Rahul once explained to me the water 
would have to be pumped for at least forty minutes, with water simultaneously being 
pumped into an already-full tank at Samandar Station, for the pipe to remain pressurized 
through to the houses at the very end of each pumping zone. But in the summer of 2017, 
when the RO plant was once again malfunctioning and the supply from Basin Station 
was short, it took Samandar Station’s powerful water motors only twenty minutes to 




hence closer to the pumping station, monopolized the “water-time”, leaving those living 
downstream with dry pipes. In response, Salman, an old PPP stalwart and Samandar 
Colony councilor, constructed an independent connection to Samandar Station. Salman 
hired laborers and heavy machinery to dig up the street and lay an independent 12-inch 
line pipe that bypassed several hundred yards of upstream houses to create an 
independent, third pumping zone.  When I asked KWSB machine operators if this 
connection involved the water board, they responded by telling me the water board had 
no business in Samandar Colony. Instead, Rahul described Salman’s act as “jiski lathi uski 
bhens” (the person with the stick controls the buffalo). In other words, Rahul indicated 
that Salman’s considerable political clout due to his connections to the PPP, not to 
mention his access to party funds, is what allowed him to alter Samandar Colony’s 
hydraulic landscape. 
As this example demonstrates, negotiated schedules are a fixture of Samandar 
Station’s times. Indeed, negotiations between local leaders have, in the past, altered the 
very nature of Samandar Colony’s water network and continue to determine how the 
settlement’s bulk supplies are distributed among its residents. As such, much like the 
supply from Basin Station to Samandar Station, the supply from the latter onward to 
various parts of the settlement is also characterized by uncertainty. This uncertainty not 
only comes from the unpredictability in the bulk water supply available at Samandar 
Station at any given time and day, but also by a turn-based or “wari” supply system which 
is constantly altered, reshaped, and otherwise negotiated between local leaders speaking 
for different parts of the settlement. As I argue below, in such a context of uncertainty, 
knowledge about Samandar Colony’s shifting water flows becomes critical for everyday 
access at the household level. The machine operators that produce this information, in 





Informed Access  
We get calls or messages about when the water will come; whether it will come in 
the afternoon or the evening or late at night. Sometimes, even if we get the 
message, the water doesn’t come. We have taken a smaller pipe connection from 
the main line, so there is more pressure. But the man from the water board [still 
must] call or message us to tell us when the water comes. 
 
- Imad, Samandar Colony resident 
 
Studying how access to water is secured in Mumbai despite the socially and physically 
opaque nature of the city’s water infrastructure, Lisa Björkman describes how residents 
must “keep up with the city” (Björkman, 2015: 157). Specifically, Mumbai’s residents are 
constantly on the look-out for scraps of information, produced and verified through 
emerging relationships with state officials and ordinary urban citizens that help make the 
city more transparent. In Samandar Colony, too, hydraulic uncertainty is a fixture of 
everyday life. Much like Mumbaikars must secure information to render the city’s shifting 
social and material hydrologies more legible, Samandar Colony’s residents must also 
constantly seek out knowledge about pumping times, valve positions, and shifting 
schedules to secure water.84 To demonstrate this, it is useful to briefly describe how 
households in Samandar Colony access water.  
Once water is collected at Samandar Station, two powerful pumping motors carry the 
supply onward to a specific pumping zone through one of three dedicated 12-inch 
mainlines. In turn, these mainlines feed secondary pipes between 6 to 8 inches in 
diameter that are perpendicularly attached to the mainline in series and carry the water 
into smaller areas of each pumping zone. Finally, these secondary pipes feed tertiary 
                                                 
84 I draw here on recent scholarship which highlights the importance of everyday, un-
institutionalized local knowledge in navigating urban life. For instance, Anjaria and Anjaria (2013: 
55) write that there exists an “alternative domain of knowledge outside of the formal domain of 
the state.” These alternative epistemologies are gained through lived experiences rather than 
official sources of information produced and curated by state institutions (McFarlane, 2011). 
Such knowledge, moreover, is crucial to how residents “navigate” urban contexts structured by 




pipes between 1 to 4 inches in diameter which carry the water directly into people’s 
homes. When the mainline is pressurized, households located closer to the pump in any 
given pumping zone are the first to receive water. Households further away must wait 
until the water travels the distance to their homes. How far the water travels in a given 
pumping zone depends on both how much water Basin Station supplies to Samandar 
Station and how much water is already present in the latter’s tank. With so many 
households (and connections) drawing from a single mainline, many families in each of 
the three pumping zones resort to using manually operated motors to siphon water with 
pressure from their individual connections. In turn, this raises monthly electricity bills. 
Thus, accessing water involves a delicate balance between minimizing the electricity cost 
of running a motor and securing good water pressure to maximize how much can be 
drawn during the given “water time”, or the amount of time one’s tertiary pipe is 
pressurized. Because this water time can last anywhere between 5 and 20 minutes 
depending on Samandar Station’s bulk supplies and how far downstream an area, street 
or household is from the mainline (connections further downstream are pressurized for 
shorter periods of time), securing line water requires constant vigilance.  
In turn, having information about the settlement’s supply levels and timings, along 
with knowledge of which pumping zone will receive water, becomes crucial to access. 
For instance, the difference in learning whether the tank at Samandar Station is full or 
half-full determines whether a resident can expect water given how far they live from the 
pumping station with houses further away likely to receive water only if the tank is over 
three quarters full. Reliable information also signals if a given day’s supply will not be 
enough if there isn’t enough water at Samandar Station to be pumped throughout the 
settlement. In such circumstances, rather than taking the risk of waiting for the next 
pumping day and hoping there is enough water to do such household chores as cooking, 




small-scale vendors. With little consistency or regularity in supply, this information 
allows residents to determine how much water they will receive on a given pumping day 
and whether alternative arrangements need to be made if the water board supply is 
inadequate. Moreover, reliably learning what time and day a pumping zone will receive 
water directly affects a household’s ability to effectively plan around pumping times. 
Accessing water is an inherently physical task with motors needing to be switched on 
manually and storage containers cleaned and at the ready at pumping times. Thus, 
households need to have an able family member present at home to carry out these tasks.  
In short, obtaining information about the settlement’s water supply is essential in 
determining how access is achieved for residents of Samandar Colony. In conditions of 
such hydraulic uncertainty there is a premium on the daily urban knowledge that 
facilitates material practices of access. Information about water flows is not known in 
advance. Nor is it always consistent. Instead, it is based on speculation informed by 
previous experience and must be verified daily. But, because it makes otherwise opaque, 
shifting supply levels and pumping times more knowable, information about the 
settlement’s water supply becomes a sort of currency in conversations about water. Thus, 
every day, residents of Samandar Colony call water operators with questions like “how 
much water is there today?” and “which zone will receive water today?” and “when will 
the water be pumped?” Residents also often visit the station itself to speak to water 
operators or confirm answers to these questions themselves. Securing this information is 
part and parcel of daily practices of access in Samandar Colony.  
In such circumstances, machine operators play an important role by producing and 
sharing information about the settlement’s water levels, timings, and schedules. The 
following section documents the practices through which machine operators produce 






A set of routinized checking practices structure each pumping day at Samandar Colony. 
Working closely with officials at Basin Station and Samandar Colony’s local leaders, three 
machine operators man the station every other day in an afternoon, evening, and later 
night (early morning) shift. Shifts begin in the afternoon on days where the water is 
pumped at 9pm, ending in the wee hours of the following morning when the water is 
pumped at 3am. Each pumping day thus begins with an operator named Khan visiting 
the pump around 3pm to check and set the exit valves in the correct position for the 
zone scheduled to receive water at 9pm. Water then arrives from Basin Station sometime 
between 4pm and 6pm. At 8:30pm, Rahul, the water operator on duty, calls Khan to 
confirm the valves are in the correct position. He then calls the operator at Basin Station 
to confirm that there are no supply problems and that the water will be pumped to 
Samandar Station at 8:45pm. When the supply from Basin Station arrives, Rahul 
promptly pumps the water to the designated zone at 9pm. Later that night (early morning 
the next day) Manzoor, a third operator, visits the pump around 2:30am to adjust the 
valves for the 3am schedule. He too calls the operator at Basin Station to ensure there is 
an appropriate level of supply before pumping the water on to the designated zone.  
Given that breakdowns, acute shortages, surpluses, and changes in pumping schedules 
are constant, machine operators also regularly visit Samandar Station themselves or 
deputize residents to check how much water has accumulated throughout the day. 
Ascertaining the water level, in turn, is itself a unique checking practice. As mentioned 
above, in the absence of bulk water meters at city pumping stations (that might anyway 
be tampered with according to some city officials), machine operators determine supply 
levels by counting the number of submerged tank stairs. Checking thus involves 




to determine how many submerged stairs are accounted for by the water board supply 
and how many stairs are accounted for by the supplementary RO supply.   
But no matter how well-scripted a pumping day is none of these practices produce 
water unless the infrastructure at Samandar Station is working effectively. Hence, water 
operators have several checking practices that revolve around the station’s powerful 
pumping motors. For instance, operators routinely check to ensure the two water motors 
are making adequate pressure. Rather than using dedicated tools that can measure 
pressure in terms of pounds per square inch, operators rely on experience and situated 
knowledge. Thus, if pushing a small exit port on each motor while it is running shoots 
water high into the air, makes a high-pitched sound, and drenches the surrounding area, 
the water operators knows from experience that the motor is making enough pressure to 
pump the water deep into a given pumping zone. Alternatively, if the water emerges as a 
fat, short fountain and makes a low-pitched gurgling sound, the motor is sucking too 
much air. On occasions where pressure is considered inadequate, operators climb down 
into the hot, dark tank to physically inspect the vacuum plates on the underside of each 
motor for lodged debris. The motors are also used to identify potential points where 
water mixes with sewage. If, for instance, a resident calls Rahul to complain that the 
water smells, a small amount of water is pumped into a bucket by attaching a plastic pipe 
to a motor’s valve. This water is then visually inspected for fecal matter or smelled for 
contamination. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the routinized checking 
practices described here. As Rahul said when I asked him what would happen if one of 
the motors failed completely for some reason; “then Usmaan Bhai, there would be a big 
problem.” But, while these checking practices are necessary to making water flow to 
Samandar Colony, they are often not sufficient. In other words, the discovery of such 
problems as leaks or inadequate pressures does not guarantee the maintenance or repair 




This was made clear to me late in my fieldwork when a routine exit port check led 
Rahul to discover that one of Samandar Station’s prized motors was not making enough 
pressure. Initially assuming debris from the tank was keeping the motor’s vacuum plate 
open, Rahul climbed down into the tank only to discover the plate was, in fact, sealing 
properly. The problem was therefore likely internal, perhaps a worn rubber seal Rahul 
suggested. After narrowing down the problem, the machine operator informed his 
superior and requested a maintenance crew. But no repairmen arrived to pry open the 
motor and replace a failed component over the next few weeks. This was despite the fact 
that the underperforming motor had reduced pressure throughout the system, thus 
impacting the supply for households located further away from Samandar Station. 
Indeed, in my final few weeks of fieldwork, Rahul received several angry calls about the 
lack of pressure. What, then, did Rahul’s checking accomplish if the motor was not 
repaired?  
Put simply, Rahul gained reliable, up to date information about Samandar Station’s 
pumping capabilities. When concerned residents asked the machine operator why they 
were receiving water with lower pressure over the next few days, Rahul informed them 
that one of the motors was working at a lower capacity and was quick to add the relevant 
authorities had been informed of the situation. Despite being unable to solve the 
problem of lower pressure in material terms, which also depended on the cooperation of 
other water board officials, Rahul’s ability to nevertheless explain why the problem 
existed and where the solution lay points to the important by-product produced by the 
maintenance work of water operators. Working amidst breakdowns, leakages and shifting 
schedules, machine operators like Rahul thus constantly produced reliable, real-time 
information about Samandar Colony’s water supplies.  
In his rich ethnography of Mumbai’s waterscapes, Nikhil Anand (2017) dispels the 




apolitical, technical urban exercises. Instead, by actively enacting or withholding such 
maintenance in different parts of Mumbai, city officials also reproduce larger political 
discourses that describe Hindu urban dwellers as clean, legal citizens and their Muslim 
counterparts as dirty, illegal migrants.85 Anand thus emphasizes how maintenance affects 
the politics of Mumbai as a whole. In Samandar Colony, too, amidst breakdowns, 
leakages, and shifting schedules, the “checking” practices of machine operators have 
political implications that far exceed the relative availability of water. Below, I describe 
how machine operators constantly produce and share information about the settlement’s 
bulk water supplies to perform the role of “neutral” public officials.  
 
“Valve Politics” and Neutral Hydrologies  
One afternoon during a fieldwork trip in 2017, I found myself chatting with residents of 
Samandar Colony. I had initially set up an interview with a local councilor named Ameer 
through a community leader named Ilam. What started out as a one on one interview, 
however, turned into a sort of community meeting as Ilam made a few phone calls. Soon, 
Ameer’s tiny office was packed with other community leaders and residents. Hot tea was 
brought in, along with cold drinks, extra chairs and snacks. Before I knew it, I was a fly 
on the wall, not so much interviewing a local councilor, but listening in on an 
enthusiastic conversation between several men – all of whom were speaking at once it 
seemed. Pasha Sahib, a local leader who identified himself as a PPP loyalist, was 
seemingly the ringleader given that he was seated behind Ameer’s massive desk with 
 
                                                 
85 Recent urban scholarship has also shed light on the important political work done through 
everyday maintenance and repair (see Dominguez Rubio, 2016; Graham and Thrift, 2007; 
Jackson, 2014). Here, maintenance and repair extend beyond physically clearing water pipes of 
obstructions or finding leaks. Instead, as Idalina Baptista (2018: 6) argues, these practices have 
“social and political dimensions” as well such that infrastructures are constantly “produced and 




everyone else on plastic chairs around him. Everyone nodded vigorously as Pasha Sahib 
angrily criticized the settlement’s water supply situation:   
There is no water. We don’t get water. Whoever has note [money] buys water, the 
poor get killed. They don’t give us water from the back. Even if they do, the 
thieves that are sitting here sell it off. Who are these people, you ask? Who do 
you think? Our area’s MPAs [members of parliament] and MNAs [members of 
national assembly], Nazims [union council chairman] and Naib Nazims [union 
council vice-chairman] do this… If people only look to line their pockets, then 
what can we do? These are those people that are killing us! How can you live 
without water? 
 
I was not surprised by Pasha Sahib’s comments given media reports that described 
corruption and mismanagement as a pervasive feature of Karachi’s water supply (see 
Ahmed and Kaleem, 2014; Kamal, 2009). Pasha Sahib’s sentiments, which were echoed 
in many of the interviews I conducted with residents of Samandar Colony, expressed 
dissatisfaction with how the settlement’s bulk water supplies were distributed between 
the three pumping zones. For instance, Pasha Sahib argued that zone 2 (his zone) had a 
larger population and thus required water more often than zone 1. “They should look at 
how many people live here when they send the water elsewhere!” he grumbled, referring 
to the local leaders that determined pumping schedules in the wari system. But Pasha 
Sahib’s went further than calling out an unequal distribution system. Instead, he 
described the wari system as facilitating theft, corruption, and ““valve politics” (valve ki 
siyasat) – where certain pumping zones in the settlement received more than their fair 
share of bulk water. He, like his companions, focused their ire on zone 1 which they saw 
as receiving water more often than zones 2 and 3 because a union council vice chairman 
drew his political support from families that lived therein.  
In general, for residents who had no clout of their own and no ethnic, political or 
kinship connections with influential councilors, party cadres and local big men, narratives 
of “valve politics” are powerful ways to make sense of Samandar Colony’s dry pipes. I 




deeply politicalized context in which machine operators work daily. It is precisely in 
circumstances where accusations of theft are common parlance that Samandar Station’s 
machine operators, who are also routinely accused of taking part in valve-politics as part 
of the wari system (“they control the valves how they want”, as Pasha Sahib would say), 
strive to present themselves as neutral state officials. Rahul’s description of his initial 
experiences working as a machine operator is instructive in this regard:  
I’m an MQM [Muttahida Qaumi Movement party] man. People [in the area] 
raised a hue and cry when I was appointed here [to SPS]. They assumed I would 
distribute water to only a few [party] people. But I explained that, even though I 
was an MQM supporter, I was at the pumping station through the water board as 
a numainda [representative]. In that capacity, I will give water to everyone because 
it’s my duty as a water board employee. Since then, people have calmed down.  
 
Manzoor, a second water operator, echoed Rahul’s comments. 
If [an influential person] makes a phone call, there can be water here. This is 
because there is enough water. But the distribution is the problem. Maybe in 
posh areas the situation is better. But here, in katcha [informal] areas, water comes 
on politics. My job is to check and pump the water at 3am. They [local leaders, 
councilors, party cadres] do this valve siyasat [valve politics], but we do our work.  
 
Samandar Colony’s water operators recognize their own lack of authority over the 
distribution of water in the settlement. At the same time, they also claim that “politics” 
has nothing to do with the work they do as public officials in Samandar Colony. Instead 
they, as Rahul claims, see themselves as neutral “representatives” that carry out the work 
of providing the settlement with water. But, with no control over the city’s bulk supply, 
limited resources to repair unreliable infrastructures and little authority over the wari 
system at Samandar Station, water operators cannot enact this claim by “[giving] water to 
everyone” as Rahul suggests. Instead, water operators claim to do their job by sharing the 
information they produce about the settlement’s water supplies. 
I let people know about the [water] situation when they ask. It’s not my zimidari 
[duty] to answer the phone. My zimidari [duty] is only to make sure the water is 
turned on at the right time and that the exit valve is in the correct position. But 
when I first started working at [Samandar Station] about five years ago, my 
number was distributed to everyone [in the settlement]. Now it is my kaam 




people are rude, but there is no reason to stop giving information to everyone for 
the sake of a few uncouth callers. Our job is to inform… the siyasat [politics] is up to 
them [Samandar Colony residents] … (emphasis added). 
 
Rahul’s description of his responsibilities shows that sharing information about the 
settlement’s water supplies is the only possible way to claim neutrality in a context where 
access is constantly punctuated by social and material uncertainties beyond any single 
group’s control.86 But, in claiming and enacting this impartiality, it is inaccurate to say 
machine operators like Rahul subscribe to an idealized notion of public duty in a sea of 
corruption and malpractice. Rather, these public officials engage in neutral performances 
aimed at distancing themselves from the discourses of corruption, patronage and theft 
that frame water access in Samandar Colony. Machine operators understand that sharing 
extremely valuable information about various aspects of Samandar Colony’s daily water 
flows allows them to make a place for themselves as public officials amidst haunting 
discourses of valve politics. Below, I relate two ethnographic encounters in which 
Samandar Station’s pumping schedule experienced “interruptions” which demonstrate 
precisely this politics of neutrality in action.87 In the first instance, a malfunctioning RO 
plant led to an extended renegotiation of the wari system. In the second, a careless 
machine operator at Basin Station, who routinely failed to pump the water on time, 
created the possibility of a severe shortage. In showing how they responded very 
differently to these circumstances, the encounters below demonstrate how self-professed 
neutral machine operators enact a distinction between the political – or “siyasi” – process 
                                                 
86 Infrastructures have been theorized in many ways. Here, I draw attention to Anand’s ((2017: 
13) claim that infrastructures are social and material “accretions” that evade the complete control 
of any single actor or group of actors.  
87 Disturbances to otherwise constant flows of things like water and electricity can be momentary 
and easily fixable, or catastrophic malfunctions that require expertise, effort and the cooperation 
of human and non-human forces to remedy. Both reveal machinations otherwise invisible when 
infrastructures are functioning as they are expected to (Larkin, 2013; Mitchell, 2014). For 
instance, in her work Vibrant Matter (2010) Jane Bennett analyzes the 2003 Northeast blackout in 
the United States. Bennett shows the blackout to be the result of both human and non-human 
agencies coalescing in unpredictable ways, arguing that the breakdown enabled critical discourses 




of allocating bulk water supplies on one hand, and the technical work of supplying water 
on the other.  
 
Interruptions  
Encounter 1:“The tank is completely empty today,” says Omer [Pak Oasis 
employee responsible for RO plant maintenance]. I shine my mobile light into the 
tank below. He is right. A very faint reflection shines back at me, indicating there 
probably isn’t enough water for the motors to pull. It may as well be empty. It seems 
like the RO plant, which has been malfunctioning for a couple of weeks (the only 
two functioning of a total six bores are jammed and waiting a repair crew) has had a 
substantial effect on today’s supply. “Didn’t the water come this afternoon?” I ask. 
Omer shrugs and tells me he doesn’t know. After a brief pause, he asks me if I know 
whether the water will come today or not, and whether it was pumped earlier this 
week (it’s Monday).  
Before our conversation can continue any further, a motorcycle pulls up and 
parks next to the control room. It seems like Rahul is early. “Rahul is here, that 
means the water will be pumped today,” says Omer blankly. He tells Rahul that the 
tank is virtually empty. Rahul shrugs. “That’s what happens when the RO doesn’t 
work.” Rahul and I discuss the lack of water today. I ask why the tank is empty. 
After all, this is the first time I have seen the tank level drop so low. It’s because the 
RO pump isn’t working says Rahul straightforwardly. But what about the afternoon 
supply, I ask. That’s usually quite reliable. But Rahul explains by telling me 
something I didn’t know about city’s supply schedule. “The city’s water shuts down 
every week at 6pm on Sunday and is restarted the following Monday at 6pm. So, 
there’s no afternoon supply for today.” In short, it is hard to overestimate how 




supply. Rahul tells me today is going to be interesting because the “dangerous 
people” (zone 3) have their turn at 9pm today. (He is referring to how residents of 
zone 3 – the smallest pumping zone – routinely complain about a lack of water from 
Basin Station when it is their turn in the pumping schedule). “Today is going to be 
fun; just wait and see what Baseer has to say” he chuckles, referring to the son of a 
councilor who visits Samandar Station to ensure there is enough water for his area 
(zone 3).  
It is 8:50pm and the water has begun to arrive. Because it is virtually empty, the 
sound of water crashing into the tank below is amplified considerably. At the same 
time, a very angry looking Baseer saunters up to the tank. “What have you 
[expletive] done to the RO plant?” he yells at Omer, confirming my observations 
about the supplementary supply’s importance. Rahul chuckles as Omer explains; 
Baseer is told that the bores have stopped working and that he’s made a complaint. I 
gather from Omer’s explanation that his supervisor has been replaced. Omer says 
that the new supervisor is going to try his best, but other than passing on the 
information there’s nothing much that he can do. Baseer cusses some more before 
violently pulling up the tank cover and shining his mobile phone into the 
subterranean chamber below. He sits there brooding and watching the water fall into 
the tank below before yelling at Rahul again about the lack of supply. The two of 
them go back and forth. “What do you expect,” Rahul says eventually. “The water is 
never good on Mondays! It’s only good on Tuesdays!” (Rahul is referring to the fact 
that there is a city-wide shutdown of Karachi’s water network from 6pm on Sundays 
to 6pm on Mondays). 
Baseer is loudly talking on the phone. I can’t understand what he is saying 
because he is speaking in Pashto, but I make an educated guess and assume he is 




not to turn on the water motors without his say so. Rahul explains Baseer is trying to 
convince a local councilor from zone 1 to give him the water that is due to be 
pumped there 3am. “Why?” I ask Rahul quietly. “Because there isn’t enough water 
today,” Rahul explains. “So now Baseer is demanding that he get the 3am supply 
too. Fazl [zone 1] is still getting water every other day so it doesn’t make too much 
of a difference to them, but Baseer [zone 3] only gets water once every week or so 
because his [zone] is much smaller.” Meanwhile, Baseer runs to the control room, 
grabs one of the chavis [valve keys], and runs off toward the valves. I ask Rahul how 
Baseer, a community member, has permission to use the water board’s equipment 
and work on public infrastructure. “What have I told you? It’s their choice; they can 
do what they want.” 
It is past 9pm and Rahul’s phone begins to ring. Rahul informs the callers from 
zone 3 that the water is falling in the tank but that he doesn’t know when or if it will 
be pumped. “You’ll have to ask Salman [local councilor and Baseer’s father] about 
that.” Baseer returns and tells Rahul he will call to tell him when to run the water. 
After sitting around for a few more minutes, Rahul checks the tank and informs us 
that only 3 stairs are submerged. He tells us that the water is coming with low 
pressure and that at this rate it will barely run for ten minutes. He further explains 
that Baseer wants to forgo the 9pm pumping time, wait until the 2:45am supply, and 
then pump the whole lot altogether to zone 3 at 3am. This involves stopping the 
pumping schedule as well as securing the water originally meant for zone 1 at 3am. 
Rahul calls Baseer and tells him how much water is in the tank, asking if he should 
turn the water on or not. The two argue a little bit more about the supply. Rahul is 
trying to explain that very little more water will arrive so there is no point in waiting 




claim on the 3am supply). Rahul assures Baseer that he will run the entire tank. 
“Only one stair will be left, don’t worry.” A single motor is then turned on at around 
9:15pm. 
 
Encounter 2: “Where are you? You said you’d be at the pump.” A resident from 
zone 2, let’s call him F, is at Samandar Station and is angry that Rahul, the water 
operator on duty, is absent. Apparently, Rahul was on his way when he received the 
call because his motorcycle pulls up a few minutes later. It is 8:50pm. As Rahul 
unlocks the control room, I notice he is accompanied by another man (let’s call him 
F2). F2 walks over to the tank cover to check the water. He looks over at Rahul and 
tells him there isn’t enough water in there. Rahul assures him it will arrive as he pulls 
out his phone. Meanwhile, F2 takes a seat next to us. He strikes up a conversation 
with Omer and it turns out their families have been friends for a long time. I find 
out F2 is a resident of zone 2. His concern over the water level in the tank makes 
sense as residents of zone 2 are always complaining that zone 1 gets a great deal of 
water, but when it is there turn the supply from Basin Station is considerably less.. 
F2 and Omer talk about a murder that took place in Samandar Colony last night. To 
distract myself from the depressing details of this story (two breadwinners have died 
in a single family within two days over something senseless), I try to pay attention to 
Rahul’s phone call to Jamshed at Basin Station. He is not yelling like I expect (the 
water is already late, and this tends to send Rahul into a rage). Instead, he is taking a 
measured, but stern tone. 
“Look. If this continues, I’m just going to have to report you.” It seems Jamshed 
has failed to pump the water on time again and Rahul is telling him he will have to 




the latter hangs up and continues taking and making calls. From the snippets I 
gather, he is trading calls between his friends and zone 2 residents. 
[A few minutes later]  
Rahul is having a terse discussion on the phone. It is dangerously close to 9pm 
and the water still hasn’t arrived. Something fishy is going on. If Jamshed had turned 
on the water like he said five minutes ago, and the water had been pumped earlier in 
the day and was hence still in the pipe, then the water should have arrived by now. 
Either there was no water pumped earlier (something unlikely because the RO 
cannot make as much water as Omer and I saw in the tank by itself), or Jamshed 
hasn’t pumped the water yet. Sure enough, it is the latter case. Rahul, now visibly 
nervous, is talking to Hunr and the problem is that neither the latter nor Jamshed 
are at Basin Station. In short, there is nobody at the station up the road to pump 
water to the Samandar Station. Rahul is frantic. “How will the water run? You’re 
going to get us all killed!” he yells frantically into the receiver. I think this moment 
has been building for a few days given Jamshed’s erratic behavior. Judging by 
Rahul’s panic – similar to, but far greater than the incident where he thought the exit 
valves were in the wrong position – it is also a real crisis situation. Suddenly, we are 
all paralyzed by the possibility of violence. A visibly shaken Rahul dials a different 
number. He tells his supervisor on the other line about the problem (“what kind of 
person have you sent us, sir?”). The water board official seems less perturbed than 
Rahul. The conversation lasts a few short minutes. Rahul instructs Omer to turn on 
the motor. It is past 9pm and it is better to send whatever supply there is in the tank 
onward. “Wait!” cries F2, jumping to his feet. “Don’t turn it on yet! I need to get 
home!” He runs off into the night. Omer waits a full sixty seconds and then turns 
the motors on. Quietly, he tells Rahul that motor #1 is sounding worse than before, 




between politely telling callers the water motors are on (no mention of a potential 
shortage) and yelling expletives at Jamshed in between phone calls.  
A few minutes later, Rahul gets in touch with Hunr who has raced his motorcycle 
to Basin Station and turned on the water. About five minutes later the water begins 
cascading into the Samandar Station’s tank. Omer and I flash our phone lights into 
the tank to make sure. The tank level has depleted significantly, but not to the point 
that the motors will not be able to suck the water until the level rises again. There 
will be no interruption in supply. Rahul, Omer, F, and I take a seat. Everything 
seems far calmer now. A sweating Rahul pops open a beer handed to him by F. The 
former’s phone keeps ringing, but he can tell people with confidence that the water 
is on its way (and they are none the wiser).  
[Several minutes later] 
The motors change pitch. It has been 25 minutes since they were turned on. Just 
as I am getting ready to leave, a motorbike with Hunr astride pulls in. Rahul and 
Hunr discuss the fiasco at Basin Station. As it turns out, it was sheer luck that the 
latter happened to be nearby. It was only because he was in the vicinity that Hunr 
was able to pump the water within minutes of Rahul alerting him. When Hunr 
reached the pump, he found that it was padlocked and that Jamshed’s motorcycle 
was parked in the compound.   
“If the [Samandar Colony] people came to the pump they would have caught 
me” he says angrily. Hunr takes a seat next to me and continues describing what 
happened after he arrived at Basin Station. He first checked the tank and made sure 
the valves were in the correct position before pumping the water on to Samandar 
Station. While waiting to make sure all the water had been pumped, Hunr received a 
call from an individual who identified himself as a local councilor named Faisal 




that Jasmshed wasn’t at the pump on the councilor’s authority and that if Hunr 
makes a problem of the former’s absence he would “send people to the pump.” 
Hunr flatly refused to make any accommodations.  
“I’ve seen people burn tires in front of me, grab me by the collar, accuse me of 
corruption, and threaten me with death during my service,” Hunr says. “What more 
could they have done if he really was a councilor?” The two water board employees 
continue discussing Jamshed’s irresponsibility and incompetence. For instance, like 
not checking whether the chamber valve at Basin Station is open (a closed valve 
leaves water in the pipes and makes the water smell rusty). Hunr points to the beer 
can in Rahul’s hand and says there’s nothing wrong with some fun, but that it 
shouldn’t get in the way of one’s duty.  
 
These encounters demonstrate two very different responses machine operators had to 
potential interruptions in Samandar Colony’s water supply. In the first incident, the 
possibility of a gap in supply was created by the actions of Baseer, a local community 
leader from zone 3, who was attempting to renegotiate the day’s pumping schedule. 
Rahul, the machine operator on duty, did not intervene in this circumstance. Rather, he 
waited to be told where and when to pump the water available at Samandar Station. This 
was because Rahul saw this interruption to the scheduled pumping time as stemming 
from a dispute between two community leaders negotiated changes in the wari system. As 
a self-professed neutral state official, Rahul claimed he had no role to play in this 
situation (“I told you, it’s their choice”). As such, Rahul stood by and let the community 
leaders of zone 1 and 2 sort out the supply amongst themselves. By contrast, in the 
second incident, where a potential supply gap was caused by an errant water board 
official at Basin Station, machine operators were quick to intervene. Both Rahul and 




phone calls and physically travelling to Basin Station to turn on its water motors. This 
was because the potentially devastating supply gap was caused by a machine operator 
failing to do his job. These reactions to different sorts of interruption were not unique. 
Rather, they were repeated on other occasions as well. Specifically, when the wari system 
was being actively negotiated, machine operators would simply inform concerned 
residents how much water there was and to ask their respective local leader whether they 
were due for a pumping day. By contrast, there were several instances where machine 
operators intervened to prevent potential supply gaps from “technical” events. These 
included both non-human factors such as misadjusted valves, congested motors or – as 
in one notable instance – a power breakdown caused by an ambitious crow, and human 
factors such as water operators failing to turn up for shifts or communicating with each 
other to coordinate the supply between Basin and Samandar Stations.  
In his important work, Andrew Barry (2002) argues that politics can be understood in 
terms of either a space of negotiation and contestation, or a domain of technicality where 
experts are concerned with metrological technologies. Barry’s distinction is helpful 
because it sheds light on the wider, if unanticipated effects of the work Samandar 
Colony’s machine operators do. Specifically, the two encounters narrated above show 
how these low-level state officials both reproduce and situate themselves within a duality. 
Concerned with their neutral personas, machine operators intervene to address 
interruptions in the water supply that are seen as emanating from technical, or otherwise 
“anti-political” (Ibid) sources. As incident 2 above shows, these include both the material 
components and “social infrastructures” (Simone, 2004) essential to the technical work of 
supplying water to Samandar Colony.88 At the same time, however, machine operators 
actively refrain from intervening in interruptions that come from political (what residents 
                                                 
88 As Julia Elyachar (2010) also notes, infrastructures are not only material but also composed of 
“phatic labor”, social infrastructures of “communicative channels” that play an essential role in 




refer to as “siyaasi”) sources. Such an interruption is most visibly illustrated in incident 1 
where disputes and negotiations between community leaders over the allotment of bulk 
supplies can create unanticipated delays or full-scale gaps in the pumping schedule. As 
the incident further demonstrates, these last minute changes and negotiations are highly 
political given the simmering disputes between each of the three pumping zones over 
bulk supplies.  
As these incidents show, then, by responding very differently to various interruptions 
based on their professed neutrality, Samandar Colony’s machine operators enact a 
distinction between the technical work of supplying water, and the political processes of 
allocating uncertain water supplies. This distinction is not only (re)produced discursively 
as machine operators constantly reiterate the purview and limits of their responsibility to 
settlement residents, each other, and outsiders (such as researchers). Instead, machine 
operators materially enact a politics of neutrality in working on (and refraining to work 
on) Samandar Colony’s water infrastructure at particular moments.  
 
Conclusion: The Politics of Engineering Neutrality 
In this chapter, I have elaborated on the work of Samandar Colony’s machine operators 
to demonstrate precisely how the precarious work of supplying water to the settlement is 
made possible. Working amidst the social and material uncertainties of Karachi’s water 
network, these machine operators constantly make opaque and incalculable hydrologies 
knowable. But, in doing so, their actions have wider effects that far exceed the relative 
ability of settlement residents to access water. In Samandar Colony, where breakdowns, 
supply variations, possible theft, and the ability of community leaders to send water 
where they desire are common, machine operators have learnt to use the information 




machine operators claim they are concerned with the technical aspects of water supply 
rather than the politics – or “siyasat” – of everyday access; particularly in terms of how 
bulk water supplies are allocated between Samandar Colony’s three pumping zones. But, 
as machine operators turn valves to produce water in the right place at the expected time, 
maintain Samandar Station’s water infrastructure, and provide information about 
pumping times and water levels to all who ask, they paradoxically recreate a hydraulic 
status quo.  
Indeed, by refraining from intervening in the everyday negotiations and disputes that 
determine how bulk water is allocated throughout the settlement, machine operators 
actively reproduce the unpredictability of the wari system. As Graham and Marvin (2001) 
write in this respect, infrastructures are “precarious achievements” which are constantly 
susceptible to interruptions caused by human and non-human forces. The literature on 
infrastructural maintenance suggests that gaps in supply are not abnormal but an intrinsic 
trait of infrastructures that require constant attention (see Baptista 2018; Graham and 
Thrift, 2007). As Stephen Graham puts it, “infrastructure networks, despite their 
occasional veneer of permanence, stability, and ubiquity, are never structures that are 
given in the order of things” (Graham, 2010: 9). In this respect, the interruptions that 
characterize Samandar Colony’s water supply system can be read as “normal.” Closer 
attention to the settlement’s motley crew of pipes, motors, and valves – as well as the 
subjectivities that determine their operation – shows that interruptions are intrinsic to 
how the water network functions. But, while interruptions are common in Samandar 
Colony just as they are in other parts of Karachi and, indeed, other cities around the 
world (Anand, 2017), not all gaps in supply are normalized. At the often quiet but 
sometimes eventful Samandar Station, interruptions that emanate from the wari system 
are a standard component in the distribution of water. Negotiated pumping schedules are 




three of Samandar Colony’s pumping zones receives water. By contrast, supply gaps that 
are associated with material and personnel failures of a technical nature – such as those 
to do with improperly adjusted valves or errant water board officials – are aberrant in 
terms of how Samandar Colony’s water network typically functions. In maintaining this 
distinction on the basis of “neutrality”, machine operators reproduce the idiosyncrasies – 
the “materials and histories” (Anand, 2017: 163) – of Samandar Colony’s water 
infrastructure.  
Of course, as the technical work of machine operators reproduces precarity, it also 
politicizes water as a resource. While machine operators claim their work is limited to a 
metrological and information-based domain, they also implicate themselves in the 
everyday politics of access by deferring to the authority of Samandar Colony’s local 
leaders. In making this argument, I am not suggesting water operators have the capacity 
or ability to act on all sorts of interruptions, simply deciding which to intervene in based 
on unconstrained decision-making capabilities. Machine operators, like many of 
Karachi’s residents living and working in a fitful city, do what they must to secure their 
professional and personal safety. Rather, I am suggesting that, despite their claims to 
neutrality, machine operators actively engineer – albeit from a technical domain – 
Karachi’s mercurial hydrologies. In the final chapter, I explore how the city’s residents 
are responding to the difficulties and uncertainties of water access described in this and 
the previous chapter. As Samandar Colony is increasingly characterized by everyday 
uncertainty in terms of urban service delivery, Karachi’s urban poor use the temporally 







“THE PROPHET’S BALLOT” 
Elections, Patronage, and the Right to the City 
 
In June 2018, with just a few weeks left before Pakistan’s general election on July 25th, 
the Karachi settlement I call Samandar Colony was a hotbed of activity. Plastered with 
flags, banners, and other paraphernalia bearing the symbols of various political parties, 
the settlement had transformed from a residential area into a colorful mural of 
campaigns. The mood was of equal parts celebration and urgency. With the holy month 
of Ramadan over, workers from a variety of Karachi’s political parties were frantically 
setting up corner offices in local shops; songs and recorded speeches blared out of 
massive speakers conspicuously wired to electrical poles; and impromptu rallies – often 
held at night to avoid the summer heat – were where stalwarts, incumbents, and aspiring 
office holders presented their case to be (re)elected. But, despite their efforts to delineate 
themselves from each other, candidates from different political parties made the same 
promises to provide jobs, development, and urban services. In Karachi, dry municipal 
pipes meant that water was a topic of incredible salience across electoral campaigns. With 
“paani chanhiye, vote do” [If you want water, vote] becoming a rallying call to secure votes 
in Samandar Colony, election season was in full swing.  
Election in which campaigns are run on promising particularistic benefits, rather than 
long-term policy proposals, are common in postcolonial countries like Pakistan. Often 
described as instances of patronage politics where “vote-buying” practices dilute the 




Asian scholarship has more recently shown that exchanging votes for particularistic 
benefits like water is not antithetical to but a fundamental part of how democratic 
institutions work in countries like India and Pakistan (Björkman, 2014a, 2014c; Adnan 
Naseemullah and Chhibber, 2018a). Instances of “vote-buying”, as Anastasia Pivliasky 
(2014: 3) notes, are rather institutionalized moments of political action where social 
groups seek to “elect one of their own to provide for them”, working outside the 
“gridlock of liberal political heuristics” to secure things like jobs, development projects in 
their communities, and access to urban services.  
In Samandar Colony for instance, older residents often describe how their “barāy” 
[elders] – village heads, community organizers, and elected officials like councilors –
promise to construct piped connections, pave roads, and provide sanitation 
infrastructures in the run-up to elections. For the settlement’s families, “selling” votes for 
potable water, jobs, and housing is not just about securing materialistic gains. Instead, it 
is, and has long been, about finding ways to alleviate the precarity of settlement in 
Karachi. Turning attention away from daily coping mechanisms like purchasing water, 
this chapter explores the various ways residents of Samandar Colony use the temporal 
window of elections – a time when state officials, party workers, and hopeful candidates 
are willing to lend an ear to the needs of the urban poor – to put formal institutions to 
work for them, however briefly. It explores not only how residents vote to directly address 
their daily concerns – by exchanging their votes to secure urban services like water 
(potable or otherwise) – but also how they increasingly find opportunities to indirectly 
make these very claims.  
Where the latter is concerned, this chapter examines the rise of a new player in 
Karachi’s politics; the far-right Islamic party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). Though 
the TLP campaigned aggressively in the run-up to the 2018 general election, it secured 




Karachi, far from the party’s roots in rural Punjab. But, though the TLP failed to secure a 
noticeable presence in the country’s provincial and national assemblies, it secured a 
significant number of votes across Karachi. Indeed, the TLP found its way to the top 
three parties in one each of Samandar Colony’s two provincial and national 
constituencies, securing upwards of 50,000 votes throughout. Many of the settlement’s 
residents explained the TLP’s popularity in terms of the party’s religious commitments. 
While both religious and secular parties championed an end to water shortages, better 
infrastructure, and more development in Karachi’s deteriorating housing settlements, the 
TLP promised nothing more than a vague enactment of “Khatm-e-Nubuwat” – the Islamic 
principle declaring the Holy Prophet Mohammad’s place as the last messenger of Allah.  
In the wake of the July 2018 general elections, popular discourses have explained the 
TLP’s rise in terms of a changing political landscape which allowed a pious electorate to 
express its religious preferences (see Ahmed, 2018; Chaudhry, 2018). After the Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM) imploded and fractured into various sub-groups in 2016, its 
constituencies were opened to new political players.89 And for reporters and political 
scientists in Pakistan, the TLP took advantage of the political vacuum in Karachi to 
spread its one point agenda of Khatm-e-Nubuwat. For instance, in one of the few profiles 
on the party’s leader Khadim Husain Rizvi, Ahmed Yusuf of the daily Dawn writes that 
the TLP’s rise stems from its ability to combine grassroots political organization and 
religious rhetoric in low-income areas (Yusuf, 2018). Rank and file TLP workers ensured 
that the “the mosque replaced the mohalla [neighborhood] network in localities 
previously labelled hardcore MQM areas” such that the TLP combined preaching with a 
winning political strategy to get votes (Ibid). A scholarly explanation of the TLP’s 
popularity might complement this narrative by also highlighting the politics of class. For 
                                                 
89 The MQM once had an iron-grip on Karachi’s politics and development (see Ahmar, 1996; 
Gayer, 2014; Khan, 2010, 2017). Since 2016, the party’s public image has been marred by 




instance, Amit Ahuja and Pradeep Chhibber (2012:3) writing in the context of India 
argue that the poor “face a capricious state that mostly ignores or mistreats them except 
on Election Day.” The marginalized thus vote to be heard and become formally visible, 
however briefly. For the poor, voting is therefore a way to enjoy their otherwise limited 
“political rights” (Ibid: 17), even if only symbolically. Moreover, Ahuja and Chhibber’s 
work has prompted Adnan Naseemullah (with Chhibber, 2018a, 2018b) to associate 
elections in Pakistan and the 2018 polls in particular with feelings of “anti-incumbency” 
on the part of voters. This explanation fits well with the TLP’s status as a new party, its 
support in Karachi’s low income areas, and its unmaterialistic message of Khatm-e-
Nubuwat.90 Indeed, one could argue that with the MQM’s iron grip on Karachi broken, 
the TLP was an ideal choice for the marginalized poor to vote and be heard.  
In this chapter, I do not argue that these explanations are out of place. Instead, I 
show that the TLP’s popularity in Samandar Colony is indicative of how residents 
actively appropriate – make their own – electoral campaigns to rearticulate demands for 
material goods such as water, roads, and sanitations. Much like exchanging votes for 
material benefits (which a majority of the settlement’s residents continue to do), support 
for the TLP signifies how the urban poor employ democratic institutions to meet their 
needs in ways that remain uncaptured by theories of liberal democratic politics.  
This chapter is based on a study of interview data and field observations from two 
distinct parts of Samandar Colony. The first is Hindu Para, the oldest part of the 
settlement where I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork in 2017 and 2018. The second is 
Katchi Para, a newer part of Samandar Colony I visited in 2018.91 While residents in the 
                                                 
90 The TLP was not the only “fringe” political party that made inroads in electorates traditionally 
associated with religious parties (see Jamal, 2018).  Another was the notorious extremist Hafiz 
Saeed’s Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek. But the latter’s performance was minimal compared to the TLP 
as data from the Election Commission of Pakistan shows (tables 5.1, 5.2 below).  
91 My engagement in Katchi Para was initially a way to further explore the themes surrounding 
water access I had encountered during my conversations with residents of Hindu Para (see 




former make direct demands for urban services, it is in the latter where election talk also 
entails a desire to support the TLP’s campaign of Khatm-e-Nubuwat to indirectly achieve 
these benefits.  
I first review the literature on elections in the South Asian context. In this section, I 
highlight the difference between rational-choice inspired accounts of patronage 
democracies and interpretive accounts of elections which, in analyzing exchanges of 
votes for materialistic goods, paint the average voter as either a rent-seeking actor or a 
political insurgent respectively. While the latter accounts for the many ways in which 
political claims are made in South Asia democracies, I suggest it is also important to see 
the average voter as engaging in indirect forms of politicking; ones in which votes are not 
directly exchanged for particularistic benefits but in which elections continue to be an 
opportunity for everyday people to make claims to state resources, jobs, and other 
tangible goods. I then turn attention to Karachi’s Samandar Colony, exploring the ways 
in which the settlement’s residents use the brief, institutionalized moment of elections to 
address the otherwise constant uncertainty of their living circumstances. As the initial 
empirical sections show, this certainly involves negotiations over directly exchanging 
votes for material goods, opportunities, and urban services both in the run up to and 
during elections. But in examining the rise of the TLP, the latter half of this chapter also 
explores the indirect ways in which residents make claims to these benefits and by 
extension seek to address their everyday precarity.  
 
Electoral Publics 
In her highly influential account of ethnic political parties in India, Kanchan Chandra 
(2004) explores the rationality of the average voter in the world’s largest democracy. 
                                                                                                                                            
the settlement faced the same problems as other parts of Samandar Colony. While speaking to 
families about water, however, I stumbled upon narratives such as Daudi Sahib’s that directed my 




Chandra bases her analysis on an understanding of India as a “patronage-democracy” 
where leaders are chosen by elections, but where state resources are monopolized by the 
public sector and elected officials have considerable influence in distributing things like 
jobs, services, and other goods. Writes Chandra, what distinguishes a patronage-
democracy is the relative “power of elected officials to distribute the vast resources 
controlled by the state to voters on an individualized basis, by exercising their discretion in 
the implementation of state policy” (Ibid: 7, my emphasis). As Chandra further argues, 
what ultimately matters for the average voter in patronage-democracies are the 
particularistic and material benefits they may receive by voting in favor of a specific 
candidate. Perhaps the most surprising implication of this suggestion, as Chandra herself 
notes, is that ethnic parties have no natural advantage over non-ethnic parties in their 
respective ethnic groups because voters are ultimately “instrumental actors” who only 
put stock in their own identity in as far as it allows them to maximize their ability to 
secure “material or psychic goods or some combination of the two” (Ibid: 12).   
One of the most widely cited political science works on elections in South Asia, 
Chandra’s account of Indian voters who “divest identity” (Ibid) in favor of material and 
particularistic benefits is grounded in a traditional understanding of the phenomenon of 
patronage. Elaborated over the years through various terms like “machine-politics”, 
“clientelism”, or “vote-buying”, elections in South Asian countries like India and 
Pakistan have typically been described as systems of exchange that are structured by 
relationships between powerful patrons and their dependent clients.92 According to this 
logic of analysis, voters do not make electoral choices on the basis of a particular party’s 
policy proposals or political platforms. Rather, they support the election bid of a 
powerful patron – often a man of wealth and/or community influence – with the 
                                                 
92 See (Piliavsky, 2014) for a recent overview. Though the presence of such patronage politics is 
common in the Global South in general and in South Asian in particular, systems of electoral 
exchange have long been present in the Global North as well (see Chubb, 2009; Judd, 2015; 




expectation that he will provide jobs and money, improve access to services like potable 
water and sanitation, or use his official status to secure development funds for a 
particular community (see Baldwin, 2013; Hasnain, 2005; Nassemullah and Chhibber, 
2018). As such, many scholars argue that elections in South Asia have failed to disperse 
democratic norms.93 The electoral process and, by extension, the rationality of the 
average voter is not only criticized for lacking a concern with policy and platform 
democracy, but also understood as a transactional exchange where citizens vote based on 
the patron’s demonstrable ability to provide essential services and development projects.  
For instance, in a work that is characteristic of this thinking, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
(2007) describe patronage as an inefficient system where both voters and politicians must 
employ elaborate methods to gauge whether the other side will hold up their end of the 
bargain. For Kitschelt and Wilkinson, the root of the problem is that democratic norms 
of accountability are replaced by “the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for 
direct payments or continuing access to employment” (Ibid: 2). In short, the assumption 
in much of this scholarship is that votes are “for sale”, and that the average (South 
Asian) voter makes electoral choices on the basis of a cost-benefit analyses that almost 
mechanistically allocates support for the highest bidder.94  
In Pakistan, too, popular accounts view patronage as typical of elections. For instance, 
in a piece entitled “Political Handouts Thrive in Pakistan”, Declan Walsh (2013) of the 
New York Times writes that for the average Pakistani citizen, “votes are dictated less by 
the strategic issues that concern Western allies — combating the Taliban, rescuing an 
                                                 
93 Interpretations that view patronage as evidence of “failed” democratization characterize some 
the earliest (Flynn, 1974; Scott, 1972) and subsequent (Breman, 1993; Fox 1994) explorations of 
the subject.  The idea that electoral exchange, vote-buying, or patronage politics is antithetical to 
the basis of democratic freedom is also a consistently made argument (see Akhter, 2011; Blunt et 
al., 2012; Bratton, 2008;  de Wit, 1996; Kapur and Vaishnav, 2018; Stokes, 2005, 2013). 
94 As Lisa Björkman (2014) notes, even interpretivist or constructivist accounts of “vote-buying” 
in this vein assume that ballots can, with varying degrees of agency or subjugation on the part of 




ailing economy or shaping policy toward Afghanistan — and more by immediate 
concerns about legal protection and government handouts.”95 
 
 
Figure 5.1: "One nation, one voice against the tanker mafia!" 
 
A cursory look at election campaigns in Karachi suggests that Walsh is not entirely 
wrong in his criticism of Pakistani democracy. In a city where dry pipes exist alongside 
the ubiquitous presence of tankers clogging up the streets, water is a cornerstone of 
nearly every single political campaign. Indeed, the 2018 manifestos of the Pakistan 
                                                 
95 Indeed, talk of “electables” – influential candidates who offer political parties large vote banks 
in exchange for party tickets – pervades popular accounts of the distinctly undemocratic nature of 
elections in Pakistan. For typical examples appearing in the Pakistani media, see “Curse of the 





People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, two of the country’s most 
powerful parties, both promise better management of urban water resources. For some 
independent candidates in Karachi such as the young and idealistic Jibran Nasir, 
providing potable water and ending the shadowy “tanker mafia” forms the entire basis of 
a campaign (figure 5.1 above). Such politicking is not limited to the cities low-income 
areas either. For instance, in one notable report published in The Express Tribune (Kazi, 
2018), the author described how access to potable water structured voter concerns for 
both “affluent areas” and “adjoining slums” during a 2018 run-off election in a 
constituency close to Samandar Colony:  
KARACHI: Given that water shortage remains a major issue in the areas falling 
under PS-111 constituency, it is no surprise that various candidates in the run for 
Sunday’s election have made water scarcity the core issue of their campaign. The 
constituency includes the affluent areas of Defence Housing Authority (DHA) 
and Clifton as well as the adjoining slum areas. The residents of these localities 
suffer as neither the Clifton Cantonment Board (CBC) nor the Karachi Water 
and Sewerage Board (KWSB) is able to meet the water demands of the residents, 
thereby forcing residents to purchase water through tankers. While political 
parties and their candidates have been running lukewarm campaigns in their 
strongholds, some have been assuring people to restore their water troubles… 
Almost all the candidates, in their own unique way, are assuring constituents that 
they will resolve the water crisis. [PTI’s candidate] Qureshi, who is also the 
information secretary of PTI Karachi, claims that water is the biggest issue faced 
by the residents of this constituency and claims that his party leader and prime 
minister [Imran Khan] will resolve the issue. 
 
These scholarly and popular accounts solidify the notion of an instrumental, gain-
seeking voter. In Karachi, such a voter is preoccupied with materialistic benefits like 
water, but may also vote in favor of patrons that provide roads, jobs, and cash handouts. 
Yet, as Anastasia Piliavsky (2014: 22) writes, the “calculus of rational choice offers one 
very distinct set of values, which pivot around the calculating, profit-seeking individual 
when trying to explain how politicians lead and why people follow them in South Asia. 
In contrast to these rational-choice inspired perspectives, ethnographic accounts paint a 




sometimes distinctly moral and rights-driven electoral choices.96 Far from “[divesting] 
identity” (Chandra, 2004: 12), voters seek to operationalize webs of entitlements and 
obligations and make distinctly political claims in the process. As such, instances of vote-
buying or machine politics are a “vernacularization” (Michelutti, 2007) of elections in the 
postcolonial context, the very “stuff” of democratic politics (Björkman; 2014) 
manifesting in social groups exchanging votes for benefits like jobs, water, and sanitation.  
This is especially apparent in the urban South, where short-lived moments of electoral 
participation are held against the backdrop of unplanned urbanization and the spatial and 
cultural legacies of empire. For instance, in his highly influential reading of urban Brazil, 
James Holston (2008, 2009) makes a case for “insurgent citizenship.” As Holston argues 
in his analysis of grassroots mobilizations at Brazil’s urban peripheries, the poor demand 
housing and basic services, not as entitlements granted by powerful patrons, but as the 
“struggle for the right to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen’s dignity” 
(Holston, 2009: 246). It is therefore at the very site of marginalization – in terms of the 
necessities like water, security, and housing that make life possible – that the 
peripheralized demand their inclusion in the city. For Holston, the urban poor’s efforts 
do not signify a desire to become rights bearing individuals in a predefined order of 
(liberal) citizenship, but a conflict over what citizenship means and how it might be 
achieved. Read in the light of insurgent citizenship, material exchanges for votes in 
patronized elections shed light on the urban poor as an electoral public that is embroiled 
in a struggle over the city itself. Here, the urban poor vote for representatives promising 
                                                 
96 For example, in his analysis of the ruling class in 19th century India, Chris Bayly (1977) argued 
that patron-client relations were stuck between competing instrumental and social imperatives. 
Bayly argued that powerful bankers and money lenders could only instrumentalize their patron 
status for financial gain if they simultaneously solidified social and religious relations by 
redistributing the wealth they acquired to begin with. Historians like Bayly thus decades ago 
demonstrated the meaning-laden quality of patron-client relationships. In more recent writings, 
such relationships are more than pre-modern practice of previously hierarchical postcolonial 
societies. Patronage as a form of political contestation can be seen not only in India (Jaffrelot, 
2007; Price and Srinivas, 2014; Webb, 2012; Witsoe, 2011), but also Indonesia (Berenschot and 




particularistic benefits not only because they must find ways to acquire highly contested 
resources that are legally, extralegally, or culturally rendered outside their grasp. Rather, in 
addition, they vote for better access to potable water, city infrastructure, and housing 
because in doing so they shape the city as more egalitarian space in which they have a 
right to live dignified lives.97 
As I demonstrate below, insurgent citizenship as a concept is useful in showing why 
Samandar Colony’s residents vote for candidates promising better urban services, jobs, 
and security. But, while residents vote for the water, sanitation, or “development” 
candidate, I also found an undercurrent in which families expressed their support for a 
new political face. In a community known as Katchi Para, residents expressed their 
support for the TLP, a rising, far-right Islamic party that did not campaign on promises 
to provide services like water, but religious morality in a system of “Khatam-e-Nubuwat” 
[finality of the Holy Prophet]. As to why residents of Katchi Para suddenly supported the 
distinctly unmaterialistic and vague nature of the TLP’s campaign despite their ongoing 
problems with things like potable water is unanswered by both the concept of insurgent 
citizenship and instrumental accounts of patronage-democracies. This is because both 
concepts assume that elections in contexts like Pakistan are always directly centered on 
particularistic gains. Either for short-term instrumental needs or for a larger struggle over 
urban citizenship itself, the poor are seen as directly exchanging their votes for potable 
water, sanitation, housing, or security. Such an assumption, however, limits our 
understanding of how the urban poor might make claims to the city and, more generally, 
employ formal democratic institutions to meet their needs.  
                                                 
97 Holston himself centers his discussion of insurgent citizenship on the acts of grassroots 
organizations and neighborhood associations that politicize things like motherhood. Here, I draw 
attention to how insurgent citizenship might also exist in the arena of elections, where meaning-
laden patronage bonds help the urban poor enact their right to the city through a more narrow 




In his original 1968 work Le droit à la ville, Henri Lefebvre (1986) introduced the “right 
to the city” as a call to action to reclaim the urban space that had become alienated 
through commodification and regimes of property rights. Lefebvre’s highly influential 
slogan has since been coopted by liberal-democratic narratives of urban democratization 
and inclusion (see, for instance, UN-HABITAT 2010). But, as Mark Purcell (2014: 142) 
writes, Lefebvre’s original formulation was far more radical in that it described a “wider 
political struggle for revolution.” Here, I draw on Lefebvre’s notion of the right to the 
city, not to describe Marxist-inspired claims for de-alienation in Karachi, but as a way to 
explore how the city’s urban poor use the critical arena of elections to make “the space 
of the city their own again” (Ibid).98 The empirical sections below demonstrate this by 
tracing how elections continue to be characterized by efforts at insurgent citizenship with 
residents making direct, materialistic claims to secure their place in the city.99 In addition, 
however, I also explore how, in supporting the TLP’s unmaterialistic dictum of Khatam-e-
Nubuwat, Karachi’s urban poor increasingly find ways to indirectly make claims to these 
very material benefits and, by extension, their right to the city.  
 
“They did a lot for us” 
Throughout my fieldwork in Samandar Colony, residents answered my questions about 
water with talk of elections. “When elections happen we get water” was a near-universal 
response to the question “Do you get water here?” When I asked residents to elaborate 
or provide specific examples, they cited how their barāy (unofficial community leaders 
                                                 
98 Henri Lefebvre’s (1986 [1968]) original conception of the right to the city has since been 
brought into conversation  with a variety of urban issues including the neoliberal restructuring of 
cities (Aalbers and Gibb, 2014; Harvey, 2010; Purcell, 2002); urban redevelopment (Fernandes, 
2007;  Shine, 2013); the spatial dynamics of  cities divided by race (McCann, 1999); and sectarian 
violence (Kuymulu, 2013; Nagle, 2009) in both the global North and south. Here, I seek to bring 
the concept of the right to the city in direct conversation with a particular performance register 
of urban citizenship: the everyday meanings that structure elections in Karachi. 
99 Like in Samandar Colony, a right to be included in the city as expressed through demands for 
urban services has long been made by voting publics in other contexts (see Anand, 2017; 




like elders as well as elected officials like councilors and legislators) regularly campaigned 
on promising a permanent end to water shortages, as well as regular trash collection, 
newly paved roads, and other long-term fixes to many of Samandar Colony’s persistent 
problems. As residents explained, this pattern of promising concrete development in 
return for votes was common to all the major parties that had been active in the 
settlement for thirty years; the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI), the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and the MQM.  
During my first trip to Samandar Colony in 2017, descriptions of elections as 
materialistic exchanges for urban services in general and water in particular were 
common. When I visited the community again in summer 2018, just three months from 
Pakistan’s general election, such talk was everywhere. Many families expressed the need 
to give a “chance” to incumbent candidates who swore to make Samandar Colony a 
better place to live. When I asked them to explain what reason they had to believe a 
particular candidate would fulfill their campaign promises, residents referred to how barāy 
in the past had developed Samandar Colony. For instance, Lalitha Aunty and her 
husband Madhu, who had lived in the settlement since 1980, described how elected 
officials of the PPP had greatly improved residents’ lives by providing crucial service 
infrastructures. When I first visited their home in 2018, Lalitha Aunty described 
Samandar Colony as a wonderful place to live, regardless of the water and sanitation 
issues people in her lane currently faced. Indeed, the old couple was optimistic about 
long term changes coming to Samandar Colony if Imran Khan’s PTI came to power. 
This was precisely because they saw in him the same potential as PPP’s Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto and his daughter Benazir who had “done work” for residents in the past:  
Me: Why do you think something will change?  
Madhu: Because he’s new [Imran Khan].  
Me: He will change things because he’s new?  
Madhu: He’s new. So, to get the votes he will do almost anything. Greed is a bad 




Lalitha: Who knows? If he bowls well he might win the cup! [Laughs] But only if 
he works hard! 
Madhu: We’ve tried everyone; Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif – now see, Bhutto did a lot 
for us.  
Me: What did Bhutto do for you?  
Lalitha: Yes, Bhutto sahib did a lot for us. I remember when I was small, I saw so 
many things that he did in Hyderabad and here.  
Madhu: He did a lot. We shouldn’t forget him. He did a lot of things for the 
poor. He was very good for minorities, and his daughter [Benazir] was too. 
Lalitha: We usually vote for [PPP] because of Bhutto sahib and his daughter. We 
voted for her because of him. 
Madhu: Whatever vote we have we give to them. We will this time too. 
Me: You won’t vote for them this time?  
Madhu: We will. 
Lalitha: If they do work for us. He [Bhutto] used to do work for us. Benazir also 
did work for us. 
Madhu: But he hasn’t done anything at all. He’s just helped himself. 
Me: Who hasn’t done anything at all?  
Madhu: [The current party chief] Zardari. He hasn’t done anything like Bhutto, 
has he?  
Lalitha: No, he’s just interested in building malls, and building flats on top of 
malls. If he’s so concerned with that why would he look to the poor? 
Madhu: Benazir wasn’t like that. She supported us. 
Lalitha: She cared for us a lot. And Bhutto sahib was so good to us, may Allah 
grant him paradise. 
Me: What did Bhutto sahib do for [Samandar Colony]?  
Lalitha I’m not sure what he did for us here. But what I do remember is that he 
did a lot in Hyderabad.  
Madhu: No, no, he did a lot here too. 
 
Pressed for concrete examples regarding what the previous barāy had done for 
Samandar Colony, Lalitha Aunty and Madhu claimed, in exceedingly general terms, how 
elected officials and community leaders had supported families over the course of the 
community’s history. For example, the PPP was credited with such significant tasks as 
providing trunk water infrastructures, paving roads, building sanitation systems, 
providing health facilities and handing out jobs. Residents thus continued to justify 
voting for them, and, to a lesser extent, other parties on the basis of securing material 
benefits. But, like Lalitha Aunty and Madhu, residents could not point to specific 
examples, specific timeframes, or specific projects in which elected representatives had 
played a significant role. Instead, they described these developments in general terms 




collection of “jhuggis” [mud huts/slums] to a “pucca” [solid/permanent] settlement with 
concrete structures, local shops, and (now heavily polluted and unusable) public 
amenities such as parks.100 In doing so, however, Lalitha Aunty and Madu, and indeed 
many other residents described elections as inherently materialistic exchanges of votes 
for benefits like water, jobs, and security.  
When it comes time to visit the ballot box, however, securing these benefits involves 
a considerable degree of contestation and negotiation; relationships with various barāy do 
not produce results until they are made to. Residents must actively work to leverage their 
votes for material benefits; they must make their demands for water, jobs, and other 
benefits explicit; deploy the language of rights and entitlements; and ground desires for 
material well-being by forcing candidates’ to recognize their everyday precarity. Below, I 
relate two ethnographic encounters – a meeting with an elected official and observations 
of Hindu Para’s awami [people’s] water tanks – that capture the contestation and 
negotiation that characterize election time in Karachi. 
 
“Because elections are coming” 
An ethnic Pashtun, Farhan ran for union council vice-chairman on a PPP ticket in the 
2015 local body elections. Farhan’s campaign was similar to those of others; he promised 
an end to water shortages, a sanitation overhaul, and more development in Samandar 
Colony. Given both his party affiliation and his status as a community elder, Hindu 
Para’s residents voted for him because they were confident he would fulfill his promises. 
After two years as an elected official, however, residents, once excited about the prospect  
of Farhan representing them (“he was from our community”), now described him as a 
selfish and immoral person who was using his political office for personal gain (“we 
                                                 
100 Many residents also spoke of Zulfikar and Benazir Bhutto’s efforts to develop Karachi’s low-
income areas in the 1970s under the slogan of “roti, kapra, makkan” [food, clothing, shelter]. 
Bhutto’s efforts are well documented in both scholarly and civil society accounts (see Ahmed et 




barely even see his face”). The bone of contention for residents was Farhan’s alleged 
shutdown of government sponsored relief water tankers. During interviews in 2017, 
residents accused Farhan of putting a stop to the government tankers that occasionally 
covered potable water shortages in Samandar Colony. The plot thickened in that Farhan 
was accused of stopping government-sponsored tankers in order to run a private water 
business. Residents pointed to how he had bought himself a new house, a new phone, 
and a new car after he was elected. When asked, Farhan would explain these were gifts 
from his son, who ran a private tanker business. Residents asked how it was possible for 
Farhan’s son to run a private tanker business in a water-starved settlement without using 
his father’s considerable political clout as a union council vice-chairman. In 2017, after 
many failed attempts, I finally secured a meeting with the man himself through Ihlam, a 
PPP supporter who I had met during my very first trip to Samandar Colony. At the time, 
I was still making sense of how residents accessed water. But, as the following excerpt 
from my field notes demonstrates, the interview quickly turned into a contentious 
encounter between Farhan and Imad.  
 
A black Toyota Corolla with tinted windows trawls past us. “He’s here” says Farhan’s 
son. Sure enough, a few minutes later a man walks towards us. He is old, in his 60s at 
least. He is dressed in an extremely clean white shalwar kameez. On his head rests a 
traditional prayer hat and his face is covered by an enormous beard. Everyone stands 
and greets him. Farhan’s phone rings and he answers. I try to eavesdrop and pick up 
the conversation about water. “Ask that [expletive] who gave him permission to go to 
the RO [reverse osmosis] plant.” Farhan continues: “I can’t promise the water today 
but tomorrow.” He then invites me sit down on one of the larger charpai’s outside one 
of the hotels. “Tell me,” Farhan says ““How can I help you?” I ask about the 




end of the distribution system. He says the settlement had water earlier, but that since 
then, various housing schemes have tapped into the trunk mains, leaving little water 
for Samandar Colony’s residents. Farhan says he complained to the KWSB Managing 
Director Misbah Fareed and the Karachi Corp Commander, but nothing changed. 
“Now you tell me, what can we do against the army?” If there is no theft, says Farhan, 
then we will get water. I tell Farhan how I read the newspaper while abroad and, 
often, there are stories about a shadowy tanker mafia that works hand in glove with 
public officials. “Is this true?” Farhan replies: “Nobody can stop our water. If they try 
we’ll stop them.” But then where is the water I ask. Farhan gestures to the 
surrounding houses on both sides of the street. “Look at the population growth!” he 
exclaims. “Look around at how many people live here! When you look at the 
urbanization in the last 15 years and the unchanged water source what do you think 
will happen?”  I ask if there are illegal connections in Samandar Colony. Without 
missing a beat Farhan says “Bilkul [absolutely].” I pause, waiting for him to elaborate. 
No other information is offered. “How does this happen?” I ask. “Under cover of 
darkness people make their connections” says Farhan. He explains that many such 
connections have been destroyed in the past and that he will continue doing so in his 
capacity as vice-chairman.  
[We continue to discuss the problem of “illegal” connections. Farhan relates how 
a local cleric was caught in the act of selling connections to the 12-inch pipes that 
runs the length of Samandar Colony. Eventually, the vice chairman turns to touting 
the work he has done for the settlement’s residents]. 
Farhan explains that all he can do is his best. He talks about the park he built and 
the girl’s school he commissioned. Ihlam speaks up: “And what about Hindu Para, 
what have you done for that place?” Farhan’s relaxed demeanor gives way to anger. 




up street lights. Then, in a lighter tone, he tells Ihlam that “work will start in Hindu 
Para in a few days, don’t worry.” Ihlam mutters in response: “that’s because elections 
are coming.” Farhan yells again, telling Ihlam that the residents of Hindu Para don’t 
support him like they did before. He looks at me, puts his hand on my shoulder, and 
says “with you as my witness if five people write to me about a problem and I don’t 
fix this problem you can take me to the barber and have my beard shaved.” 
Meanwhile, men are milling around the heated discussion. There’s a large group 
sitting behind us. They keep looking over their shoulders, smirking at the things being 
said. “It’s the PTI government now!” a voice pipes up from behind me. Farhan 
shoots the man a dirty look. Ihlam asks what Farhan has done for him personally. 
“Why did you ask for 2 lacs [roughly $1,200] when I asked you for a job?” Farhan 
looks at me again and says he did all that he could, but that he couldn’t be held 
responsible for a promise falling through. 
 
This encounter demonstrates two points. First, Samandar Colony’s residents expected 
Farhan to provide them material resources from a position of power. Indeed, in 
rebutting Ihlam’s accusations by claiming to provide street lights, Farhan was explaining 
how he honored his responsibility as a representative of Samandar Colony. Second and 
closely related, it was precisely because elections were a few months away that residents 
could both demand such particularistic benefits and hold Farhan accountable for failing 
to provide while in office. This can be seen in how the union council vice-chairman 
promised to carry out more work, even pointing to specifics tasks he had done in the 
past such as fixing lights and paving roads. In relating this incident, I do not mean to 
adjudicate the truth contest of either Farhan’s claims or those of the Hindu Para 
residents present at the meeting. Instead, I seek to demonstrate how the competing 




conversations with residents – shed light on the brief window of open haggling – 
between elected representatives and their constituents for particularistic benefits – that 
accompanies the domain of electoral politics in Karachi.  
 
Awami Tanks 
My first encounter with the awami tanks was in 2017 when I was invited to see how water 
was distributed (see figure 5.2). I observed how residents (mostly women and children) 
jostled back and forth in a cue with all manner of pots, plastic bottlers, and makeshift 
cans at the ready. An old man sat next to a cylindrical tank encased in concrete, filling 
people’s containers via a hose pipe connected to the bottom of the structure. “This is 
one of the ways we supply water” said Khalil, a PTI worker, explaining that another 
similar tank was located at the opposite end of Hindu Para. Khalil further explained that 
the tanks were built by residents to store and distribute tanker water. In the run up to the 
2013 general elections, however, PTI candidates for the national and provincial 
assemblies “surveyed” Samandar Colony and were shown the tanks as a way to alleviate 
potable water shortages. Once elected, the PTI lawmakers worked closely with party 
workers within the settlement to fill the tanks with free tankers. “We try to get a tanker 
every 15 days” Khalid said, admitting that this was not always possible.  
When I asked families about this schedule, they argued the tanks were filled randomly. 
“It depends on their mood” grumbled Aadi, a shopkeeper who spent most of his days 
sitting outside his tiny establishment due to the lack of electricity. Like Aadi, residents 
claimed they had to wait months for a PTI tanker. They claimed tankers would arrive 
without warning or time to prepare, and that families were forced into a mad dash to get  
ahead in line. Moreover, not all residents were allowed to get water from a specific tank. 








Figure 5.2: Residents distribute water from an awami tank (photo by author) 
 
But, while the tanker schedule was random in 2017, by 2018 it was far more common. 
The PPP had constructed a tank midway between the two PTI tanks and was filling it 
daily in the run up to elections. Mahsib, the PPP worker responsible for securing the 
tankers admitted that there were other parties also distributing water in this fashion. “But 
the PPP gives water on an almost daily basis,” he explained. Once again, residents were 
far more skeptical of the party line. “This is dhikawa [showmanship]” said Pandey, a local 
resident when I asked why the tank had been built. Late one night in July 2018, we sat 
under a loud fan in Pandey’s two bedroom home. He had just gotten off work at the 
port, but was patient enough to answer my questions. Typically, our conversation began 




built by the PTI in a different segment of Samandar Colony.101 “You see it now and it is 
completely garbage”, he continued: “It barely ran for a month. I myself went and filled 
gallons for my own house from there. It was supposed to clean salty water, but it was just 
for show [dhikhawa].”  I asked Pandey to elaborate:  
Me: You said the plant is for dhikhawa? What does that mean?  
Pandey: The PTI people put up the tank to show those houses that they’re doing 
something for water. They made the plant. But if you put that water in a glass and 
it is not possible to drink, then what is the point of the plant? If you are getting 
Rs10 lakhs, and you are spending only 5 lakhs on the plant, then you may as well 
give that money to the poor. Give someone Rs5, 000, give someone Rs10, 000. 
What is the point of wasting all that money [on the plant]? You’ve put up a 
machine, a water tank, a roof, walls, taps; how much money do you think they 
spent on that? A lot right? Now see what they’ve done here [in Hindu Para]. 
First, they used to give water every other day with this [awami] tank. Most people 
that rent here are from interior Sindh. The PTI said to them, let’s go in a 
jalsa.[rally]. Some people went, and some didn’t. The people who stand in line to 
get water from the tank, not one of them went in the jalsa. So, they shut the 
water. The PTI said, you didn’t come in the jalsa so why should we give you 
water? 
Me: But then what did the people say?  
Pandey: Nothing. The poor can’t say anything. I’m usually on duty, but when I 
come home I try to see what is happening. One day I came home and asked my 
son if they gave the water and he said no. When I asked, they told me people 
didn’t go in the jalsa so they shut the water. I said: what kind of system is this? If 
you go in the jalsa you get water, if you don’t go in the jalsa you don’t get water? 
This is not right. If you’re giving water, then give it constantly. We voted for you.  
 
 
Panday’s (and for that matter Aadi’s) disgust with parties like the PTI is, by no means, 
uncommon. Many of Hindu Para’s residents see elections as replete with instances of 
party workers blithely supplying (and indeed withholding) goods like water for votes. As 
such, the case of Hindu Para’s awami tanks shows that elections are times when patron-
client networks (in which material goods are traded for votes) are activated. Indeed, 
Panday’s description of awami tanks as a kind of showmanship rather than sincere 
support [“dhikhawa”] for residents sheds light on an understanding of elections as 
temporal instances where goods like water can be secured. While party workers like 
Khalid and Mahsib spoke of their work as a commitment to provide water in a low-
                                                 
101 This was not the reverse osmosis plant attached to Samandar Station as discussed in chapter 




income settlement, residents described such efforts as electioneering strategies aimed at 
securing votes.  
 
The Work of Settlement 
Elections in Samandar Colony always were and continue to be about exchanges of votes 
for services, jobs, and other goods. This was the case when I visited Samandar Colony in 
2017, a full year before the general elections, in 2018 when campaigning for the 
upcoming polls was in full swing, and, as residents explained, throughout the settlement’s 
history. Throughout this period, Samandar Colony’s families voted for barāy who had 
provided particularistic benefits in the past, or continued to promise such benefits in the 
future. But while these exchanges might initially be perceived as instances of vote-buying, 
the incremental material improvements Samandar Colony’s residents hope to make to 
their own lives by continuing to take part in patronized elections signifies a broader 
effort for urban inclusion. Indeed, closer attention to the accounts of residents like 
Lalitha Aunty and Madhu shows that exchanging votes for tangible goods like potable 
water, sanitation, and jobs is about demanding a right to live in the city itself. 
Contextualized in the precarious, often reversible histories of ongoing settlement where 
potable water, working sanitation networks, and communal security signify the ability to 
live a decent life, it is clear that Samandar Colony’s residents articulate their desire to live 
in Karachi at the very site of precarity; through demands for the very material 
entitlements that make the work of settlement possible. As Lalitha Aunty explained:  
Because we’re voting for our barāy! They should take care of the poor, shouldn’t 
they? If they want to live in comfort then they should realize we want at least 
some comfort too. They should at least give us water. They should fix our roads. 
They should fix our gutter lines. That is very big for us. The day these things  
happen I will hand out sweets because our area will have become very nice! 
People pray for rain but we worry about how to make their way through dirty 
water, hiking up their saris, and taking the long way round. We pray it rains 
everywhere in Karachi except in [Samandar Colony] [laughs]. Now you tell me, 




working sewerage lines, if we got water and a little bit of rain didn’t create 
puddles of dirty water, then everyone would send their blessing to the 
government for making our lives better.  
 
At the same time, while many residents of Hindu Para claim that, as caretakers and 
sincere patrons, barāy are responsible for providing these material benefits, they also hold 
a cynical view of elections as instances when political parties engage in, at times, amoral 
electioneering strategies. Indeed, the case of Hindu Para’s awami tanks shows that 
residents are often skeptical of election promises and that contestation and negotiation 
goes both ways; much like residents can withhold votes, party workers and candidates 
can withhold providing benefits if not supported at the ballot. Despite this, voting 
remains an important practice in Karachi’s Samandar Colony. For instance, when I asked 
Aadi, a local shopkeeper, why people vote in circumstances in which outlandish 
campaign promises (such as 24-hour potable water) are unlikely to be met, he explained 
that voting ensured at least a temporary improvement in terms of material-well-being: 
“Now days we ask our barāy, will you give us water for two months or six months?” he 
shrugged.  
As a temporal, institutionalized moment of political action, elections are thus times 
when Samandar Colony’s residents can make direct demands for material and 
particularistic benefits. Elections are also times when political parties become attentive to 
the needs of the communities they represent, activating the networks of material 
exchange that garner them votes. But, rather than being instances where votes are bought 
or otherwise mechanically exchanged for particularistic benefits like jobs, street lights, 
and water, elections (including the months before the ballot itself) are an altogether brief 
window in which Karachi’s urban poor put formal institutions to work for themselves. 
As the preceding sections show, elections, unlike other moments, are times when 
residents can bring their elected officials to the negotiating table and force the latter to 




securing water, clean living environments, and decent jobs. As Madhu explained when I 
asked him what his expectations were from the upcoming 2018 General Election: “We’ll 
see who works for us. When the time for elections comes, you see everyone around. 
They come to your houses.” 
And yet, directly exchanging votes for urban services and other material is not the only 
way Karachi’s urban poor utilize elections to their benefit. In analyzing the rise of a 
unique, right-wing party in the TLP below, the remainder of this chapter explores how 
residents of a small community in Samandar Colony known as Katchi Para found ways 
to indirectly make these very claims during Pakistan’s 2018 General Election.  
 
Interlude: Rise of the TLP 
We have emerged as the third largest party in the by-polls in Lahore and 
elsewhere. And we have accomplished this not by promising paved streets or 
drains, but by committing ourselves to fight for Khatm-i-Nubuwat. 
 
- TLP Leader Zubair Kasuri. (quoted in Jamal, 2018) 
 
In 2016, Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was murdered by his bodyguard Mumtaz 
Qadri in broad daylight. Taseer was murdered for speaking in defense of Asia Bibi, a 
Christian woman who had allegedly insulted the Holy Prophet Muhammad.102 The 
Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool was a deeply reactionary movement emerging in response 
to the perceived injustice behind Qadri’s conviction and eventual hanging for the 
 
murder. This movement, which advocated the sanctity of the Holy Prophet Muhammad 
above all else and the protection of Pakistan’s strict blasphemy laws, established the TLP 
as its electoral wing in 2017. Contesting in Punjab’s 2017 by-elections, the TLP gave a 
                                                 
102 A legacy of British Colonialism, Pakistan’s blasphemy law seeks to protect recognized religions 
from public insults. With President Zia’s aggressive Islamization of Pakistan’s legal and civil 
institutions in the 1980s, however, the blasphemy law tends to favor perceived insults against 
Islam more than any other religion. Indeed, the Pakistan Penal Code, the country’s criminal code, 




surprisingly good showing when it received 7,000 votes in a PML-N stronghold. But the 
TLP’s watershed moment came in November 2017 when it organized a sit-in close to 
Islamabad against a controversial change to Pakistan’s election law. Led by Khadim 
Husain Rizvi, a religious preacher whose personal history was shrouded in mystery, the 
TLP demanded Law Minister Zahid Hamid’s removal over a clause in the 2017 Election 
Bill which changed the phrase “I swear” to “I believe” in an oath declaring the Holy 
Prophet Mohammad as the final messenger of Allah. After three weeks of the sit-in, 
police and army crackdowns led to protests across Pakistan, culminating in criticism for 
the ruling PML-N and the law minister’s resignation. 
Less than a year later, the TLP was unable to convert this momentum into victories in 
Pakistan 2018 general election. Despite considerable street power backing candidates 
across Pakistan in both national and provincial constituencies, the TLP only won two 
seats in the Sindh Provincial Assembly – both of which represented urban constituencies 
in Karachi. The party did not win any seats in the constituencies that make up Samandar 
Colony. These results are presented in tables 5.1 to 5.4 which are compiled with data 
collected from the Election Commission of Pakistan. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the TLP’s 
results in select provincial and national constituencies of Karachi (discussed below). 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4, including both the TLP and other parties, correspondingly present 
the vote counts and percentages in the provincial and national assemblies that make up 
Samandar Colony. With just two electoral wins, it is clear that the TLP failed to secure a 
significant voice in Pakistan’s lawmaking bodies. Yet, when the party’s performance is 
assessed according to its ability to secure votes, the TLP’s 2018 election results show that 
it made significant inroads in Karachi constituencies long considered strongholds of 
larger, mainstream parties like the PPP, PTI, MQM, and PML-N. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
assess the TLP’s popularity according to an expanded set of criteria that includes whether 




constituency; and whether the TLP candidate was among the top three vote getting 
contenders in each constituency.  
 
Constituency Win/Loss 10,000 votes+? Top 3? 
PS-92 L N Y 
PS-93 L Y Y 
PS-94 L Y Y 
PS-95 L Y Y 
PS-96 L Y Y 
PS-105 L Y Y 
PS-106 L N Y 
PS-107 W Y Y 
PS-109 L Y Y 
PS-110 L Y N 
PS-113 L N Y 
PS-115 W Y Y 
PS-117 L Y Y 
PS-118 L N Y 
PS-119 L Y Y 
PS-124 L Y Y 
PS-126 L Y Y 
PS-127 L Y Y 
Table 5.1: TLP Sindh Provincial Assembly results in Karachi 
 
Constituency Win/Loss 20,000 votes+ Top 3 
NA-239 L Y Y 
NA-240 L Y Y 
NA-241 L N Y 
NA-245 L Y Y 
NA-246 L Y Y 
NA-247 L Y Y 
NA-249 L Y Y 
NA-251 L Y Y 
NA-252 L N Y 
NA-253 L Y Y 
NA-254 L Y Y 
NA-255 L Y Y 
Table 5.2: TLP National Assembly results in Karachi 
 
Based on these criteria, the TLP’s performance is far from insignificant. For instance, 




criteria in 18 constituencies (table 5.1). Of the 18 national assembly seats in Karachi, the 
party succeeded on at least one of the three criteria in 12 constituencies (table 5.2). 
Support for the TLP during the 2018 elections, as measured by these criteria, is unique 
for several reasons. Unlike other religious parties which relied on creating broad 
coalitions to secure the religious vote, the TLP emerged alone as an Islamic political 
party with considerable street power in low-income, working class neighborhoods of 
Karachi.103 That the TLP came from the Barelvi sect of Islam made the party’s broad 
appeal across a politically, religiously, and ethnically diverse Karachi even more 
distinctive. This is because core practices in the Barelvi sect – such as directly 
worshipping the Holy Prophet Muhammad and venerating both dead and living saints – 
were tantamount to the sin of shirk (polytheism) in mainstream Islam.104 Yet, the party 
secured votes and a leading position in many of Karachi’s multi-sectarian constituencies. 
Though the TLP did not achieve any electoral victories in Samandar Colony, it did 
secure at least one of the three criteria described above in three out of four of the 
settlement’s provincial and national constituencies. For instance, in the two provincial 
assemblies, the TLP secured over 10,000 votes in PS-110 and third position (with 8,911 
votes) in PS-113. In NA-247, the TLP secured both 20,000 votes and second place in 
NA-247. It was only in NA-248 that the party failed to secure the national assembly 
threshold of 20,000 votes and came in fourth. Beyond winning and losing, these criteria 
provide a nuanced way to assess the party’s performance. For instance, that the TLP 
secured 10,000 votes in a provincial constituency where the margin between second and 
                                                 
103 Scholars of democratization argue that President Musharraf relied on religious party coalitions 
like the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to break the influence of traditional parties like the PPP 
and PML-N and secure the support of middle-class voters in Karachi (see Misra, 2003; Nasr, 
2004; Talbot, 2003). Coalitions like the MMA were successful because of establishment support 
as well as a desire to secure the religious vote under one large umbrella. But, as pundits and 
experts note, the TLP’s success as a grassroots party campaigning on a single belief made its 
success very different from that of the religious coalitions in the past (see Chaudhry, 2018; Faiz, 
2018; Husain, 2018)  
104 For instance, Behuria (2008) argues that rifts existed between Barelvi beliefs and other 




third place was under 4,000 votes, and where the margin between third and fourth place 
was less than 800 votes is a mark of its popularity. Moreover, in constituencies where the 
total number of candidates was 20 (PS-110); 18 (PS-113); 23 (NA-247); and 12 (NA-248) 
it is remarkable that TLP routinely secured a top five position – often beating out 
established parties like the MQM, PML-N, and PPP to do so. Taken together, these 
criteria suggest that although the TLP did not win, it enjoyed considerable support in 
Samandar Colony.  
 
Party Position Votes secured/Total  Percentage 
PS-110 
PTI 1 38,878/236,665  16.4% 
PPP 2 14,046/236,665   5.9% 
MQM 3 11,951/236,665   5% 
TLP 4 11,165/236,6652   4.7% 
PS-113 
PTI 1 18,685/147,904  12.6% 
PPP 2 14,967/147, 904  10.1% 
TLP 3 8,911/147, 904 6% 
Table 5.3: Provincial Assembly results in Samandar Colony 
 
Party Position Votes secured/Total  Percentage 
NA-247 
PTI 1 91,020/543,964 16.7% 
TLP 2 24,680/543,964 4.5% 
MQM 3 24,146/543,964 4.4% 
NA-248 
PPP 1 35,124/303,258 11.5% 
PTI 2 34,101/303,258 11.2% 
PML-N 3 20,732/303,258 6.8% 
TLP 4 12,797/303,258 4.2% 
Table 5.4: National Assembly results in Samandar Colony 
 
Of course, support for the TLP does dampen the wins or considerable vote 
percentage of other parties. Indeed, reading tables 5.1 through 5.4 in this way might 
amount to associating votes for the TLP as evidence of an electoral revolution – 




2018 general election. But, the party’s vote percentages and positions nevertheless signify 
that the TLP was a popular choice in Samandar Colony. This is especially significant 
given that the TLP’s campaign of Khatm-i-Nubuwat stood in direct contradiction to that of 
more established political parties that sought votes by providing particularistic benefits 
such as water. In what follows, I demonstrate that support for the TLP might be 
understood in terms of the same issues – of water, sanitation, and housing – that have 
characterized electoral politics in Samandar Colony throughout the settlement’s history. 
In addition to directly exchanging votes for particularistic benefits, then, support for the 
TLP shows how Samandar Colony’s residents also indirectly make claims to these benefits 
and, by extension, continue to pursue the work of settlement during the temporally 
bounded moments of elections.  
 
“Everything else will fall into place” 
On my very first trip to Katchi Para in June 2018, I found myself in the home of Daudi 
Sahib, a former Karachi Municipal Corporation worker. At first, Daudi Sahib’s family 
was suspicious of my presence. Their guarded nature, though intimidating, was not 
surprising; it was election season and homes in Samandar Colony were routinely invaded 
by political party workers promising many wondrous things like water and money. 
Households across the settlement had expressed to me their annoyance with workers 
showing up unannounced at their doorsteps with plates of warm biryani [a mixed rice 
dish], making promises to provide water and jobs. But once Daudi Sahib’s family learnt 
that I was not affiliated with a political party, they acquiesced to answering my questions. 
Soon, I was drinking tea in a small room packed with around 15 men, women, and 
children. Ahmed, Daudi Sahib’s son and an ex-councilor, described himself as a former 
long-time worker of the PML-N. Offering what he called the “inside view” [andar ki baat] 




ratchet up efforts to provide water and other urban services as elections drew near. 
Indeed, Ahmed claimed this was common across all political parties in Samandar Colony 
including the PPP, PML-N, MQM, and MMA. Ahmed explained: “They [party workers; 
candidates] only come to us during elections, and then we don’t see their faces for five 
years!” Members of Daudi Sahbi’s family muttered in agreement as he continued: “If we 
ask why things are so bad after elections, why we don’t get what was promised to us, our 
councilors say our votes have been bought. They think giving water and food during 
elections means buying our votes. They think providing for us after elections is a 
choice.”  
Like many others, Daudi Sahib’s family described elections as moments of 
contestation in which residents and party workers sought to secure material benefits and 
secure votes respectively. But, whereas residents in other parts of Samandar Colony were 
debating which of the established parties would offer the most for their votes (see 
above), households like Daudi Sahib’s expressed their support for a newcomer. Indeed, 
the TLP had a growing presence in Katchi Para unlike other parts of Samandar Colony, 
and its regular corner meetings and rallies were quickly drumming up support. When I 
asked Daudi Sahib’s family what made the TLP different from all the other parties in 
Katchi Para, they emphasized the former’s message of religiosity and morality. This 
desire to vote on the basis of religious belief was repeated in many of the subsequent 
interviews I conducted in Katchi Para. In one noteworthy instance, for example, Anya, 
an old widow and her niece Momina, explained that the TLP would introduce broader 
Islamic principles in the work of government. Indeed, Anya and Momina argued that 
support for religious morality was far more important than the particularistic benefits, 
such as water and jobs, offered by other political parties:  
Me: You’ll vote for the TLP even if they don’t give you water?  




Momina: Meaning that if some party worker says they will give us water, that they 
will give us a new line, that they will give us jobs, even then we will vote for the 
[TLP]. We’ll tell them to their face we will vote for the [TLP]. Whether they win 
or lose, whether our votes our wasted or not we will vote for them. Everyone is 
saying that he [Khadim Husain Rizvi] is good, that he will bring Islamic principles 
back [deeni Islam]. All the women will have to wear burkas. See, they [TLP] 
haven’t tried to convince anyway to vote for them by making them greedy for 
water or jobs [laalach nahi di hai]. All [Rizvi] has spoken about is respect and 
religion. So people want to vote for him. You must have seen all his posters up in 
our areas. Before you came here he came to our street. There were cameras and 
TV people there too. All the men made arrangements for his food and transport 
and he gave a speech too. They prepared a lot for him. It’s not allowed for us to 
take part because women are not allowed. There were lots of men. But we were 
allowed to go to the roof to listen to his speech.  
 
Based on Momina’s explanation, it is easy to conclude that support for the TLP is a 
product of religious belief. Certainly, it would be a mistake to argue that Islamic values 
played no role in this electoral choice – after all, many families I spoke to were, in 
appearance, pious, hardworking Muslims. However, attributing the TLP’s popularity in 
Katchi Para to religious beliefs alone would miss how residents like Momina situate their 
preferences in a wider critique of Samandar Colony’s electoral politics. For instance, 
when I asked Momina and Anya if they would vote for the TLP even if the party didn’t 
supply them water, I had unwittingly asked why residents would consider supporting an 
outfit which, unlike others, was not purchasing votes by providing or promising to 
provide particularistic benefits. Yet Momina took my question as an opportunity to 
explain how different the TLP was compared to other political parties. It was precisely 
because the TLP did not attempt to garner votes by “making them greedy for water or 
jobs [laalach nahi di hai]” that Momina claimed she and others supported them. Indeed, 
throughout my interviews in Katchi Para in 2018, residents rationalized their support for 
the TLP in religious terms and because the party did not promise or actively provide 
particularistic benefits like water, jobs, and money – because it did not engage in vote 
buying. Residents thus perceived the TLP as offering something genuinely different in a 




Momina’s comments make it possible to see the TLP’s popularity as more than a vote to 
be heard, a vote against the corrupt, and a vote on the basis of religion. Precisely what a 
vote for the TLP means is elaborated in the following exchange I had with two TLP 
supporters in June 2018:   
Me: What will happen in the elections?  
Tanveer: For now, everyone is dishonest. Not one person is good. Whoever will 
be elected this time, it’s their responsibility. But I can’t say anything because my 
party is the TLP and our goal is to get them elected. Why? Because they haven’t 
promised us water. They haven’t promised us electricity. They haven’t promised 
us anything. All they have said is when the deen [religion] is corrected then we’ll 
get everything else. The dishonest people in the assembly, for example, they’re 
saying don’t announce the call for prayer on the mosque’s loudspeaker. Why? 
Where is the law against this? Now look at Majib, he’s a PPP worker that was 
promised a job. Ask him if he got anything. He’s got files and files but all the 
benefit has gone to the relatives [of the PPP councilors].  
Me: Who do you think is responsible for this?  
Tanveer: The MPA. It’s his fault. Now, let me tell you. If he [the MPA] wins an 
election, he gives responsibility to some helpers. He gives them money to get 
work done. If he gives them money but doesn’t check where that money was 
spent, then he did wrong.  
Me: You’re saying MPAs should check whether the work is done?  
Tanveer: Yes, because he is responsible [zimidar]. 
Me: Responsible? What does responsibility mean?  
Tanveer: If you’re running a house, you know how much money you’re getting, 
how much you need to spend on your home, and how much you need to keep 
for yourself. This is your responsibility. If you keep all the money for yourself 
then it’s not right is it? This is what happens here; all they [barāy] care about is 
taking money meant for the poor. We’ll invite you to one of our party’s [TLP’s] 
rallies. You’ll see that they won’t make any promises about water, gas, electricity, 
or houses. All they’ll talk about is deen [religion]. Then you listen to the other 
parties and see what happens. Some of the things they say at these rallies… There 
was a time in the last elections when a PPP candidate was giving a rally. One of 
his supporters was addressing the crowd. They were both drunk. You know what 
he said? He said vote for – I won’t say his name [the PPP person] – and you’ll go 
to heaven. What’s the basis of this? We’re sick of false promises. And another 
thing, these parties also make residents fight with each other.  
Me: Fight, how so?  
Tamveer: For instance, all the parties are having their rallies close to each other. 
Now, what happened? Some person from one of the parties throws money into 
the air – not his own, the party’s – and others start copying him. The crowd 
comes onto the road and a fight inevitably begins. They make us fight like this. 
We have faith in Allah that this party [TLP] will not do any such thing. Why? 
Because all they talk about is faith and religion. There’s no dancing, no alcohol, 
no mischief. You come to their office and you’ll get knowledge and education. 
You go to another party’s office and you’ll get alcohol. Where should you go? 
You need to look at your faith, don’t you? We’re going to try to get them elected 




religion… We have faith in god that the TLP will win. And you’ll see their work 
for yourself. They’ll do it all in front of you. We’ve made them promise. They 
have to work for us. 
 
While Tanveer described his electoral choice as an “issue of religion”, he also claimed 
that the TLP would “work” for the community.105 In terms of the latter, Tanveer argued 
that the party would fulfill its “responsibility” of providing for the settlement’s material 
needs. Tanveer therefore did not see the TLP’s unmaterialistic message as separate from 
the settlement’s ongoing concerns over things like potable water, sanitation, and 
development. Rather, it was precisely because the TLP had made elections an “issue of 
religion” that Tanveer claimed they could promise with credibility the very material 
benefits other parties could not. Tanveer’s comments show that support for the TLP, 
like support for any other political party or patron, cannot be decontextualized from 
Samandar Colony where material needs, and in particular access to water, remain 
significant precisely because these issues have always been crucial in the ongoing and 
precarious work of settlement. Rather, Tanveer argued that the way to secure the 
settlement’s material needs lay not in exchanging votes for particularistic gains, but in 
religion (“once the religion is corrected then we’ll get everything else”). Tanveer’s 
comments show that while the TLP’s promises are ethereal, vague, and unmaterialistic, 
Katchi Para’s residents actively make them about concerns over the very same material 
needs that have always concerned them, albeit indirectly (“you’ll see the work for 
yourself.”). 
In Samandar Colony’s Katchi Para, the TLP’s popularity says less about religious 
beliefs (as deeply held as it may be) and more about the ways in which residents actively 
respond to structures of precarity during the all too brief moment of elections. Presented 
with this temporally bounded, institutionalized  opportunity for political action in 2018, 
                                                 
105 “Getting things done” is central to how democracy functions in the South Asian context (see 
Berenschot, 2014; Björkman, 2014a, 2014c. 2015). Here, I draw attention to how getting things 
done remains an important, if not crucial concern in electoral politics even in the absence of 




Katchi Para’s residents not only received the TLP’s vague message through the lens of 
their everyday precarity, they actively appropriated its campaign promises and redeployed 
it in efforts to solve their persistent problems of potable water shortages, unemployment, 
and unsanitary living conditions. The fact that the TLP’s single point campaign of Khatm-
e-Nubuwat was so vague is precisely the reason why Katchi Para’s residents modified it as 
a way to secure the urban inclusion they desired. As I left Daudi Sahib’s family that night 
in June 2018, I asked why residents of the area were supporting a party like the TLP. 
Daudi Sahib himself responded: “As far as our party is concerned, we don’t want any 
electricity or water or anything. All we want is Nizam-i-Mustafa (the system of the Prophet 
Muhammad). Once we have that, everything else will fall into place.”  
 
Conclusion: Reclaiming the City 
In Karachi, when the banal, invisible work of settlement overlaps with elections, the once 
“capricious state” (Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012: 3) suddenly becomes attentive to the 
whims of the urban poor. In Samandar Colony, this means that elections are a time when 
officials can simultaneously be held accountable for their past work and also called upon 
to address everyday concerns. Before visiting the ballot box, residents call on incumbents 
and elected officials alike to provide water (potable or otherwise), enact development 
works, or give jobs. But, while Samandar Colony’s residents certainly negotiate the 
“price” of their vote, their actions cannot be described as instances of vote-buying alone 
as often assumed by theories of liberal democratic politics (Kitschelt and Wilkinson; 
2007). Instead, these exchanges signify conscious attempts to reduce everyday precarity, 
however briefly. As such, elections are times when Karachi’s urban poor more broadly 
articulate their place as residents of the city.106 
                                                 
106 As James Holston argues (2008, 2009) access to water, sanitation, housing are unique sites for 




But, in Katchi Para, a small community within Samandar Colony, families articulate 
their claim to Karachi, not through direct claims for urban services, but by supporting 
the distinctly unmaterialistic, even ephemeral message of a religious party. In making this 
argument, I seek to show how the TLP’s message – while predicated on Islamic 
fundamentalism, authoritarianism, and the exclusion of religious minorities – is 
appropriated by residents to articulate the same basis for urban inclusion in new ways. 
To be sure, the material requirements of settlement – water, sanitation, jobs, and security 
– are perpetual concerns for Samandar Colony’s residents. But, in supporting the TLP 
during the 2018 elections, some residents utilized a new vernacular with which to make 
claims to these particularistic benefits. Rather than negotiating an explicit price for their 
votes, Katchi Para’s residents made their own the TLP’s otherwise vague and 
exclusionary idea of religious morality and redirected it towards their settlement needs. 
Read in this light, Samandar Colony’s nascent support for the far-right TLP points to the 
many ways in which the poor claim “the space of the city their own again” (Purcell, 2014: 
142) at the opportune moments of elections. Though temporally bounded, elections are 
nevertheless formalized instances of political action which Karachi’s residents creatively 
deploy to counter, however briefly, their everyday precarity.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
granted services of modern cities is thus an important metric for urban inclusion that Samandar 








As the process of control becomes a question of achieving the continuous 
appearance of structure or order, there suddenly appears an equally continuous 
threat: the problem of 'disorder'. Disorder now emerges as a natural and 
inevitable liability, requiring a constant vigilance. Disorder though, like order, is a 
notion produced in the distributive practices themselves. It is only now that it 
appears as an ever present threat. 
 
- Timothy Mitchell (1988: 79) 
 
In January 2020, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led Government of Sindh introduced 
a draft act to establish the Sindh Urban and Regional Master Plan Authority. The 
authority is expected to replace Karachi’s Master Planning Department which has, under 
the jurisdiction of either the provincial or city government, drawn up master plans for 
Karachi since 1957. PPP lawmakers argue that replacing the department with a new, 
independent authority is crucial step to standardizing planning practices not just within 
Karachi, but across the entire province of Sindh. Said Sindh Local Government Secretary 
Roshan Ali Shaikh: “The authority [will] work independently with a separate director-
general in all regions of Sindh and having its headquarters in Karachi… The aim is to 
reformulate urban and regional lands and housing standards to provide improved 
conditions, particularly in urban areas” (Khan, 2020). But city officials and opposition 
lawmakers remain skeptical, claiming that the new authority will curb the powers of the 
Karachi mayor’s office. This latest dispute between the provincial and city governments 
is part of the decades-long struggle to plan and govern Karachi. Provincial lawmakers 




with the latter clamoring for more control over planning and municipal-level functions 
and the former constantly seeking to subsume these and other local government 
functions as part of the Government of Sindh (see Rid and Mustafa, 2018 for a historic 
overview). The controversy over the Sindh Urban and Regional Master Plan Authority is 
thus typical of the politicization of governance in Karachi. It represents yet another 
instance in a long history of bureaucratic contestation, poor governance, and ad-hoc 
administration that has come to characterize popular and scholarly understandings of the 
city as disordered, unplanned, and ungoverned (Esser, 2004; Davis, 2006; Gazdar and 
Mallah, 2013; Khan, 2017; Verkaaik, 2016).107 Civil society activists, media narratives, and 
urban scholars argue that these and similar political struggles have left Karachi’s planning 
history in shambles.  
Refocusing the lens on urban planning as an empowered discourse, Precarious Pipes has 
looked beyond narratives of disorder and weak governance to instead examine the ways 
in which planning discursively produces “order” and “disorder” based on a privileged set 
of assumptions and with consequences for how state power is claimed and performed. 
While the lack of housing, poor provisions for service delivery, and decrepit 
infrastructures make Karachi an exemplary case of failed “high modernist” governance 
(Scott, 1998), this dissertation has argued that a consistent failure of rulers to meet the 
basic needs of the population such as water and sanitation – by effectively shaping the 
city’s built form – is precisely the context that enabled the production of both order and 
disorder, as well as their respective roles in processes of urban development and 
governance. This has happened as planners, relying on “slum regularization and 
                                                 
107 For an important scholarly critique of this view, see Laurent Gayer’s (2014) excellent work in 
which he argues that the persistent violence in Karachi means that the city is not governed by the 
state’s monopolization of violence but through the unplanned dispersal of violence across 
multiple independent actors that keep a “game” in check. Gayer focuses specifically on the role 
of political parties, gangs, and other non-state actors who collectively keep the city from falling 
into chaos. In doing so, however, his notion of “Ordered Disorder” tends to support the idea 





improvement”, produced large segments of the city’s space as simultaneously formalized 
yet informal; rationalized yet irrational; and legible yet haphazard. No longer were rapidly 
emerging urban spaces – in particular ad-hoc housing settlements – considered an 
existential threat to the planned city. Instead, they were now produced as “regularized” 
katchi abadis [impermanent settlements]; a unique kind of urban space – legible, 
standardized, and legalized no less – that were perceived to engender the sort of 
resilience and entrepreneurship integral to Karachi’s transformation into a livable city. 
Not only did planners discursively produce order and disorder, they represented both as 
integral to governance in Karachi.   
In both critical and policy-oriented scholarship on urban planning, order is too often 
thought of as a function of the degree to which a city’s built form aligns with (or can be 
made to conform to) a plan, model, or otherwise abstracted mock-up that accentuates a 
desired physical layout. In turn, cities of the Global South (and some in the Global 
North) – with their shantytowns, “ghettos”, favelas, and “slums” – are afforded 
monikers of unplanned and disordered precisely because they entail a seemingly 
insurmountable gap between idealized urban plans on one hand and a constantly 
changing and deeply imperfect reality on the other.  Indeed, if one were to compare the 
2007 Karachi Strategic Development Plan’s goal to make Karachi a “A world class city 
and an attractive economic center with a decent life for Karachiites” (Master Planning 
Group of Offices, 2007: iv) with the city’s present and rising unplanned housing 
settlements, encroached business areas, and congested thoroughfares, it would easy to 
see an instance of planning failure and, hence, disorder. However, if one observes how 
the city’s physical space is discursively normalized as an inherent – albeit distinctive – 
part of Karachi’s urban fabric, it is possible to see an altogether different kind of order at 




master plans, legal documents, and other artifacts that actively codify, monitor, and 
document the city’s rapidly expanding space.  
Precarious Pipes has thus put forth the idea that rule in Pakistan’s largest city, in as 
much as this means the ability to order and structure physical space – is not a function of 
the gap between a material reality and an abstracted, ideal-typical representation of what 
ought to be. Instead, it is what Timothy Mitchell (1988: 60) calls “an order that works by 
appearance.” Representations of order in Karachi, in other words, are part of a 
power/knowledge nexus that reproduces seemingly obvious expressions of disorder – 
such as “unplanned” spaces, “slums”, and “informality” – as examples of legible, 
governed social categories. In addition to making this argument, this dissertation has also 
made three additional claims relating to postcolonial state power and everyday politics in 
the preceding chapters, namely: 1) the reproduction of the state through empowered 
discourse; 2) urban “informality” as lived experience; and 3) the politics of appropriation. 
Below, I take each in turn. 
 
Reproducing the “State” 
Social science scholarship has criticized efforts to “bring the state back in” (see Evans et 
al., 1985) as a standalone that is conceptually distinct from society. For instance, in his 
influential works, Joel Midgal (1988; 2001) argues that states and societies are mutually 
constitutive of one another and collectively implicated in structuring everyday life. For 
Midgal, the state is not a fixed object that can be delineated in terms of a distinct set of 
actors, institutions, and processes. Instead, it is a social, spatial, and political “empirical 




laden social practices and historicized subjectivities.108 Moreover, in contrast to both 
positivists and constructivist perspectives, Timothy Mitchell (1991: 94) argues that the 
state is neither a fixed, objectively identifiable actor that controls society nor a subjective 
figment of discourse. Instead, it is a web of power relations that is experienced as a 
“metaphysical effect of practice that make such [state and society] structures appear to 
exist.” These and similar critiques show that studying and understanding the “state” 
requires placing empirical focus on the processes through which the entity’s perceived 
boundaries with society are drawn, redrawn, and enacted.  
This approach is particularly useful in examining the militarily “overdeveloped” 
postcolonial state in South Asia (see Alavi, 1972; Daechsel, 2011) that, while in control of 
its borders, is still struggling to provide necessities like housing, water, and sanitation to a 
majority of its citizens. Given the central role of cities in regulating the globalized flow of 
goods, capital, and people (Sassen, 2013) urban processes of postcolonial state formation 
are thus highly significant in South Asia. Of particular importance are the various 
cultural, economic, and political logics through which cities are dichotomized into 
“formal” and “informal” spaces, practices, and relationships, often understood to mirror 
legitimate state or state sanctioned and illegitimate non-state spaces respectively. As 
Boudreau and Davis (2017: 152) write in a special issue on informality in Current Sociology: 
“dichotomization, that is, the discursive and ideological imperative to separate the formal 
and the informal, the public and the private, the traditional and the modern, or even the 
advanced and the backward” is one of the main mechanisms through which the modern 
state is “able to centralize legitimate authority at the expense of other forms of political 
authority (such as traditional chiefdom, urban guilds, or the like).”  
                                                 
108 Noah Coburn (2011), for instance, demonstrates how communities in the village of Istalif, 
Afghanistan create the idea of the state “as useful fiction” to promote social order even as state 




The idea that the state can define the “informal” as something that is uniquely 
pathological to itself (Scott, 1998) has given rise to two strands of urban scholarship. The 
first, which I address in the subsequent section, is that urban informality – in as much as 
this entails unregulated “social and culturally embedded frameworks of access and 
belonging” (Björkman, 2015: 6) – is a way for excluded populations to resist, contest, and 
otherwise subvert political authority (for instance, see Bayet, 2010; Chatterjee, 2004). The 
second strand sheds light on how the state actively extends its political authority by both 
creating distinctions between the formal/informal and seeking to formalize, regulate, or 
eradicate the informal.109 For instance, colonial rulers in the past, in creating distinctions 
between formal potable water and informal non-potable water, gave racialized 
distinctions between the white colonizer and non-white native material form while also 
defining the ambit of political authority (Kooy and Bakker, 2008). In more recent times, 
postcolonial rulers have created categories like the “dirty slum” (Doshi, 2013; Ghertner, 
2015; Soederberg, 2018; Wu, 2016) or the “illegal” water connection (Björkman, 2014b; 
Kooy, 2014) to identify certain social practices and physical spaces as needing 
rehabilitation, particularly in order to create the so-called world-class city. By creating 
these categories, state power not only defines what is outside its ambit of governance, 
but actively extends its political authority by targeting what is deemed “informal” as an 
object of intervention and correction.  
The assumption in this otherwise important critical work is that rulers define what is 
unregulated by laws, codified procedures, and formal rules in order to circumscribe what 
is antithetical to a teleological process of development.110 But in Karachi, “informal” 
                                                 
109 For instance, in his study of Lesotho,James Ferguson’s (1994) shows how development 
discourses both de-politicize and strengthen state power by defining what is “undeveloped” and 
thus subject to intervention.  
110 In her recent work, Malini Ranganthan (2018) notes that “improvement” has constantly 
undergirded how colonial and postcolonial urban planners viewed and continue to view the 
Indian city of Bangalore. Though seemingly aimed at bettering the city through various urban 




social and economic activity – while defined and presented as existing parallel to the state 
– is no longer considered a threat to urban redevelopment. Rather, in line with a shift in 
global development discourses during the mid-1970s, legislators, civil society activists, 
and planners have come to view “informality” – in particular, the work of local leaders 
and community-based organizations – as decisive in Karachi’s transformation to a livable 
city. Chapter two, “Forecourt of the Nation” traced how this shift in thinking was 
codified through “regularization” policies in the late 1980s which, rather than advocating 
evictions and resettlement as had often been the case, sought to provide legal tenure and 
urban services to the city’s growing ad-hoc housing settlements. Crucial to this process 
was the discursive production of “regularized” katchi abadis as unique forms of land use 
that were simultaneously “formal” and “informal” – existing as both part of and outside 
the state. This was most clearly articulated in the so-called “external/internal” 
development model (as described in the 1993 Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority 
(Regularisation, Improvement, and Development) Regulations) which effectively 
demarcated specific developmental roles for state institutions – such as the Sindh Katchi 
Abadis Authority, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, and various other municipal 
bodies – on one hand, and relational networks of community organization and grassroots 
development on the other. Subsequent master plans further entrenched the 
“external/internal” model of development, including the various roles expected of state 
and non-state actors. For instance, the 2007 Karachi Strategic Development Plan stated 
that: “While the government will make substantial investments in trunk infrastructure, 
the residents will be encouraged to improve their living conditions” (Master Planning 
Group of Offices, 2007: 66).  
                                                                                                                                            
century. Attempts to improve Bangalore through racialized, class-based, and market based 
reforms from 1890 to present, Ranganathan argues, successively justified one another in a 
constant cycle of betterment while enabling capitalist accumulation. Colonial rulers in South Asia, 
moreover, enacted a unique form of bio-politics by defining the racialized and cultural other as 




With planners continuing to endorse an external/internal logic of urban development, 
the construction of local community organizations or non-state, unregulated 
provisioning of urban services like water as “informal” is further incorporated into how 
official procedures are expected to work. More than highlighting a particular approach to 
urban redevelopment, then, chapter two demonstrated how the external/internal and 
formal/informal dichotomy, which planners once used to justify evicting “kutcha” 
[impermanent] settlements in order to make room for neatly organized “neighborhood 
units” (MRV, 1967: 114), has since been repurposed and integrated as part of a 
systematic system of governance in Karachi.  
This did not occur with rulers defining the informal as a backward or undeveloped 
domain that needed to be targeted for rehabilitation. Rather, by highlighting the need for 
things such as a community’s “human and material resources”111, indigenous “social 
structures” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 1974: 33), and “internal development” 
(Government of Sindh, 1994: 9) in processes of urban renewal, Karachi’s planners since 
the mid-1970s framed informality as a legible – and legitimate – form of social practices in 
and of itself. But the Government of Sindh’s approval of informality amounted to more 
than creating special allowances or “zones of exception” for unplanned areas.112 Instead, 
in Karachi the “informal sector” as it is often described in planning documents is an 
abstracted social category created by planners in order to conceptualize and render 
legible different kinds of human activity – much like rulers historically created scientific 
abstractions, such as economic growth, public health, development, and, more recently, 
urban “resilience” (see Braun, 2014; Escobar, 2012; Foucault, 1991; Scott, 1998). 
                                                 
111 https://skaa.sindh.gov.pk/ 
112 For instance, in his analysis of Jakarta’s water reforms in the 1990s, Michael Kooy (2014: 48) 
has argued that Indonesia’s New Order government actively prefers certain populations engage 
in informal practices and that, as such, informality is “a function of the historically mediated, 
political, process of development the state encourages.” Yet, as Kooy also shows, while informal 
water access is encouraged in particular “zones of exception”, the state nevertheless sees 




Informal relations and practices – or those practices that remain unregulated by codified 
rules and laws – are thus coopted and incorporated into how the state enacts its 
authority.  
As such, the case of Karachi is indicative of how urban processes of state formation 
entail de-dichotomizing socially constructed distinctions between the so-called 
formal/informal, legal/illegal and developed/undeveloped and creating new social 
categories in ways that contradict a straightforward teleological process of 
modernization. In Karachi, the “regularization” of unplanned areas as katchi abadis that 
are simultaneously formal and informal; unplanned and legal; and rationalized yet 
irrational (according to preexisting understandings of these constructed categories, no 
less) is emblematic of how new objects of legibility are constructed. Though the state 
may struggle to exert spatial authority, enact discipline, and infiltrate society through 
traditional means, it is nevertheless able to reproduce itself by discursively constructing 
and incorporating within its regulatory ambit distinct social categories – including those 
that seem antithetical to its own formalized domain.  
This theoretical argument entails two further observations pertaining to how the 
modern postcolonial state functions. The first concerns an often-cited distinction 
between the strong “contractual” European or North American state that facilitates the 
needs of its citizens and the “predatory” weak postcolonial state as an extractive and 
coercive entity that caters to powerful groups like the military or political parties (de Wit, 
1996).113 As Ananya Roy writes (2003: 139) in her analysis of the Communist Party of 
India, states in the latter sense are replete with regulatory ambiguities resembling an 
“ensemble of everyday and extraordinary practices”, many of which are not codified or 
proceduralized. As such, the predatory postcolonial state is inherently informalized for 
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Roy, consisting of a continuous regime of actors that blur the lines between what is 
official and what is not (see also, Roy, 2009). Yet, while this may certainly be true in 
institutionally weak contexts such as Pakistan, chapter two shows that “informality” is 
not just a regulatory ambiguity that powerful actors can exploit to enact discipline and 
spatial control through extralegal and sometimes illegal means and actors. Instead, 
informality is also an official, conceptual category in and of itself that is part of the very 
knowledge/power nexus through which states, postcolonial or otherwise, seek to rule.   
The second concerns the degree to which states are restructured in the face of post 
Washington Consensus-era market influence.114 For instance, Bob Jessop (1996: 263-264) 
has argued that liberalization and globalization have entailed the “hollowing out” of the 
nation-state, entailing a shift from “government to governance” which includes “a set of 
quasi and non-state actors in a variety of state functions.” As Roy (2003: 66) writes, 
however, Jessop’s hollowed out state does not portend the dominance of markets, but 
“new regimes of regulation” that are characterized by the “the territorial and functional 
reorganization of state capacity”. In Karachi, as market ideology over the past two 
decades has collided with continued advocating for katchi abadis as crucial to urban 
redevelopment, there has been a retrenchment of the state as an entity. For instance, the 
2007 Karachi Strategic Development plan, in exploring how the external/internal model 
of urban development from the 1980s may be better implemented, advocates a role for 
“public-private partnerships” in such areas as housing and service delivery, going as far as 
to state that the “role of the private developers… in the informal sector needs to be 
further promoted by way of unstunted cooperation between the public sector agencies 
and the private developers” (Master Planning Group of Offices, 2007: 66). While 
informality here is conceptualized as part of market logic facilitating urban development, 
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this logic also gives planners a new set of ideological tools with which to reinforce the 
discursive construction of katchi abadis as urban spaces that are nevertheless part of the 
formal state. Specifically, by recasting the “internal”, community-level process of 
development as bottom-up, entrepreneurial activity, market logic discursively demarcates 
the respective roles of formal institutions and (now market-based) informal actors while 
keeping intact the external/internal development model. 
 
Lived Informality  
Scholars across a plethora of disciplinary boundaries have recognized the resilience of the 
urban poor in the face of state and market predation as a kind of agency. Engaging in an 
unregulated domain of “flexibility, negotiation, or situational spontaneity that push back 
against established state regulations and the constraints of the law” (Boudreau and Davis, 
2017: 155), urban populations in both the Global South and North are able to make 
space for themselves in contexts that are, by most accounts, inhospitable toward their 
presence. As Hernando De Soto (2002; 2003) argues, these actions are an agentic 
response to burdensome regulations and weak institutions that lock the poor out of the 
global economy. Yet, such narratives are not only espoused by advocates of market 
hegemony such as De Soto. They are also central to postcolonial scholarship which sees 
the everyday strategies of urban populations to access housing, urban services, and 
livelihoods as akin to political acts of “subsistence” (Bayat, 1997, 2010; McFarlane, 2011) 
or full scale resistance and bottom-up democratization in the face of state and market 
exclusion (Appadurai, 2002; Benjamin, 2008).  
Such scholarly perspectives on everyday politics are a welcome pushback against 
Eurocentric models of state formation and citizenship (North et al., 2009; Rotberg, 2003; 




action has since taken root in development circles as well. For instance, a cursory glance 
at the United Nation’s 2017 “New Urban Agenda” shows multiple references to “slum 
and informal-settlement dwellers” and the challenges they face in an urbanizing world. At 
the same time, the New Urban Agenda also recognizes how these populations contribute 
to and sustain formally regulated domains of economic and social activity. For instance, 
article 59 states that:  
We commit ourselves to recognizing the contribution of the working poor in the 
informal economy, particularly women, including unpaid, domestic and migrant 
workers, to the urban economies, taking into account national circumstances. 
Their livelihoods, working conditions and income security, legal and social 
protection, access to skills, assets and other support services, and voice and 
representation should be enhanced. A progressive transition of workers and 
economic units to the formal economy will be developed… We will take into 
account specific national circumstances, legislation, policies, practices and 
priorities for the transition to the formal economy. 
 
The New Urban Agenda indicates that urban “informality” has shed its reputation as 
a social-ill that impedes economic, social, and political development.115 This recognition 
has gone hand in hand with so-called slum legalization and improvement programs 
gaining prominence in development circles since the 1970s which seek to incorporate the 
urban poor’s unregulated economic activities as part of public-private partnerships 
between state officials and grassroots actors. Such projects are grounded in the idea – 
promoted by development institutions such as the World Bank – that state-sanctioned 
institutions and actors, including both public and private, alone cannot address the needs 
of growing urban populations (see Cammett et al., 2014; Marin, 2009; van Horen, 2000). 
As such, grassroots actors and community based organizations are not only seen as 
pillars of support for the formal sector, but part and parcel of the development process 
given their ability to provide situated knowledge, facilitate infrastructure and service 
delivery projects at the local level, and make collaborative governance possible (see UN-
                                                 
115 See, for instance, a 2004 report published by consultants McKinsey Global Institute that 




Habitat, 2007; World Bank, 2017). For development practitioners, slum legalization and 
improvement, rather than top-down urban planning alone, is a tried, tested, and inclusive 
solution for urban inequality, particularly in weak institutional contexts besieged by urban 
growth.116 
Perhaps the most well-known project of “slum-improvement” comes from Karachi 
itself. Beginning as a small-scale initiative to provide low-cost sanitation infrastructure to 
a collection of illegal settlements on Karachi’s northeastern periphery, the Orangi Pilot 
Project gave rise to the “external/internal” model of development that was later codified 
in the 1987 Sindh Katchi Abadis Act (Bano, 2017). Since then, the OPP has gone on to 
become a world-renown model of grassroots development (Boyatzis and Khawaja, 2014; 
Sami, 2009; Satterthwaite et al., 2015; Zaidi, 2001). Over the course of three decades, the 
OPP has helped residents transform the settlement of Orangi Town from a peripheral 
territory devoid of government support, basic sanitation, housing, and access to water, to 
a thriving and livable urban area home to over 1.2 million people. Residents have worked 
with civil society actors, urban activists, and state institutions to establish low-cost 
housing, communally regulated water access, education, healthcare, family planning and 
micro-credit programs (Ahmed and Sohail, 2003; Hasan, 1995). While the OPP is a 
model in which civil society and the state play a critical role in providing technical 
support, its philosophy is based on the continued recognition of the role of informal 
community and grassroots actors in the development process::  
People build their houses incrementally… Initially the land supplier (who is a 
resourceful person having links with politicians, government departments and the 
private operators) arranges the supply of water through water tankers and 
transportation (i.e. bus routes). As the settlement expands and consolidates, need 
for water supply, sewage disposal, schools and clinics arises…  People lobby with 
government for facilities but due to lack of or adhoc government response, they 
soon undertake self-help initiatives…  OPP decided to strengthen people’s 
initiatives with social and technical guidance. It is demonstrated through the 
programs that at the neighborhood level people can finance, manage and 
                                                 




maintain facilities like sewerage, water supply, schools, clinics, solid waste 
disposal and security. Government's role is to compliment people's work with 
larger facilities like trunk sewers and treatment plants, water mains and water, 
colleges/universities, hospitals, main solid waste disposals and land fill sites. The 
component-sharing concept clearly shows that where government partners with 
the people, sustainable development can be managed through local resources.117  
 
The OPP is an ongoing example of how residents at Karachi’s peripheries have relied 
on both formal and technical support and middlemen, political patrons, and community-
based organizations to acquire land, housing, and urban services.118 But, as informality 
becomes a buzzword for hitherto untapped potential in developmental circles (see 
Hasan, 2006), we are confronted with the important question of how to understand the 
actions of the populations who engage daily in unregulated economic practices, develop 
situated knowledge and unique skills, and generally make life possible by navigating both 
formal rules and everyday relationships such as kinship and friendship. I suggest this 
requires a methodological shift that looks at “informality” as more than just a tool of 
“critical analysis” in studying large-scale processes such as urbanization (see Banks et al., 
2020 as a recent example). Instead, informality can also be explored as what Clifford 
Geertz (2001 [1985]) describes as an “experience-near” concept for social groups who 
make up and navigate messy, diverse urban political economies.119  
As chapters three and four demonstrated, for some of Samandar Colony’s residents, 
“informal” relations and practices that facilitate access to water created pervasive social, 
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between political and civil society, both developmental and scholarly perspectives are increasingly 
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people and places as they need to know to reconstruct in the role of theory in ethnographic 
research.” For Duneier, while highlighting lived experiences does not eliminate this conundrum, 
it does allow “learning from the site” (Ibid: 1566) if theoretical concepts are actively interrogated 




political, and financial marginalization. Chapter three showed that in a context where 
access to water is largely secured through unregulated economic exchanges with water 
vendors, this is not necessarily glorified as a “push back against established state 
regulations and the constraints of the law” (Boudreau and Davis, 2017: 155). Chapter 
three showed that, while seen as entrepreneurial stopgaps in large water distribution 
systems by development circles (Ayalew et al., 2014; Casey et al., 2006; Ishaku et al., 
2010; Onyenechere et al., 2012; Vasquez at al., 2009; Whittington et al., 1991), water 
vending were attributed meanings of helping oneself (“apni madat āap”) and making do 
(“guzāra”) by Samandar Colony’s residents. Such meanings, while indicative of purposeful 
coping mechanisms in the face of precarity, did not amount to instances of agency or 
everyday subversion. Indeed, these far less celebratory lived experiences of unregulated 
water access were captured in how residents describe Samandar Colony as an “Allah 
waris” community; a community “forsaken by god.” 
Chapter four, “Our Job is to Inform” further showed how councilors, big men, and 
political patrons created hydraulic uncertainty by constantly negotiating Samandar 
Colony’s pumping schedules amongst themselves. While the wari [turn] system did ensure 
that all three of the settlement’s pumping zones received bulk water from the Karachi 
Water and Sewerage board (KWSB), it was also subject to constant changes as influential 
local leaders worked with the KWSB machine operators to direct the flow of water. As 
the ongoing dispute between different pumping zones as well as the ad-hoc creation of a 
third zone in mid-2017 described in this chapter showed, the wari system was highly 
politicized for residents of Samandar Colony. Accusations of “valve politics” (valve ki 
siyasat) where local leaders were criticized for “playing politics on water” by distributing it 
unequally among different parts of the settlement were so common that KWSB machine 
operators were forced to demonstrate their “neutrality” in matters of water distribution. 




with competing narratives of “valve politics” and “neutral work”, chapter four thus 
demonstrated how the authority of local “informal sovereigns” (Hansen and Stepputat, 
2006: 297) in this context reproduced lived experience of uncertainty for Samandar 
Colony’s residents. Indeed, the uncertainty in everyday water access was so pronounced 
that accessing information about the settlement’s bulk water supplies became part and 
parcel of accessing potable water.  
As chapters three and four demonstrated, for many of Samandar Colony’s residents 
the small-scale vending and the authority of local leaders – what development 
practitioners often describe as instances of “informality” – were associated with lived 
experiences of everyday precarity. In making this argument, I do not seek to discredit the 
considerable efforts of the urban poor across the Global South and North to live decent 
lives. Nor do I cast doubt on the significant gains made the OPP and similar projects in 
addressing structural urban inequalities. Nor, finally, do I suggest that increasing 
formalization as seen in, for example, large-scale urban redevelopment projects and slum 
demolitions do not also serve as significant sources of uncertainty. Instead, I seek to show 
how adopting an experience-near approach to the study of urban informality can both 
reinvigorate our understandings of so-called subaltern lifeworlds as well as help place 
them within larger processes of urban stasis and transformation. In Karachi, for instance, 
a focus on the meaning-laden nature of everyday “informality” shows that the city’s poor 
not only understand their own precarity, but actively seek to work through it rather than 
opting for social mobilization and overt resistance.  
This leads to an interpretation of everyday life in Karachi that cannot be described as 
subversive insurgency (Scott, 2000). Nor, however, should the lack of subtle acts 
resistance be read as a straightforward reproduction of structural abjection without 
contestation as scholars have argued to be the case in similar circumstances. For instance, 




Swistun (2009) argue that the lack of overt resistance despite ongoing pollution in 
shantytowns signals an internalization of hardship and misery in which people are unable 
to conceive of better living circumstances.120 Indeed, in working to cope with their living 
circumstances, Samandar Colony’s residents act purposively to address hardships beyond 
their control, even deploying the temporally-bounded, frantic, and institutionalized 
moments of elections towards alleviating their daily precarity.  
 
Politics by Appropriation 
Scholars are critical of Pakistan’s democratic hopes despite the longest stint of successive 
civilian rule since 2008. For instance, a special issue of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics devoted entirely to “Electoral Fraud and Manipulation in India and Pakistan” 
seeks to explore “fraud, violence and manipulation as a vernacular assemblage of 
practices, discourses and representations that shape and are shaped by local political 
histories” (Martin and Picherit, 2020: 3). As Paul Rollier (2020: 135) writes in this special 
issue, while powerful candidates at the polls can no longer employ “thuggish tactics” to 
garner votes, they nevertheless project their supremacy “symbolically and within the 
established idiom of modern political rituals.” Others in the special issue argue that 
powerful political parties in Pakistan are able to infiltrate state apparatuses such as the 
police and other bureaucracies to force preferable electoral outcomes (Javid, 2020). Aside 
from these granular, ethnographic accounts, scholars who study Pakistan through the 
more common lens of civil-military relations argue that the successive turnover of 
civilian governments since 2008, while evidence of the military’s reduced preference for 
coups, has nevertheless entrenched a tutelary regime (Samad, 2017). These and similar 
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studies point out that despite the regularity of voting over the last decade, elections in 
Pakistan are marred by practices that stand in the way of “true” democratization.  
The idea that South Asian democracies are somehow deficient when compared to an 
ideal-typical, universalized view of electoral participation is a common critique of 
democratization in the region (see Chandra, 2006; De Witt, 1996; Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007; Wilkinson 2006). Elections in South Asia (and other postcolonial 
contexts) are criticized for engendering undemocratic norms where votes are secured by 
providing short-term, materialistic and particularistic benefits rather than advocating 
specific kinds of social policy. The supposed “illiberal” nature of elections in Pakistan is 
by no means abnormal – even beyond the South Asian context.121 Nevertheless, by 
exploring how powerful actors steer electoral processes, these studies either associate the 
rationality of the everyday voter with utility maximization or overlook it entirely in favor 
of exploring how the powerful reproduce their electoral victories (see Martin, 2020; 
Rollier, 2020 for recent examples of the latter in the context of Pakistan). By contrast, 
other studies of elections in the South Asian context show that seemingly transactional 
exchanges of votes for particularistic benefits such as water, jobs, and cash are spaces of 
meaning in which the urban poor take part to be “seen” by the state and experience their 
rights as citizens (Banerjee, 2011; Carswell and De Neve, 2014). Indeed, by posing the 
question of “why people vote” (see Banerjee, 2014) scholars have shown that elections 
are instances where social groups can engage in significant political performances (Straus 
and O'Brien, 2007).  
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In this light, chapter five “The Prophet’s Ballot” showed how elections – while not a 
space to debate different policies and social platforms – nevertheless provide a brief 
opportunity for Karachi’s urban poor to express their deeply-held desire for a “right to 
the city” in a context of increasing political, social, and environmental uncertainty. 
Chapter five made this argument not only by highlighting how residents of Samandar 
Colony exchanged their votes for particularistic benefits like water and jobs, but also by 
exploring the surprising popularity of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) in the 2018 
general polls, a far right party that campaigned on a distinctly unmaterialistic and vague 
notion of religious morality to garner votes. For the former, while elections in 
settlements like Karachi’s Samandar Colony have always been characterized by 
negotiations over material and particularistic benefits, these exchanges bely broader 
efforts by residents to make the constant, reversible work of settlement possible. Indeed, 
for residents, things like clean streets, reliable livelihoods, and access to potable water – 
however brief – are symbolic of their ability to live decent lives in Karachi. But chapter 
five also showed how residents of Samandar Colony indirectly laid claim to these resources 
and benefits and by extension their place in the city.  
As chapter five further argued, support for the TLP could not solely be explained in 
terms of a pious, working class electorate expressing their religious preferences in a 
fundamentally altered electoral landscape (see Naseemullah and Chhibber, 2018a, 
2018b).122 Rather, it was situated in and emanated from the very material concerns – of 
water, sanitation, jobs, and security – that had always been characteristic of electoral 
politics in the settlement. Chapter five showed that families in Katchi Para voted for the 
TLP over other, more influential political parties because it was a way to restate their 
demand for the very same particularistic benefits that symbolized their capacity to live as 
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deserving citizens of Karachi; a different means to the same end. Here, the garb of 
Islamic proselytization provided an alternative to direct exchanges of votes for benefits; 
as many residents claimed, the TLP would “work for them” – in the sense of providing 
these very benefits – if brought into power.   
As such, chapter five also showed that the politics in this context was neither solely a 
story of informal, claim-making enacted through channels such as patronage or local 
grassroots organization (Appadurai, 2002; Chatterjee, 2004; Weinstein, 2008) nor class-
based electoral mobilization in an altered electoral landscape (Naseemullah and 
Chhibber, 2018a, 2018b). Instead, Karachi’s urban poor “made their own” the TLP’s 
vague and dog whistle message of Khatm-e-Nubuwat [finality of the Holy Prophet] and 
redirected it towards their concerns for more reliable public service access, as well as 
jobs, and government support in general. Of significance here is not that the TLP was 
able to make inroads in a contested set of constituencies. Rather, it was that Samandar 
Colony’s residents made their own the far-right party’s religious message to rearticulate 
their deeply held desire to live less precarious lives. In doing so, Karachi’s urban poor 
engaged in a form of electoral politics that can neither be understood as vote-buying or 
characterized as insurgent, direct vote-for-benefit politics on the other. Instead, in addition 
to the latter, the average TLP supporter in Samandar Colony engaged in appropriation – 
foregoing direct exchanges of votes for benefits in favor of indirect claims to state 
resources. Indeed, this was a story of pirating, plagiarizing, or otherwise taking over the 
discourses of more powerful actors and redirecting them towards predefined political 
possibilities. As Asher Ghertner (2015: 127) writes in his analysis of how “dirty” slum 
communities made a place for themselves in millennial New Delhi by coopting 
discourses of a world-class city: “To ‘partake’ means to participate, but it also means to 




sensibility. In Karachi’s Samandar Colony, residents did this by partaking in and making 
their own the growing discourses of Islamic piety during the 2018 general elections.  
 
Precarious Pasts, Uncertain Futures 
In June 2009, Asia Bib, a Christian farm laborer from Punjab was dragged out of her 
home by police, beaten by a mob, arrested, and charged with blasphemy under section 
295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. The events transpired after Asia Bibi was accused by 
neighbors of insulting the Prophet Muhammad in an argument. After she was found 
guilty and sentenced to death in 2010, Asia Bibi’s case garnered considerable attention 
from international and domestic human rights groups arguing against the misuse of 
Pakistan’s blasphemy law. When the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned Asia Bibi’s 
conviction in October 2018 the TLP’s response was swift. In a Twitter post, party leader 
Khadim Husain Rizvi wrote:  
If Asia is found not guilty, despite her confession in public and before trial court, 
and [is] acquitted after 9 years, it can put a big question mark on the [court’s] 
decision. It means there is something rotten in the [the] judicial procedure or 
there is some third umpire making decisions.123  
 
A mere three months after securing a substantial number of votes in the general election, 
TLP leadership was calling on its supporters to clash with the state and kill the justices 
that had dismissed the case against Asia Bibi. Widespread protests gripped Pakistan over 
the next three days as TLP supporters blocked roadways in and out of major urban 
centers, protested in front of government buildings, and clashed violently with police. 
The federal government, meanwhile, attempted to placate the mob with Prime Minister 
Imran Khan pleading with the TLP not to incite violence. After three days of protests, 
the government and TLP came to an agreement in which arrested party workers were 
released and Asia Bibi was barred from leaving the country by being placed on Pakistan’s 





Exit Control List. TLP top brass were arrested for inciting violence against the state but 
later released on bail.  
While certainly the most publicized instance, Asia Bibi’s case is far from the TLP’s 
only foray into national level politics. Party supporters have also been implicated in other 
high-profile cases of alleged blasphemy, some of which have resulted in extra-judicial 
killings.124 Beyond its continued pursuit of Khatm-e-Nubuwat [Finality of the Holy prophet] 
through extra-legal, often violent means, the TLP has also exerted its influence to force 
the federal government to sack ministers and advisors deemed disrespectful of the 
Prophet Muhammad – either by virtue of the official’s political position or because of 
their adherence to specific sects of Islam. Indeed, since 2016, the TLP has shaped the 
ongoing national debate on the role of religion in Pakistan. The party has used its 
considerable street power and a variety of tactics such as electoral contestation, social 
mobilization, and violence against both state institutions and private citizens to demand 
that Sharia (Islamic) Law be implemented nationally through a process of social and 
political change. Funneling matters of state and society through the lens of blasphemy, 
the TLP is fast becoming the social media savvy face of right-wing populism in Pakistan. 
But Pakistan is not alone in this regard. In recent years, populism has become a 
fixture of political contestation across the Global South and North (Aytaç and Öniş, 
2013; Burack and Snyder-Hall, 2012; Casiple et al., 2016; Jaffrelot, 2015). Countries like 
India, the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Hungary, and Brazil have 
all seen xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and anti-Semitic narratives enter mainstream 
politics. In his now widely cited paper Why Populism, sociologist Rogers Brubaker (2017) 
argues that the current populist conjuncture is a product of both structural changes in 
national governance as well as a set of globally connected developments that include 
                                                 
124 The TLP has been indirectly linked to at least two extra-judicial killings between 2018 and 
2019. Both have involved students at Pakistani universities killing their professors for allegedly 




economic recession, the influx of refugees to the west, Islamic terrorism, and post-truth 
media practices. As Brubaker writes, leaders and other political actors have “construed and 
represented as crises” these events in order to stir up populist support (Ibid: 35, emphasis 
in original). Although Brubaker is careful to note that “crisis” is not a neutral descriptive 
term regarding the state of the world, he nevertheless argues that political actors cannot 
construct crises out of nowhere. As such, there is a link between events that can be 
framed as crisis and the rise of populist movements across the globe.  
This dissertation began by describing the now widespread assumption that the world 
is undergoing an “urban crisis” fueled by rising urbanization and poverty. The link 
between urban crises and populist politics may therefore explain the TLP’s electoral 
victories and hitherto non-existent political support in Karachi. Not only is Pakistan’s 
largest city characterized by the unavailability of services, housing, and security, such 
uncertainty is further compounded by policies which encourage city and municipal 
institutions to shift their focus from the needs of the urban poor to the needs of the 
national economy. While politicians and planners push for Karachi to become a 
competitive “world-class city” whose primary goal is to attract capital investment 
(particularly in the real estate sector), urban activists tout self-help and grassroots 
development as tactics to overcome the structural inequality produced by, among other 
things, the very land speculation encouraged by policies that seek to attract capital.125 
These discourses not only responsibilize the urban poor for fostering their own urban 
inclusion by expecting them to invest time, money, and labor into bettering their living 
conditions, they also elide the material realities of abjection, marginalization, and neglect 
that increasingly afflict Karachi and arguably contribute to support for populist agendas 
promising change.  
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Yet, it is also true that the urban poor have inhabited Karachi as precarious citizens 
for much of the city’s history. Indeed, the various crises that are said to affect Karachi – 
including those to do with affordable housing, solid waste management, water access, 
and public health – have a history that stretches all the way back to the British Raj and its 
othering of the city’s indigenous populations.126 While critics rightly point out how 
planning in the millennial age of the world-class city has had exceedingly negative 
impacts on the livelihoods and living conditions of the urban poor (Bhan, 2009; Ellis, 
2012; Ghertner, 2015; Myers, 2015; Watson, 2009b), it is important to note that the 
ensuing insecurity is by no means new for urban populations. It is neither a recent 
historical development nor a special feature of the so-called developing world as 
inhabitants of Karachi, like those of other cities in the Global South and North have 
faced eviction, criminalization, environmental injustice, and racial/cultural profiling for 
decades.127 I do not suggest here that the problems faced by various urban populations 
are not pressing or qualitatively different in contemporary times, especially given the 
exigencies of climate change. Rather, I seek to highlight how support for right-wing, 
populist agendas is not the product of a sudden “urban crisis” – at least in Karachi – but 
situated in a historical context of uncertainty that has increased over time and always 
been a part of the city’s fabric. Historicized in this way, electoral support for the TLP is a 
double-edged sword; on the one hand, it shows how some of the world’s most 
condemned populations continue to find creative ways to express their political 
preferences (amidst intolerable, historic, and ongoing alienation). On the other, as the 
TLP’s rising influence in Karachi’s urban and Pakistan’s national politics indicates, it also 
                                                 
126 As Timothy Weaver (2017) argues, the notion of an “urban crisis” has been deployed to 
counter various structural, economic, and cultural changes in cities of the United States since the 
1950s. For an excellent account of colonial engineer James Strachan’s efforts to plan Karachi 
during the British Raj, see Damohī (2016). 
127 For recent urban scholarship that transcends the traditional theoretical and empirical 
boundary between the Global South and North see Anand et al. (2018), Edensor (2012), and 




shows that such agency has so far come at the cost of empowering political ideas based 
on extremist rhetoric.  
This raises pressing questions about how the rhythms of urban life will adjust in 
response; will Karachi’s poor continue to exist between the shifting dichotomies of 
formal/informal, legal/illegal, and planned/unplanned to protect the precious, reversible 
gains in settlement they have so far secured? Or, caught between dry pipes, broken 
electoral promises, and ambivalent bureaucracies, will they shatter the status quo by 
appropriating and (inadvertently or otherwise) giving voice to dangerous, violent, and 
absolutist discourses of change? Precarious Pipes does not offer a predictive answer to this 
question. Rather, it seeks to dissociate such questions with an underlying preoccupation 
with “new” crises to instead shed light on the deeply historicized and lived experiences 










CDGK: City District Government of Karachi (defunct) JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency WB: World Bank 
GOP: Government of Pakistan     MPGO: Master Planning Group of Offices  UNDP: United Nations  
GOS: Government of Sindh     KWSB: Karachi Water and Sewerage Board  Development Program 
 
Number Date  Text Name Author Document Type  
1 1952 Greater Karachi Plan Merz Rendell Vatten  Master Plan 
2 1952 Water and Sewerage Problems Greater Karachi Harland Bartholomew Third Party  
3 1962 The Greater Karachi Resettlement Program MPGO Policy 
4 1969 Master Plan for Karachi Metropolitan Region Vol 1 MPGO Master Plan 
5 1969 Master Plan for Karachi Metropolitan Region Vol 2 MPGO Master Plan 
6 1969 Master Plan for Karachi Metropolitan Region Vol 3 MPGO Master Plan 
7 1974 The Karachi Development Plan 1974-1985 MPGO Master Plan 
8 1979 Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations  MPGO Policy 
9 1982 Karachi, Physical Situation of Human Settlement MPGO Report 
10 1985 Karachi Special Development Report WB/GOP Report 
11 1987 SKAA Katchi Abadis Act 1987 GOS Legal 
12 1988 Second Karachi Water Supply and Sanitation Project  WB/GOP Report 




14 1991 Karachi Development Plan 2000 MPGO /UNDP Master Plan 
15 1991 Karachi Master Plan 1986-2000 MPGO /UNDP Report 
16 1994 SKAA (Regularization, Improvement, Development) Regulations 1993 GOS Legal 
17 1996 Karachi Water and Sewerage Board Act GOS Legal 
18 2002 Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations  GOS Legal 
19 2006 The Study of Water Supply and Sewerage Systems in Karachi  KWSB/JICA Report 







SCRIPTED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1) Do you get line water [piped water] in your community? 
2) What is the system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] here? 
3) Is the system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] good or bad here? 
4) Is the system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] the same in other 
communities/parts of the city? 
5) Did you get potable water in the past? 
6) Do people sometimes have fights over water in your community? 
7) Whose responsibility is it to give you water? 
8) Has any political party done work for you now or in the past? 
9) Do you get water when there are elections? 







LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Samandar Colony Residents  




1 1 F 65+ HP Hindu Gujrati 1 6/19/17 
2 
 
F 30-40 HP Muslim Gujrati 
 
6/19/17 
3 2 M 30-40 HP Muslim Pashtun 2 6/22/17 
4 3 M 65+ HP Muslim Unknown 3 6/24/17 
5 4 F 65+ HP Hindu Gujrati 4 7/12/17 
6 
 










M 20-30 HP Hindu Sindhi 
 
7/12/17 
9 5 F 65+ HP Hindu Unknown 5 7/13/17 
10 6 F 65+ KP Muslim Kutchi 6 7/17/17 
11 
 










M 20-30 KP Muslim Kutchi 
 
7/17/17 
14 7 M 65+ HP Muslim Sindhi 7 7/19/17 
15 8 M 40-50 HP Muslim Pashtun 8 8/1/17 
16 
 






17 9 M 65+ KP Muslim Kutchi 9 6/1/18 
18 
 










M 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 
 
6/1/18 
21 10 M 40-50 KP Muslim Pashtun 10 6/3/18 
22 
 
M 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 11 6/3/18 
23 
 
M 30-40 KP Muslim Pashtun 12 6/3/18 
24 
 
M 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 13 6/3/18 
25 11 M 30-40 KP Muslim Kutchi 14 6/5/18 
26 12 M 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 15 6/8/18 
27 
 
M 20-30 KP Muslim Kutchi 16 6/8/18 
28 13 M 30-40 HP Hindu Sindhi 
 
6/10/18 
29 14 F 50-60 HP Hindu Unknown 17 6/12/18 
30 
 
M 50-60 HP Hindu Unknown 
 
6/12/18 
31 15 F 50-60 KP Muslim Kutchi 18 6/14/18 
32 
 
F 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 19 6/14/18 
33 
 
F 20-30 KP Muslim Kutchi 
 
6/14/18 





M 20-30 HP Hindu Sindhi 20 6/20/18 
36 17 F 20-30 KP Muslim Unknown 21 6/23/18 
37 18 F 30-40 HP Hindu Gujrati 22 6/24/18 
38 
 
M 30-40 HP Hindu Gujrati 
 
6/24/18 
39 19 F 30-40 HP Hindu Sindhi 23 6/28/18 
40 
 
M 30-40 HP Hindu Sindhi 
 
6/28/18 
41 20 F 30-40 HP Muslim Gujrati 24 7/1/18 




43 22 M 50-60 HP Hindu Unknown 26 7/3/18 





F 40-50 HP Muslim Sindhi 
 
7/6/18 
46 24 M 30-40 HP Hindu Gujrati 27 7/8/18 
47 
 
F 30-40 HP Hindu Gujrati 
 
7/10/18 
48 25 M 30-40 HP Hindu Unknown 28 7/14/18 
49 26 F 50-60 HP Hindu Unknown 29 8/7/18 
50 
 
M 40-50 HP Hindu Unknown 
 
8/7/18 
51 27 M 40-50 KP Muslim Kutchi 30 8/9/18 
52 28 M 40-50 HP Muslim Pashtun 31 8/12/18 
53 29 F 20-30 KP Muslim Kutchi 32 8/16/18 
Samandar Colony Local Leaders 










M 50-60 SC Christian Unknown 
 
7/2/17 
57 31 M 40-50 HP Muslim Pashtun 33 7/3/17 
58 
 
M 20-30 HP Muslim Pashtun 
 
7/3/17 
59 32 M 50-60 HP Muslim Pashtun 
 
7/3/17 
60 33 M 30-40 HP Hindu Sindhi 34 7/8/17 
61 
 
M 30-40 HP Hindu Sindhi 
 
7/8/17 
62 34 M 50-60 HP Hindu Gujrati 35 6/20/18 
63 
 
M 50-60 HP Hindu Sindhi 
 
6/20/18 
64 35 M 50-60 HP Muslim Pashtun 36 7/1/18 
Karachi Water and Board Machine Operators  
65 36 M 40-50 N/A N/A N/A 37 6/29/18 






M 40-50 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7/17/18 
68 38 M 40-50 N/A N/A N/A N/A 8/13/18 
Karachi Water and Board Management 
69 39 M 65+ N/A N/A N/A N/A 1/6/17 
70 40 M 50-60 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1/17/17 
Technocrats 
71 41 M 50-60 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1/12/17 
72 42 M 20-30 N/A N/A N/A N/A 6/29/17 
73 43 M 30-40 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7/13/17 
74 
 
F 20-30 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7/13/17 










Codes related to methods of water access in Samandar Colony 
 
1) Awami (People’s) Tanks 
This is a practice by which people line up to receive water from small tanks, usually filled 
by political parties and distributed by a cadre or someone similar.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents describe their experience accessing, and trying to access, water from these 
tanks. While these descriptions are often inseparable from discussions of voting and 
elections, descriptions of the frequency, quality, and reliability of this method are 
prioritized here. Evidence might also include field notes where the author directly 
observes the distribution of water supplies through various tanks. 
Example:  
X tells me that PTI and PPP, on occasion, distribute water. “I don’t know if they have a 
schedule. They have tanks that they give water through. People line up with their 
containers and collect water.” Does this happen only during elections? I ask. Imran tells 
me he’s not sure when or why they distribute water. Only that, elections are currently a 
long way away, but PTI and PPP are still distributing water. “I don’t know if it depends 
on their mood or what…”  




2) Bore-well Connections:  
Bore-well connections are ubiquitous in Samandar Colony and are often undocumented 
and self-constructed. These bore wells are used to share water between households.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents talk about the various advantages and disadvantages of accessing water 
through bore-well connections. A respondent does not have to have a bore-well to 
discuss this method, as the benefits and subsequent maintenance costs of a bore-well in 
one household is shared with neighbors who don’t have a connection of their own. 
Example:  
“I can’t afford a water motor, and there isn’t any water in the line, so I buy sweet water 
by the gallon. For other needs, like washing clothes and dishes, I use brackish water. I get 
this water from neighbors who have had boring done. It doesn’t cost me anything. But 
when the boring pump breaks down or stops working, the owner asks us all to 
contribute to repair it because we all use it. But we need to mix brackish water with sweet 
water to do household chores. The brackish water doesn’t mix well with dish soap or 
detergent, so we need to add sweet water.”  
– Interview, July 2017 
3) Piped Water: 
Most houses in Samandar Colony have piped connections. Those that don’t either a) had 
a connection in the past that is now obsolete b) could not afford the financial investment 
required to make a connection c) can afford the financial investment but don’t see the 
point in having a pipe connection if others’ pipes are dry more often than not.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents describe their experience accessing, and trying to access, piped water. 




with trying to get piped connections, opinions on the value of piped connections, and 
past experiences with piped connections. Discussions of who is or isn’t getting line water 
in the community are not included a priori but are included if they are related with a 
personal experience of piped water access.  
Example:  
We talk a little bit about how the women have to wake up in the early hours of the day to 
turn the motor on. X tells me she is alerted by a shopkeeper close by on the days water is 
suspected. “I wake up and turn the motor on. Sometimes the water comes sometimes it 
doesn’t. Sometimes I stay awake till 4 or 5am and nothing happens. Sometimes the water 
comes but stops after 10 minutes. Whenever it does come, it comes very slowly.”  
– Fieldnotes, June 2017  
4) Water Vendors: 
The most common way to access water in Samandar Colony is through unregulated 
water vendors who sell water per the gallon. This method of access might qualify as 
“informal” access in the sense that it is not regulated by the state, at least in terms of 
price-setting.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents describe their experience accessing, and trying to access, piped water. 
Descriptions are limited to personal experiences with vendor water.  
Example:  
UF: What is the system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] here? 
X: The system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] here is that we have to buy it. About three 
years ago one gallon used to cost about 5 rupees. Now it costs 40 rupees! This is hard to 




Some might sell it 10 cans for Rs350 others might sell it for Rs400 or Rs500. These are 
poor people and they can’t afford it. But they need water to drink.  
– Interview, June 2018 
 
Codes related to lived experiences of water access in Samandar Colony 
 
1) “Āsra” [hope]: 
Respondents use the phrase “āsra dena” [giving hope] to describe how elected officials 
make promises about delivering water to households.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents describe specific instances of promises made to deliver piped water (and 
generally, public services). Respondents also describe the general practice of elected 
officials/election hopefuls/local elders making promises. Respondents also describe the 
meanings behind āsra (when asked directly).  
Example: 
UF: Why is it [elected representatives’] responsibility [to give water]? 
X: Because we voted for them. But they just give us āsra. They shouldn’t give āsra. They 
should do our work. They never say no. They always say the work will be done. But 
when it will be done, nobody knows. We know they are lying. 
- Interview, July 2018 
2) Abjection: 
The idea that Samandar Colony is ignored by elected officials and formal institutions 
such as the water board.  




Language and experiences describing feelings of being ignored and taken advantage of. 
Respondents may be describing personal feelings of abjection as well as a wider 
community sentiment of abjection.  
Example:  
Samandar Colony is Karachi’s oldest settlement, says X. But nobody has done anything 
for this community despite the fact that Bilawal House is next door and the PPP has 
dominated local elections for years. If people only look to line their pockets, then what 
can we do? These are those people that are killing us! How can you live without water? 
There is a lot of cruelty with water here, he says.  
– Fieldnotes, June 2017 
3) “Aika Nahi” [Sedenterism}: 
Residents claim or express the belief that people refuse to mobilize to demand better and 
more reliable piped water access or service delivery in general. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents might use language to explain why collective action around the demand for 
water doesn’t work or won’t take place. It is important to distinguish sedentarism from 
abjection. The latter is a code that refers to feelings of being abandoned and his hence 
associated with the acts of other actors (politicians, etc.) The former, however, has 
everything to do with the internal dynamics of a class of actors describing their own lack 
of political engagement.  
Example:  
X: Actually, why do these leaders make money on this? Because our people never 
complain! Nobody goes to our leaders and complains about what is happening to us.  




X: Who should we complain to? Whenever we ask someone they say they don’t have any 
power. So we let it go and come home.  
– Interview, June 2018 
4) “Apni Madat Āap” [Helping oneself]: 
Respondents make direct/indirect references to how they must use their own money, 
personal connections, and sometimes labor to do things like take piped connections to 
the water infrastructure, clear garbage, and pump sewage water. Also describes an 
attitude where the lack of state support does not produce modes of community 
organization and solidarity, but an attitude of “taking care of one’s self”.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents describe instances where they have tried to secure access to public services 
through personal investments in labor and materials. Respondents also describe the 
meanings associated with apni madat āap (when asked directly). 
Example:  
UF: Let’s talk about papers and meters first, you’re saying these are not allowed to you? 
X: No. We are just not given them. We are not getting connections from the water 
board. We don’t have any paperwork for our connections. And we don’t have a water 
board representative here. We help ourselves.  
UF: You help yourselves? How so?  
X: We make the hole (khadda) ourselves. We do the connection ourselves. We take the 
pipe home ourselves.  
Y: For example, I need water. I take a connection from here. Now, the cost of ensuring 
that connection reaches my house which is far away and inside the gulley is on my 




government in such a circumstance. Even the pipe that was laid here before was done on 
our own cost. 
Z: Even if the government gives us pipes that reach our home. There is no water in 
them. This is why we come to the main pipe [on the road] for water. We’ll keep running 
after water and one day we’ll jump into the ocean [laughs].  
– Interview, June 2018 
5) Bills: 
Almost all houses receive water bills (even if they don’t have water connections).  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
This code may include ideas about the legitimacy/illegitimacy of receiving bills, the 
accuracy of billed amounts, and reasons for the payment/non-payment of bills. Bills 
associated with things like electricity only included if they are deployed in conversation 
with reference to water bills. 
Example:  
UF: Do you think people should have to pay for water?  
X: If the government gives you water, then you it’s okay to pay a tax on it. But when 
there isn’t any water we shouldn’t have to pay the government. This isn’t right. We still 
get a water bill. Our last bill was Rs 25,000. Nobody pays this bill, they tear it and throw 
it away. We already pay water vendors about Rs4,000. Isn’t it better that this money go to 
the government? If they give us water in the line this money is good for them. But they 
don’t have enough sense to give us this water.  
– Interview, July 2017 
6) Corruption: 
Respondents express the belief that public officials, including elected officials, local 




explain things like the lack of water by way of suggesting water is illegally monetized and 
sold by the state officials who control the settlement’s supplies. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents use highly normative language describing a wider culture of corruption. 
Respondents may relate both specific, first-hand experiences of corrupt practices as well 
as allude to a general belief held by a wider community. Descriptions of corruption are 
not limited to water but may include experiences with/explanations of other public 
services as well.  
Example:  
“If they give line water free of cost…” “Who is going to pay for their water?” interjects 
X. That’s just it says Y. We’re dependent on them whether we pay or not. I am, for the 
umpteenth time, once again related the story of the PTI and PML-N tankers that were 
shut down so that FA could sell his own tankers. He sells connections, says the man 
behind me. “He recently sold a connection for 36 lacs.” Z knows all about this, continues 
the man as X and Y nod along. And it’s not just this one; he’s been selling connections 
for a long time.  
– Fieldnotes, June 2017 
7) Fights/Violence 
Residents respond to questions about fights/violence over water.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents must describe fights/violence directly (no structural violence). Includes 
language/experiences about why there are/aren’t fights/violence over water, and what 
the nature of these fights and violence may be.  
Example: 




X: The people that gave the 300-line, they said they didn’t want the pathans to get water. 
But we thought, after we fill our own water, it’s better to give it to someone else instead 
of throwing it in the gutter. So, the when the pathan’s children would come, we would 
tell them that the water is coming and to bring gallons to fill. Then some houses 
complained. Some katcha houses said people were giving pathans water so they stopped 
the water. Then what happened is that the pathans got a line in their area. They started 
saying that the katcha should not get water then. They kept fighting and that’s why they 
closed the water. This was two or three years ago. Then when the water was turned on 
again and the same thing happened. So, our people broke the line.  
– Interview, June 2018 
8) Finances: 
Respondents describe the financial costs associated with securing water. Because most 
households have to purchase water from vendors, residents usually discuss how much 
they spend on water gallons per day/month.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Not to be confused with money spent on or owed to water bills. This is limited to 
language or experience which describes the financial aspects (normative/positive) of 
purchasing water from water vendors.  
Example:  
UF: Do you get water here?  
X: I live here. I am 38 years old. I was born here, I own a business here, and I am an 
independently elected councilor as well. Ever since I was elected, the biggest worry 
[parishani) we’ve had is about water… Sometimes water costs Rs. 8,000 a month, 




we buy it] because water is such a thing that – it is god’s gift – not only the living but the 
dead need it too.  
– Interview, June 2018 
9) “Guzāra” [Making Do] 
Residents describe how, rather than looking for long term, reliable solutions to their 
water problems, they make do/subsist through various stop gap means.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents use the word “guzāra” to describe a lived experience/method of water 
access. Respondents may also, without using the word itself, express sentiments of 
“making do” or “living day by day.” 
Example:  
UF: Why don’t people go?  
X: What can I say? We don’t have a connection in any case. 
UF: Is there any particular reason for that?  
X: We usually take water from our neighbors. We get about two or three gallons from 
them and make do [guzāra ho jaata hai]. Or we buy water. 
– Interview, June 2018 
10) “Majboori” [Compulsion] 
Residents claim or express the belief that they are compelled or constrained with the 
system of water access they have.  
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Respondents might use language to describe feelings of compulsion and constraint. It is 
important to distinguish majboori from sedentarism. The latter is a code that refers to a 




sentiment which describes the powerful effect of outside forces. Not something that is 
produced by the community, but something the community must deal with.  
Example: 
UF: Is the system of getting water [pāni ka nizām] here good or bad? [Scripted judgment 
question] 
X: In my opinion it is bad.  
Y: It is very bad. There is no water. We have to buy. The water that we should easily we 
are not getting. If we got water a lot of our problems would be solved. The main thing 
we are worried about is water. Because if we don’t get water everything else becomes a 
problem, cooking, cleaning, everything… 
X: And if we can’t buy water then things are really bad. In the summer, if the sellers 
don’t have tankers then we have to go very far and get water. Then after a few days 
they’ll come to us and say, this is how much a gallon costs (Rs50) if you want it buy it, if 
you don’t want it don’t buy it. 
Y: Then we have to buy it out of desperation [majboori].  
– Interview, June 2018 
11) Self-organization: 
A distinct collection of experiences and meanings from, apni madat āap; these are 
instances when residents talk about or exhibit examples of self-organization to solve 
problems/meet needs that are not being taken through formal/legal channels. They may 
include things like community oversight over the water infrastructure or local 
mechanisms of decision making. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion: 
The key is to distinguish self-organization from apni madat āap. The latter is more of an 




services outside the support of either formal/legal means such as the water board or 
sometimes illegal means as patronage. The former, however, involves language or 
experiences which describe some form of or attempt at community organization in 
which various types of actors are working together to achieve a goal.  
Example: 
X: What also happened was that area (Sultan’s) wasn’t getting any water, just like we 
aren’t getting water here, because they were right at the end. He put in an extra line so 
that water could be sent on a turn by turn basis through two different pipes. We are 
thinking about doing the same here because we’re in the same situation at the end.  
Y: They’re going to be fights over that.  
X: Just listen to me, it’s possible. If all of us get together we can tell them that we’re not 
taking anyone else’s water. The people across the street have their own water, the people 
on this side have their own water, and we have our own. Everyone gets water by turn.  
– Fieldnotes, June 2017 
12) “Zimidāri” [Responsibility] 
Resident discuss whose responsibility it is to give supply line water. 
Inclusion/Exclusion criterion:  
Residents’ interpretations of the individuals/entities responsible for providing line water. 
Includes language and experiences that suggest who is considered responsible for 
supplying water. This is very different from corruption, which is a response that blames 
certain actors for dry pipes. It is entirely possible that those responsible for water are 
considered different from those responsible for no water.  
Example:  
X: If there is an honest person and he sees that someone is laying a water pipe for his 




line. Now the person who’s laying that line, it’s his responsibility [jawab dari] to tell them 
that this line is not for them, it’s for the settlement! He doesn’t say anything to them so 
they take their connections. And that same water then gets taken elsewhere. We end up 
getting the line but we don’t get water. It’s his job, the person who is laying the line for 
us, to stop them and say this line for this area.  
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